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Abstract 
Based on agency theory, this thesis investigates the link between agency costs and 
earnings management (EM) using data from listed public companies in China from 
1999 to 2014. In this thesis, I examine whether EM reduces agency costs in China, 
where companies suffer from agency problems. Using static and dynamic models 
to test the agency costs/EM nexus, I find a significant and positive relationship 
between agency costs and EM based on a static model that suggests opportunistic 
EM in China. These results are consistent with suggestions in the literature that EM 
can be used opportunistically by managers with regard to agency costs (e.g., 
Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Guidry, Leone, & Rock, 1999; Healy, 1985; Holthausen, 
Larcker, & Sloan, 1995). However, I find an insignificant relationship between 
agency costs and EM using a dynamic model that takes into account the 
endogeneity issue. Therefore, my results suggest that engagement in EM has no 
significant influence on agency costs in China. Furthermore, board size, board 
independence, firm size, leverage and CEO duality, which are conventionally 
thought to be important in explaining agency costs, do not have a significant impact. 
The results add support to the growing literature on the relevance of endogeneity 
issues in corporate governance studies, since failing to take these into account can 
lead to spurious results. 
This thesis examines both principal-agent and principal-principal agency costs. The 
concept of traditional principal-agent agency conflict caused by the separation of 
ownership and management was conceived in a developed market context. 
However, in emerging economies, principal-principal agency conflicts are the 
major concerns in corporate governance. Emerging economies are characterized by 
weak legal protection, high information asymmetry, and concentrated ownership 
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structures, which provide the economic and institutional roots for principal-
principal agency conflicts.  
Based on agency theory, Jiraporn, Miller, Yoon, and Kim (2008) relate agency costs 
to the extent of EM, and find the practice of EM, on average, reduces agency 
conflicts in the U.S. In emerging economies, with weak institutional environments 
and highly concentrated ownership structures, managers become affiliated to the 
dominant shareholders, and principal-principal agency costs become prevalent. As 
in other emerging economies, the Chinese market is also subject to characteristics 
such as highly concentrated ownership structures, weak protection for minority 
shareholders and uneven legal enforcement.  Therefore, this thesis accommodates 
principal-agent and principal-principal agency costs in relation to EM in China.  
The endogeneity issue was the major concern when conducting this study. We add 
new empirical evidence to support the growing literature on concerns relating to 
endogeneity issues in corporate governance studies. Consistent with the prior 
studies of Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) and Schultz, Tan, and Walsh (2010), 
I show that failing to take endogeneity issues into account can lead to spurious 
results; therefore, caution must be exerted in making policy implications based on 
empirical results that fail to address endogeneity issues. I expect my results to be of 
great interest to academics involved in researching corporate governance topics that 
have inherited dynamic natures and endogeneity issues.  
As agency cost is a fundamental problem in corporate governance worldwide, this 
study is expected to be of interest to regulatory and supervisory authorities, 
investors, and financial analysts. The findings are inconsistent with what is implied 
by Agency theory, suggesting that corporate governance in China is different; 
therefore conventional western market theory may not fully incorporate the 
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corporate governance dilemmas prevailing in emerging economies. In agreement 
with researchers such as Young, Ahlstrom, and Bruton (2004), I suggest that 
creative solutions need to be explored by emerging economies to resolve their 
particular agency conflicts in their specific institutional contexts, which indicates 
fruitful avenues for future research.  
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1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Outline 
This research investigates the link between earnings management (EM), agency 
costs (AC), and corporate governance (CG) characteristics, using data from listed 
public companies in China. This work is timely, given the emerging position of 
Chinese companies, and is significant as a robust empirical study. 
Earnings are vital in managers’ decision-making processes, companies’ business 
and investment decisions by investors (Chen & Yuan, 2004). The potential to adjust 
accounting numbers, either fraudulently or by the astute use of financial reporting 
rules, is not a new phenomenon. Earnings may not always reflect the real picture of 
a firm’s performance and it is accepted that accounting for financial reporting 
purposes is “a language with some manoeuvring room” (Stolowy & Lebas, 2006, 
p. 8). 
The analysis undertaken is important, highlighting matters relating to information 
flows essential for an efficient capital market.  Linking the behavioural issues 
flowing from agency theory through non-congruent goals to earnings management 
brings to the fore information asymmetry and signalling distortions.  This study is 
beneficial for financial information users to gain a better understanding of the 
available financial information. Given agency conflicts and EM practice tend to 
harm the transparency of the company’s financial status, this study contributes to 
the policymakers to by providing insights to agency conflicts and EM practice in 
China to better supervise the behaviour of listed companies.  This study also 
contributes to the corporate governance literature by extending the literature beyond 
developed markets and providing the first empirical evidence on the role of EM in 
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agency conflicts in China. Last but not least, this study provides further support to 
the growing literature that has raised concerns on endogeneity issue in CG studies 
(e.g., Pham, Suchard, & Zein, 2011; Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012) since 
our results indicate that failing to take endogeneity issues into account can lead to 
spurious results. 
EM is defined as the practices of management to bring reported earnings to the 
desired level (e.g., Ning, 2009). Management’s incentive to change a firm’s 
financial picture to be more favourable connects AC with EM. Agency costs 
comprise both the traditional principal-agent (PA) costs and the emerging principal-
principal (PP) costs. PA agency costs occur because of misaligned interests between 
owner and management, while PP agency costs result from the concentrated 
ownership structure that is prevalent in emerging economies. Based on agency 
theory, EM closely associates with PA; the different interests of ownership and 
management provide motivations for managers to manage earnings to meet their 
objectives and to avoid problems with owners. The EM incentive from the PP 
agency costs perspective is also obvious.  One such example is that the majority 
owner would want to use EM to expropriate profits from minority shareholders or 
to limit the visibility of PP conflict.  
The study is empirical and accommodates both static and dynamic modelling 
frameworks to investigate the association between the level of agency costs and the 
extent of EM in China. Fixed-effect ordinary least squares and generalised least 
squares are used in a static model to address the presence of heteroscedasticity 
issues. A two-step system generalised method of moment is used in the dynamic 
model to take account of the endogeneity problem. 
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The data used for this study were extracted from DataStream and CSMAR. In order 
to merge the data from DataStream and CSAMR, this study developed a series of 
codes by matching the full names of companies. All the variables were winsorized 
with 5% probability to remove the influence of outliers.  
Based on the static model employed, EM, in general, increases AC. However, the 
result of the dynamic model, where the possible impact of historical AC on current 
AC is fully controlled, indicates no significant relation between AC and EM. The 
dynamic model using the two-step system generalised method of moment gives 
sufficient consideration to different sources of endogeneity (e.g., dynamic nature 
inherited in corporate governance variables, omitted variables, measurement error, 
and simultaneity). A static model that fails to consider endogeneity may produce a 
biased and misleading result and the results from a dynamic model are likely to 
provide more reliable inferences. Thus, our result casts doubt on a causal 
relationship between AC and EM. This study indicates that the AC/EM relation is 
subject to endogeneity issues; the past values of agency costs have a positive and 
significant influence on current agency costs.  
Subsection 1.2 justifies the use of the Chinese market as the platform on which to 
conduct the research. Subsection 1.3 notes the significance of the study and 
Subsection 1.4 provides the organisation of the thesis. 
1.2 Chinese context 
Agency costs arise in an effort to resolve agency conflicts and better align the 
interests of ownership and management. A high level of AC indicates inefficient 
monitoring activities and weak corporate governance (Guariglia & Yang, 2016; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Based on agency theory, 
Jiraporn et al. (2008) posit that agency conflicts could induce managers to exploit 
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the flexibility in accounting policies to manage earnings, and they find that EM 
mitigates AC in the US market.  
This study examines the AC/EM nexus in China. I chose China because it is the 
largest emerging economy and it is differs from the US and other developed markets. 
The legal environment in China is relatively underdeveloped compared to the US 
and other developed countries (Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006). It is important to 
study how the AC/EM nexus differs in countries with relatively underdeveloped 
legal environments, such as China, considering the legal environment has 
significant implications for firm performance and corporate governance (e.g., La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). 
Unlike western countries, the Communist party has a strong influence on CG in 
China. For example, the block holders of listed companies in China are often the 
State; China's company law requires Chinese companies to establish supervisory 
boards that typically include officials from the company's internal Communist party 
committee. Senior management staff typically start their careers as government 
bureaucrats, and they tend to have a different mindset to their counterparts in the 
developed markets. Therefore, the relatively underdeveloped legal environment and 
unique CG in China offer an excellent opportunity to examine the impact of EM 
activities on agency costs. 
China is important as the largest emerging economy and the largest recipient of 
foreign direct investment among developing countries (United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, 2017). The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) and the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative 
have further boosted the interest of foreign investors, financial institutions, 
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multinational companies, and academics in the Chinese economy. Therefore, it is 
important to study the CG issue in China in order to provide a better understanding 
for interested parties. 
Agency problems are an important aspect of CG in China (Clarke, 2003). Although 
China has borrowed CG structures from the developed market, only the form of CG 
has been acquired, not the substance (Backman, 1999). Unlike the widespread 
shareholders in the developed market, the ownership structure in Chinese listed 
companies is often State-concentrated. With the presence of highly concentrated 
ownership, the conflict between majority shareholder and minority shareholders 
(PP agency conflict) can become severe in Chinese companies. Although previous 
studies in developed markets suggest that managerial ownership may moderate PA 
agency conflict (e.g., Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000; Singh & Davidson III, 2003), owner 
management is not a panacea for eliminating agency problems (Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Especially in China, managers are rarely significant 
shareholders in listed companies (Jiang & Kim, 2015), indicating serious PA 
agency problems (e.g., Lin, Ming, & Xu, 2006; Xu, Zhu, & Lin, 2005). This thesis 
investigates the AC/EM nexus, taking account of both PA and PP agency costs in 
China. 
1.3 Significance of the study 
Having reviewed the previous studies on EM in China (e.g., Appendix 1),  to the 
best of my knowledge, this is the first study specifically focusing on the 
interrelationships between EM, PA and PP agency costs in China, the world’s 
largest emerging market. The significance of this research, therefore, lies in 
extending the current literature by testing the agency theory-derived hypothesis of 
whether EM is used to mitigate AC in China. 
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Most prior studies on agency conflicts have focused on the developed markets, and 
the literature on AC in emerging economies is limited. There have been calls for 
researching agency costs in emerging economies, and creative solutions need to be 
explored by countries with emerging economies to resolve their particular agency 
conflicts in their own specific institutional contexts  (Young et al., 2004; Young, 
Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008).  This research is designed to investigate 
PA and PP agency costs separately in response to the call for such studies, and to 
deal with agency costs in depth. 
This study is significant for financial information users. The relatively 
underdeveloped legal system negatively influences information asymmetry in the 
Chinese CG, and listed companies in China tend to be less transparent in terms of 
corporate information, which leads to a situation where managers manage earnings 
opportunistically to meet investors’ short-term immediate interests (Wang & 
Claiborne, 2008).  Financial reports provide an important way for financial 
information users to access the firms’ financial position.  Therefore, the quality or 
authenticity of the information provided is crucial for information users. 
Manipulated information can easily mislead investors, as investors are often  fixated 
on earnings and unable to discriminate between the techniques applied to manage 
earnings and the types of fraud that can be applied in financial reports (Ikram, 2013; 
Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001).  Earnings management may distort financial information, 
affecting the authenticity, reliability, and transparency of financial information, 
which can mislead financial information users (see Appendix 2).  By examining the 
AC/EM nexus among listed companies, this study helps financial information users 
gain a better understanding of the available financial information. 
By studying the EM, PA and PP agency costs nexus in China, this study is also 
beneficial to policymakers, such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
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(CSRC hereafter), whose primary goal is to ensure China’s securities and futures 
markets operate in an orderly and legitimate manner. As the highest authority of 
securities supervision and a counterpart of the SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission) in the US, the CSRC exercises unified supervision and management 
of stock market functions.  EM can be driven by stock market purposes, such as 
capital or funding needs, or  to change investors’ perceptions, which has the 
potential to harm the transparency of financial information and investors’ rights to 
access to fair trade. Principal-agent and principal-principal conflicts can also 
disadvantage shareholders, especially small shareholders. Therefore, by 
investigating whether EM mitigates agency conflicts in China, this study creates 
related understanding for CSRC to protect small investors and to supervise the 
behaviour of listed companies and that of their shareholders, who are obligated to 
obey relevant laws and regulations. 
China is the world’s largest emerging market. China and Hong Kong (China) have 
become the second and third largest global foreign direct investment recipients 
since 2012 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2013). With 
its links to the Communist Party, the Chinese market has unique characteristics and 
institutional background, which differentiate it from the developed markets. As 
financial behaviour fluctuates in response to changes in economic circumstances 
(Kaplan, 1985), EM practice and agency conflicts in Chinese companies may not 
fully apply the basic theories developed for developed markets due to the unique 
Chinese context. Considering the uniqueness of the Chinese market and the lack of 
studies on the association between EM and AC in China, this study is significant in 
shedding light on this particular topic. 
Last but not least, this study provides further support to the growing literature that 
has raised concerns on endogeneity issues in CG studies (e.g., Pham et al., 2011; 
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Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012). My results indicate that failing to take 
endogeneity issues into account can lead to spurious results. Therefore, I expect the 
results to be of interest to academics involved in researching CG topics that have 
inherited dynamic nature and endogeneity issues.  
1.4 Summary 
The links between EM and AC are investigated in this study, and this is important 
for at least four reasons. First, this is the first study to investigate the role of EM in 
agency conflict in China in response to the call for researching agency conflict in 
emerging economies. Second, PP agency conflict is given full consideration as one 
important components of agency costs in emerging economies. Third, this study is 
important for Chinese policymakers, such as the CSRC, because it investigates the 
AC/EM nexus in the Chinese institutional setting, which is significantly different 
from the rest of the world. Last, this study adds support to the growing concerns 
about endogeneity issues expressed in the literature. 
This study hypothesises that, in the context of CG mechanisms in Chinese listed 
firms, the degree of AC (PA and PP agency costs) is strongly associated with EM 
activities. To address the issue, this study uses both static and dynamic regression 
model to examine the relationship between EM and agency costs. In addition, 
multivariate statistics are used to examine the influence of EM, combined with CG 
factors, on overall agency costs. The results of the static model suggest that 
discretionary accruals (a proxy for EM) are significantly and positively associated 
with agency costs, including PA and PP agency costs, in China. However, the 
dynamic model indicates insignificant association between EM and agency costs. 
By employing the more advanced model that considers endogeneity, this study 
finds that the relationship between EM and agency costs is subject to endogeneity 
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issues; therefore static modelling, in which the dynamic nature and endogeneity 
issues are not taken care of, can be biased. 
The reminder of the thesis is organized as follows:  
Chapter 2 provides a review of the theoretical literature on the relationship between 
EM and agency costs. Agency theory is used as the foundation for hypothesis 
development and discussion of the results. Chapter 3 provides a review of the prior 
literature on the fundamental elements of the study and describes the context of 
corporate governance in China. Based on Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, Chapter 4 
establishes the hypotheses on the relationship between EM, principal-agent, and 
principal-principal agency costs.  
Chapter 5 describes the research framework and the measurement of variables for 
the empirical analysis of the thesis. Chapter 6 describes the data, data sources, and 
the statistical methods and techniques that are employed in the current study. 
Chapter 7 specifies the regression model used to address the research questions in 
this study. The Granger causality test is used to test the causality direction between 
the dependent and independent variables.  
Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 report the empirical results for principal-agent and 
principal-principal agent costs respectively. Chapter 10 concludes the thesis, 
clarifies the limitations of the study, and provides recommendations for potential 
future research.  
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2 CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviews the finance theories that support the nexus between AC and EM 
to provide a theoretical rationale for this research. Earnings management represents 
the practices of management to bring reported earnings to a desired level. The 
earnings management incentives, such as the intent of obtaining some private gain, 
is often closely related to agency conflicts.  
Agency theory provides a conceptually sound and robust empirical model for 
examining corporate governance considerations (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Agency theory originally developed in the context of 
explaining the relationship between the owner (principal) and management (agent) 
of a business, where the separation of the ownership and management leads to 
agency conflicts and maximises the EM incentives.  
In this chapter, agency theory, combined with stakeholder theory, resource 
dependency theory and legitimacy theory are reviewed to provide the theoretical 
base for AC/EM relationship. In Chapter 3, I will explore the prior studies on AC 
and EM empirically. 
2.2 Agency theory, agency conflict, EM 
The pioneering work of Ross (1973) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) analyzed the 
relationship between owners and management. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 5) 
define an agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principals(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involved delegating some decision-making authority to the agent.” To 
pursue the maximization of their own interests, the interests of principals and the 
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interests of the agent are not aligned. On the one hand, from the principal’s 
perspective, to prevent an agent’s interests diverging from the principal’s interests, 
the principal would establish appropriate incentives for the agent and incur 
monitoring costs to limit the agent’s aberrant activities.  On the other hand, when 
the agent’s action harms the principal’s interests, bonding costs are applied to 
compensate the principal. The third type of cost in an agency relationship refers to 
“residual loss” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 5). Residual loss represents the 
reduction in the principal’s welfare as result of divergence between the agent’s 
decisions and those decisions that maximise the principal’s welfare. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of monitoring costs for principals, 
bonding costs for agents, and the residual loss.  
The traditional focus of agency theory lies in the conflicts between principal and 
agent. The concept of principal-agent conflict was conceived in a developed market, 
where the ownership structure is decentralized, with strong legal protection of 
investors. However, in emerging markets, the major concern transfers from PA 
conflict to PP conflict, due to the changes in institutional settings. In emerging 
economies, concentrated ownership structures are common, and legal protection of 
investors is weak. The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms varies 
from market to market and country to country, because of the differences in the 
institutional environments in different markets or countries. Institutional factors are 
important determinants of how corporate governance operates and affects 
businesses’ performance (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Aguilera 
& Jackson, 2003; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012).  Similarly, cultural factors, legal 
frameworks, religion, educational standards and gender considerations  also have 
implications for corporate governance (Davies & Schlitzer, 2008; Zattoni & Cuomo, 
2008).  
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Management’s incentive to change a firm’s financial picture to become more 
favourable connects AC with EM. The practice of EM can bring reported earnings 
to the desired level, hence, it is natural for the managers to engage in EM to satisfy 
self-interest (Schipper, 1989; Scott, 1997). The case for a nexus between AC and 
EM has been strongly asserted in prior studies. For instance, based on agency theory, 
Lambert (1984) examines the impact of principal and manager relations on earnings 
and finds that the EM (income smoothing) incentives arise with the presence of AC. 
Dye (1988) argues that not only the agency conflict but also the perception of a 
potential investor about the firm value triggers EM. EM can be used to add 
information value, reduce information asymmetry, and mitigate AC (e.g., Arya, 
Glover, & Sunder, 2003; Louis & Robinson, 2005; Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). 
However, EM can also be used opportunistically to deteriorate AC when managers 
undertake EM to benefit themselves (e.g., Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Dechow 
& Sloan, 1991; Guidry et al., 1999; Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995). 
2.2.1 Key concepts of agency theory 
The basics of agency theory relate to the problems between principals and agents 
(Lambert, 2001).  Most fundamentally, agency theory contributes to management 
research by addressing two questions. The first question refers to “how do features 
of information, accounting, and compensation systems affect (reduce or make 
worse) incentive problems?” The second question is “how does the existence of 
incentive problems affect the design and structure of information, accounting, and 
compensation systems?” (Lambert, 2001, p. 1)   
Agency theory demonstrates the conflicts caused not only by the separation of 
ownership and management but also by the separation of risk-bearing, decision-
making and control functions (Morris, 1987). Agency theory is applied in research 
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areas such as corporate governance, information systems, outcome uncertainty, 
incentives, and risk. As Lambert (2001, p. 2) states, “agency theory provides a 
framework for rigorously examining the link between information systems, 
incentives, and behaviour.” 
2.2.2 Agency conflict and EM 
Agency theory provides a theoretical basis for research issues about the separation 
of ownership and management, and the separation of ownership and management 
leading to opportunistic acts by managers to increase their own wealth (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1979). Agency theory “allows us to explicitly incorporate conflicts of 
interest, incentive problems, and mechanism for controlling incentive problems” 
(Lambert, 2001, p. 1).  On the issue of EM practice and agency conflicts, agency 
theory offers a theoretical tool to explain the effect of EM practice and agency 
conflicts, and the incentives behind EM practice from the perspective of agency 
conflicts.  
Earnings are vital, and financial reports play an important role in conveying 
accounting information to external accounting information users.  The dependence 
placed on accounting information strongly motivates managers to manage earnings 
for their personal benefit (Rahman & Ali, 2006). Jensen and Meckling (1976) refer 
to the managers’ activities of maximising their own interests as agency costs. 
Therefore, agency theory provides the theoretical perspective that rationalizes the 
agency conflicts and the management incentives for EM. 
Also, agency theory studies frequently fall into the category of EM, as management 
incentives and earnings are closely related. For instance, in practice, it is common 
that a firm’s management attempts to influence earnings to “(a) maximise its 
compensation, (b) avoid the breaching of debt covenants of bond liabilities, which 
14 
 
would prevent payment of dividends, and (c) minimise reported income to lessen 
the possibility of governmental interference if the enterprise has high political 
visibility” (Dodd & Rozycki, 2008, p. 405).  
The separation of management and ownership is the original concern of agency 
theory, which is also the key to Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency model. Over 
the years, the focus of agency theory has broadened beyond the concerns of 
owners/shareholders seeking maximum returns through share prices and dividends 
to incorporate other stakeholders.  
In their pioneering work on agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest 
that the separation of owner and management creates information asymmetries, 
which provide an opportunity for agents to engage in activities that can have a 
negative impact on firms’ performance and owners’ welfare. Owners can reduce 
the information asymmetry and management incentive hazard by monitoring agent 
activities and by creating incentives for an agent to act in line with the owners’ 
interests. Thus, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), when the owners 
participate directly in the company’s management or owners act as managers, 
agency costs can be minimised. However, Schulze et al. (2001) disagree. 
Schulze et al. (2001) assert that the presence of owner management does not 
necessarily eliminate agency costs. On the contrary, “shareholders have incentives 
to invest resources in curbing both managerial and owner opportunism” (p. 99). In 
their study of 1376 family firms with owner management, Schulze et al. (2001) find 
that the assumed benefits of owner management (family ownership, in particular), 
are offset by agency costs and other costs of ownership. Therefore owner 
management, which aligns the owner’s and the manager’s interests, still incurs 
agency costs and engenders various agency threats. Schulze et al. (2001) provide 
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an extension to the agency theory in general by investigating shareholder incentives 
in agency costs and discrediting the myth of owner management as a panacea for 
eliminating agency costs. 
Unlike the widespread shareholders in the developed market, the ownership 
structure in Chinese listed companies is often State-concentrated. However, 
managers in China are rarely significant shareholders in listed companies (Jiang & 
Kim, 2015), thus indicating serious PA agency problems and extensive incentive to 
manage earnings (e.g., Lin et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2005). 
Besides traditional PA agency costs, which are the focus of agency theory, PP 
agency costs in emerging economies are attracting more attention.  PP agency costs 
arise when dominant owners pursue their own targets by sacrificing minority 
owners’ interests (Chen & Young, 2010).   
Jiraporn et al. (2008) apply agency theory as a tool to evaluate whether EM is 
opportunistic or beneficial.  Based on agency theory, Jiraporn et al. (2008) relate 
the degree of EM to the magnitude of agency costs and find negative PA/EM 
relation in the US market. 
2.3 Generalised agency theory with stakeholders 
In addition to the owner/management relationship, there are many other 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, communities, 
and the general public, who have a relationship with the firm through its 
management. Hill and Jones (1992) successfully reconcile these multifarious 
stakeholders with agency theory, developing a resultant model of stakeholder-
agency, which is a generalized theory of agency. “Stakeholders” refers to a group 
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of interest-related parties who have a legitimate claim on the firm and may vary as 
to the size of their stake in the firm.  
Among all the stakeholders of a firm, managers play a unique role. This is because 
each stakeholder can be considered as a part of the firm’s nexus of implicit or 
explicit contracts and managers occupy a central position. Managers are involved 
in contractual relationships with all other stakeholders, and at the same time, 
managers directly control the decision-making processes of the firm. Therefore, 
managers act on behalf of the other stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992). This led to 
the development of stakeholder-agency theory, where all stakeholders are 
considered as principals and managers are the agents hired by the other stakeholders. 
Hence, agency theory can be seen as a subset of the generalized stakeholder-agency 
theory. 
2.4 Agency theory and board incentives 
From the perspective of agency theory, incentives are vital with regard to 
management effectiveness. Misalignments between the board and the shareholders 
incur agency costs. Monitoring costs in agency theory emphasize the principals’ 
perspective, given the strong incentive for principals to monitor the agent. However, 
the board’s ability to monitor is often overlooked (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Resource dependence theorists assert that apart from its monitoring function, the 
board also serves as a resource provider, which enhances firm performance and 
maintains social resources via external connections (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) provide a richer understanding of how board 
capital relates to the monitoring and provision of resources by integrating agency 
theory with resource dependence theory. They argue that board capital directly 
relates to the monitoring and provision of resources, and board incentives affect 
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board monitoring indirectly. In other words, board incentives have a moderating 
effect on the board’s capital relationship with the monitoring and provision of 
resources.  
Resource dependence theory can be integrated into agency theory. From the 
integrated model described by Hillman and Dalziel (2003), the role of incentive can 
be clearly seen to moderate the relationship between board capital and monitoring, 
and the provision of resources (Figure 2-1 demonstrates the integration of resource 
dependence theory with agency theory). 
Figure 2-1 Integrated model of board capital, board incentive, and firm 
performance  
(Source: Hillman & Dalziel, 2003, p. 390) 
Figure 2-1 provides a schematic linkage of Resource Dependency and Agency 
theories. Board capital leads to the provision of resources to firm performance, 
consistent with resource dependency theory. The stream of agency theory research 
focuses on the effects of board monitoring on firm performance. Monitoring and 
providing resources are important board functions and reconciling these respective 
emphases provides additional insights of board functions. 
From the agency theory perspective, which deals with incentive issues, this study 
argues that the board, as the resource provider, uses all the resources as its 
incentives. In other words, the resources that the board possesses help the 
realization of the board’s incentives.  
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2.5 Agency costs and legitimacy 
Some research has suggested that legitimacy theory needs to be considered in EM 
(e.g., Sun, Salama, Hussainey, & Habbash, 2010). Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines 
legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Legitimacy theory can be seen as two-fold. 
One layer of legitimacy is macro-oriented. The other layer focuses on the 
organizational level. The two layers of legitimacy theory are demonstrated in Figure 
2-2. 
Figure 2-2 Layers of legitimacy theory 
(Source: Tilling, 2004, p. 2) 
The first level of legitimacy theory, which is the institutional level, deals with 
organizational structures, such as government, religion, society and capitalism as a 
whole, and explores how the organizational structure has gained acceptance or 
legitimacy in general society. The second level, the organizational level, deals with 
the congruence between “the social values associated with or implied by their 
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activities” and “the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social system in 
which they are a part” (Mathews, 1993, p. 350). From an agency theory perspective, 
the members of the first level are relevant stakeholders of the firm. 
Most researchers operating from an accounting or finance perspective use an 
understanding of legitimacy at the organizational level. According to Tilling (2004), 
legitimacy theory at the organizational level suggests that there are four stages in a 
firm’s legitimacy. As illustrated in Figure 2-2, the four stages are: firstly, 
establishing legitimacy; secondly, maintaining legitimacy; thirdly, extending 
legitimacy; and lastly, defending legitimacy. The last stage of defending legitimacy 
has drawn the most attention from accounting researchers, in terms of corporate 
social responsibility, corporate environmental reporting, voluntary disclosure, and 
financial disclosure policy (Fernando & Lawrence, 2014; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; 
Mathews, 1993; Moir, 2001).  
The legitimacy of institutions is an important component of the business 
environment; various studies have explored legitimacy-related good corporate 
governance. As Lindblom (1994, p. 2) explains, legitimacy is “a condition or status 
which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the value system of 
the larger social system of which the entity is a part. When a disparity, actual or 
potential, exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s 
legitimacy”. Harmonizing and legitimating a CG system with others is desirable for 
firms when competing with counterparts in the global economy (Djelic, 2007; Guler, 
Guillén, & Macpherson, 2002; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) examine the factors that affect applications of 
the code of good CG in countries worldwide, and they contend that companies 
improve national CG systems in response to both endogenous and exogenous 
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pressure. Endogenous pressure may arise from pressure to increase the system’s 
efficiency, while exogenous pressure aims to acquire legitimation. Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) suggest that the dual forces of endogenous and exogenous 
pressure require firms in different countries not only to increase CG effectiveness 
but also to legitimate the countries’ CG system.  
From the perspective of stakeholder and legitimacy theory, companies’ social 
disclosure or CSR (corporate social responsibility), which is considered part of the 
dialogue between the company and its stakeholders, plays a role in negotiating 
relationships (Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995). Ullmann (1985) was one of the first 
to explore legitimacy theory with regard to stakeholders. Companies with social 
disclosure and CSR create a positive image with their stakeholders and are 
recognized by a range of stakeholders. In addition, the positive image created is 
beneficial to the company’s reputation, resulting in economic benefits (Sun et al., 
2010). 
From the perspective of agency and stakeholder theory, managers who are 
motivated by self-interest may tend to undertake EM to maximise their interests at 
the expense of the firm’s stakeholders. “Nonetheless, stakeholders will respond to 
management in case their interests are damaged by earnings management practices” 
(Sun et al., 2010, p. 684). To avoid being dismissed, managers may attempt to 
manage earnings aiming at a good or “legitimate” impression for stakeholders and 
the public at large, to enhance the firm’s legitimacy. 
Agency theory, when considering stakeholder and legitimacy issues, is well suited 
to research on corporate governance and EM. In Sun et al. (2010)’s attempt to 
examine the relationship between CG and EM, they contend that to maintain 
organizational legitimacy, managers are motivated to engage in EM to fulfil 
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stakeholders’ expectations, and thus to obtain social support. Also, relying on 
legitimacy theory, Yip, Van Staden, and Cahan (2011) investigate whether CSR 
reporting is related to EM, in the specific context of a political environment. They 
argue that companies apply various strategies, such as CSR reporting and EM, to 
obtain legitimacy, and they find the relationship between CSR reporting and EM is 
affected by the political environment. 
In addition to the theories discussed above, Rajgopal, Shivakumar, and Simpson 
(2007) propose a catering theory to rationalize EM activities, based on stock price 
motivation. Catering theory is built on two main assumptions. The first assumption 
specifies that there is a time-varying investor response to positive earnings surprises 
relative to negative earnings surprises. The second assumption is that the current 
stock price is important to managers. Rajgopal et al. (2007) provide robust research 
results that show managers identify changes in investors’ responses to reported 
earnings over time. In other words, managers cater to their investors’ response by 
managing the accruals. In order to maintain or to increase the stock price, managers 
manage earnings by increasing abnormal accruals to cater for investors’ appetites, 
and “this catering behaviour is observed when investors place a relatively high price 
on firms that report positive earnings surprises” (Rajgopal et al., 2007, p. 32).  
As discussed above, agency theory, combined with stakeholder theory, resource 
dependency theory and legitimacy theory, provides the theoretical base from which 
to investigate the AC/EM relationship. In Section 2.6, based on a multi-theoretical 
orientation, the relevant CG characters will be discussed by reviewing the prior 
literature.  
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2.6 Corporate governance and agency costs 
Corporate governance (CG) is a term that is often used but rarely defined. 
Researchers often have different interpretations of CG. In general, CG is viewed as 
a system of rules and factors that organize and control a company’s daily operation  
(Gillan & Starks, 1998). Zingales (1998) defines CG as the exercise of authority, 
direction, and control, or a set of structures that set up boundaries for business 
operation.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Huson (1997) emphasize the importance 
of CG from the perspective of  a company’s stakeholders. A CG system provides 
ways to deal with the company’s stakeholders to make sure they are getting returns 
through their investments. For a firm to perform competitively and enter the 
international capital market, good corporate governance is vital. In particular, 
internal CG mechanisms are more closely related to the company’s management 
and thus play an important role in monitoring and constraining agency conflicts and 
EM (Shan, 2015).  
Good CG helps to reduce agency costs and transaction costs. Hart (1995) suggests 
corporate governance is important when agency costs are present.  In the absence 
of an agency problem, CG becomes relatively less important; this is because when 
there is no misalignment of goals, i.e. no agency conflict, the maximization of 
stakeholder wellbeing is the accepted priority. With the presence of an agency 
problem, a comprehensive contract that specifies everything in advance leaves no 
room for residual decisions that may incur agency costs. The standard PA model 
assumes there are no costs for establishing a comprehensive contract. However, in 
reality, contracting costs or transaction costs cannot be eliminated. Hart (1995) 
notes that firms are unlikely to develop comprehensive contracts, because of the 
high costs in practice. As a result, firms’ contracts mostly end up being incomplete, 
with gaps or missing provisions in the contract terms. The implications of 
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incomplete contracts include conflicts of interest and potential legal disputes. In 
most cases, incomplete contracts and agency problems present simultaneously. CG 
is important in these cases since it provides the mechanism for decision making 
when the provision is missing in the initial incomplete contract (Hart, 1995).   
2.6.1 Theory-based variables of interest, EM 
Offering agency theory as the theoretical framework, this study examines how the 
degree to which EM is engaged in affects agency costs (PA and PP costs).  
According to agency theory, when the agency conflict is severe, managers tend to 
undertake EM to mitigate the severity of agency costs. From the perspective of 
generalized agency theory with stakeholders, managers who act as the agent for all 
the interest-related parties are motivated to coordinate a nexus of various 
stakeholders. 
Agency theory, taking consideration of stakeholder theory and resource dependence 
theory, explains the incentive for managers to use EM to alleviate the conflict 
between managers and other stakeholders.  
Agency theory, focusing on the legitimacy theory issues, provides additional 
explanation of managers’ incentives to manage earnings.  According to legitimacy 
theory, managers are motivated to manage earnings to meet the expectations of 
internal stakeholders and the public, to develop and maintain the legitimacy of the 
firm.  
This study emphasizes the impact of EM engagement on agency costs and applies 
an empirical approach of regression to test the relationship between EM and agency 
costs. Thus, the variable of interest related to agency costs is EM. Based on agency 
theory, with considerations of aspects of stakeholder theory, resource dependence 
theory, and legitimacy theory, this study hypothesizes that engagement in EM will 
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help to mitigate the conflict between principal and agent, and conflict between the 
majority of shareholders and the minority of shareholders. 
2.6.2 Theory-based explanatory variables 
After choosing the variable of interests, to specify the regression model, other 
explanatory variables are required. It is important to “choose variables and a 
functional form on the basis of theoretical and general understanding of the 
relationship” (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2008, p. 151). This study selected several 
elements from internal CG mechanisms as control variables. This section reviews 
the theoretical and empirical literature on the explanatory variables and agency 
costs.  
Internal governance mechanisms include the controlling mechanisms for various 
groups inside a firm, such as its management, its board of directors and its 
shareholders.  According to agency theory, agency costs occur when the interests 
of the firm’s managers do not match the interests of the firm’s owners (Ang et al., 
2000).  Agency theory provides a tool to investigate the conflicts between various 
groups (ownership and management). 
Internal mechanisms play an important role in monitoring managers’ behaviour and 
in aligning managers’ interests with shareholders’ interests. Thus, internal 
mechanisms are essential in constraining the agency problem and should be 
included in the model for examining agency costs. This section reviews several 
corporate governance factors that have been frequently examined by previous 
studies with regard to agency costs.  
2.6.2.1 Board independence 
The Board of Directors is responsible for overseeing the activities of a company. A 
group of individuals is elected to comprise a board of directors to represent 
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stockholders and to monitor a firm’s management (Weisbach, 1988).  The legal 
responsibilities of boards and board members vary with the nature of the 
organization, and between jurisdictions. 
The directors of an organization are those persons who are members of its board. 
The board of directors can be categorized into inside and outside directors by the 
presence or absence of other relationships with the organization.  
An inside director is a board director who is also connected to the organization, 
such as an employee, officer, chief executive, or major shareholder. Inside directors 
represent the interests of the firm's stakeholders, and often have special knowledge 
of its inner workings, its financial or market position. An inside director who is 
employed as a manager or executive of the organization is sometimes referred to as 
an executive director. Executive directors usually have a specified area of 
responsibility in the organization, such as finance, marketing, human resources, or 
production. 
An outside director is a member of the board who is not otherwise employed by or 
engaged with the organization and does not represent any of its stakeholders. An 
outside director is also known as an independent director. A typical example of an 
outside director is one who is president of a firm in a different industry. Outside 
directors are not employees of the company or affiliated with it in any other way. 
Outside directors bring outside experience and perspectives to the board. Outside 
directors are often useful to a company since they can think objectively and rarely 
have a conflict of interests with shareholders or managers; therefore, outside 
directors are often useful in handling disputes between inside directors, or between 
shareholders and the board. On the other hand, there are also deficiencies associated 
with outside directors because they may lack familiarity with specific issues relating 
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to the organization's governance and they may not have adequate knowledge about 
the industry or sector in which the firm is operating. 
There is additional evidence supporting a negative opinion on the effect of 
outside/independent directors. For instance, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) assert 
that the selection of outside directors is dominated by managers. They argue that 
given the outside directors are chosen by managers, there will be doubt about 
outside directors’ abilities to make independent judgments on a firm’s performance. 
Therefore, board independence is an important factor in the internal governance 
mechanism (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990). A board that is independent of the 
company refers to the situation that arises when the majority of the board are outside 
directors who are not affiliated with the top executives of the firm. An independent 
board also rarely has business dealings with the company, in order to avoid potential 
conflicts of interests. An independent board is expected to oversee the firm’s 
executives vigilantly to alleviate managerial opportunism and to increase 
shareholder value. Therefore, an independent board is often considered a necessity 
for good CG. However, the effectiveness of an independent board can be 
compromised for various reasons, such as the expertise of the outside or 
independent directors, and how busy the independent directors are. Lack of 
sufficient background may also limit outside directors’ insight in a specific 
business, and consequently affect the firm’s development in the long term. Also, 
when the independent directors hold positions on several different boards, it is 
natural to expect that their efforts with regard to each firm may be compromised.  
2.6.2.2 Board size 
Board size is an important element in the internal CG mechanism and relates to 
agency problems. There are two main board-size effects discussed in the literature: 
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the impact on the communication within the board; and the monitoring ability of 
the board.   
There are divergent arguments for small and large boards.  Some studies find that 
firms with a smaller board tend to be more effective and a bigger board size tends 
to lead to increased problems in communication and coordination (e.g., Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Yermack, 1996).   
In support of small boards, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993), among 
others, assert that increased board size raises the issue of poor communication and 
can harm the effectiveness of the firm. Yermack (1996) finds a negative relationship 
between board size and firm value, which is consistent with the findings of Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992). Yermack (1996) used a sample of 452 large firms in the US, 
Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) expanded Yermack (1996) study by testing 
the board size and firm performance relationship using a sample of small and 
midsize firms in Finland, achieving similar results. Eisenberg et al. (1998) also 
show an inverse association between board size and firm profitability in an 
extended sample comprised of small firms with small boards. 
In support of large boards, Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999), 
Firstenberg and Malkiel (1994), among others, assert large boards contain expanded 
information and diverse managerial experience that enhances the boards’ 
capabilities in terms of stimulating various perspectives and monitoring. A reduced 
ability of the board to monitor management behaviour may result in increased 
agency costs.  
In general, board size is considered an important indicator of board characteristics 
and CG. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of EM on agency 
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costs, and board size will be included as one of the explanatory variables in the 
model used in this study.  
2.6.2.3 CEO duality 
The term CEO duality is used when the Chief Executive Officer is also the 
chairperson of the board of directors.  The board of directors is set up to monitor 
managers such as the CEO on behalf of the shareholders. The board of directors 
designs compensation contracts and hires or fires managers, including the Chief 
Executive Officer. CEO duality may benefit the firm if the CEO works closely with 
the board to create value. 
The establishment of CEO duality is a double-edged sword. On one hand, CEO 
duality provides a unity of command at the head of the firm, which allows the firm 
to send a reassuring message to its shareholders. On the other hand, when the CEO 
is also the chairperson of the board of directors, it is easier for the CEO to assert 
control over the board and consequently make it more difficult for shareholders to 
monitor and discipline the firm’s management. 
Shareholders elect a board of directors, boards of directors elect CEOs, and in turn, 
CEOs must answer to their board of directors. CEO duality is controversial as 
explained above. From the perspective of agency theory, firms would benefit from 
separating the position of CEO from that of board chair.  
When a person simultaneously holds the position of CEO and board chair, the 
CEO’s behaviour will be restrained less, and the CEO could more easily act in his 
or her own interests since there is no separate chairperson to oversee the board and 
protect shareholders’ welfare. The consequence of two roles for a single person is 
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the potential for increased conflict between shareholders and manager, and adverse 
effects on shareholders’ interests. 
McGrath (2009) mentioned that, besides the weakening of the board’s oversight 
powers, CEO duality also raises concerns about CEO succession. Consider the 
situation when a dual CEO retires as CEO but retains his or her role as the board 
chair. This would alleviate the agency conflict since the roles are separated; 
however, what should not be neglected is the new CEO’s position, particularly the 
difficulties that will be faced conducting his or her work as a new CEO.  Although 
the last CEO has left the position, he or she would be still quite influential as the 
chairperson of the board, and the CEO has to answer to the board. Thus the 
chairperson of the board is bound to question any changes initiated by the new CEO. 
Board members may also side with the chairperson, given their working experience 
together and trust in each other. Therefore, CEO duality can cause conflicts of 
interest, and difficulties for the new CEO since the former CEO’s influence and 
power continues as the chairperson of the board.  
The opposing side of agency theory argues that CEO duality will lead to more 
effective and efficient management. Advocates of CEO duality support the 
stewardship theory and believe that when a CEO is holding a dual role as the board 
chair, it will contribute to aligning the firm’s managers and board of directors, 
allowing the CEO to manage the firm and serve as a representative of the 
shareholders even more effectively.  
Although as a CG phenomenon, CEO duality has been widely discussed, the prior 
literature on CEO duality provides inconclusive evidence on whether CEO duality 
is beneficial or detrimental (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007). Many studies 
indicate that there is not much relationship between CEO duality and firm 
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performance (e.g., Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996; Daily & Dalton, 1997). One may 
suspect that without an independent chairperson to oversee the CEO’s behaviour, 
there are more chances for CEO corruption. However, against many people’s 
intuition, many high-profile corporate scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, 
which received much attention because of CEO corruption, actually had a 
separation of CEO and board chair (McGrath, 2009). 
The literature shows that CEO duality has a role in agency costs. The presence of 
CEO duality leads to powerful managers. When the manager gains too much power, 
with increases in managerial entrenchment and reduction in the effectiveness of 
board monitoring, the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders can 
worsen (Finkelstein & D'aveni, 1994; Weisbach, 1988). Because of the high 
potential for managerial entrenchment and agency costs, investors appear to react 
negatively to a firm with CEO duality (Sundaramurthy, Mahoney, & Mahoney, 
1997). 
Agency theorists favour a vigilant board of directors, because board directors serve 
as the primary device to protect shareholders’ interests and a vigilant board of 
directors, composed of a large portion of outside or independent directors, tends to 
have more substantial motivation to monitor its CEO. At the same time, a vigilant 
board of directors favours non-duality, mainly because CEO duality has the 
potential to increase CEO entrenchment and may result in opportunistic and 
inefficient behaviour (Finkelstein & D'aveni, 1994). CEO duality with a non-
vigilant board of directors can result in a shortage of power, influence, and 
motivation to monitor and discipline the CEO’s behaviour. Thus, from the agency 
theory perspective, CEO duality is one of the sources of agency conflict, as a result 
of less effective and less efficient monitoring by the board. 
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Prior studies provide mixed evidence of CEO duality with respect to agency costs 
and firm performance. In the US, using the sample of Fortune 500 companies, 
Baliga et al. (1996) find that both market and firm performance are unaffected by 
changes in firms’ CEO duality status. Consistent with Baliga et al. (1996), Chen, 
Lee, and Li (2008) use a sample of firms in the S&P 1500 index to show no evidence 
of a significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance after 
controlling for the self-selection bias using the Heckman two-step method. In 
contrast, Yan Lam and Kam Lee (2008), using a sample of H-share companies in 
China, found that CEO duality tends to be beneficial for non-family firms, while 
for family firms, non-duality status is better. In Sri Lanka, where the ownership 
structure is highly concentrated in family-owned businesses, the presence of CEO 
duality is found to be positively associated with agency conflicts in subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations, while there is no significant relationship to firm 
performance and agency costs in local public companies (Hewa Wellalage & 
Locke, 2011b). Given CEO duality is one of the attributes of a company’s agency 
conflicts, this study includes CEO duality as one of the variables in explaining 
agency costs. 
2.6.2.4 Capital structure  
Capital structure is an important element regarding corporate governance since it 
reflects how a firm finances its operation and growth. Capital structure is a mixture 
of debt and equity. Debt and equity represent different sources of funds. The debt 
to equity ratio is the usual measurement of a firm’s capital structure and provides 
insight into the firm’s overall risk.  Debt, as one way to raise capital in the capital 
market, has an advantage in terms of tax (since the interest payments on debt are 
tax deductible), and unlike equity, debt does not dilute the existing ownership. 
Equity, the second component of capital structure, is usually more expensive than 
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debt, and grants the equity holder the right to claim the firm’s future earnings as a 
part owner.  
Leverage refers to the amount of debt used to finance a firm’s assets. When there is 
a significantly larger amount of debt than equity, the firm is considered highly 
leveraged. A highly leveraged capital structure is usually referred to as aggressive, 
and poses a greater risk to investors; however, the risk may turn into the primary 
source of the firm’s growth.  
Agency costs of debt and equity have been widely discussed (e.g., Brockman & 
Unlu, 2009; Jensen, 2004; Jensen, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kim & 
Sorensen, 1986). Misaligned interests of managers and stakeholders incur agency 
costs, including agency costs of equity that occur due to the difference in interests 
between managers and shareholders, and agency costs of debt that lean more on 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders. When managers’ 
interests diverge from the interests of shareholders, managers engage in suboptimal 
decisions by compromising the target of firm value maximization. Agency costs of 
equity arise firstly due to compromised firm wealth, and secondly due to monitoring 
costs incurred to prevent managers from taking suboptimal decisions.  
Agency costs of debt occur due to the conflict between shareholders and 
bondholders. Shareholders, who invest with bondholders’ money, may not act in 
the best interest of bondholders. However, it is not the shareholders who make the 
important investment decisions in listed firms. Instead, it is the managers who 
themselves act as the agents of shareholders to make important decisions related to 
a firm’s investment. In one potential scenario, the firm’s management is more in 
favour of the shareholders; in this case, the firm’s management would try various 
means to transfer the firm’s wealth to shareholders instead of bondholders. To 
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prevent the managers from doing so, the bondholder/debtholders may demand 
higher interest rates or impose restrictive covenants. The priority given to dividends 
is one example of protecting debtholders from losses due to agency costs of debt. 
In the management’s aim to please shareholders, where the firm’s priority is to pay 
cash dividends, there will be less left for the firm to pay its debts. Thus interests 
generated by debt should be paid before cash dividends to equity holders. 
The conflict between shareholders and bondholders is referred to as the agency cost 
of debt. The relationship between managers and shareholders can affect the agency 
costs of debt (Brander & Poitevin, 1992). Increasing the amount of debt in a firm’s 
capital structure may lead to an increase in the agency costs of debt, including 
bankruptcy costs. Specifically, Brander and Poitevin (1992) study how the conflict 
between managers and shareholder affects the agency costs of debt and find that 
managerial compensation contracts play an important role in mitigating the agency 
costs of debt. Agency costs of debt cannot be eliminated entirely by managerial 
contracts. However, the setting of managerial contracts does contribute to 
alleviating the conflict between shareholders and bondholders.  
Firms with higher insider ownership tend to have higher debt ratios due to agency 
costs (Kim & Sorensen, 1986). With a higher percentage of inside ownership, firms 
may prefer to finance capital by issuing debt, rather than equity to avoid the agency 
costs of equity. Comparing to levered firms, Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) find 
that the managers of all-equity firms tend to have larger stockholdings and more 
family involvement. As a result, managerial choice in all-equity firms is more 
focused on minimizing the risk associated with undiversified investments by 
managers. 
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Debt and equity compose a firm’s capital structure, and most studies on capital 
structure using the debt-equity ratio assume that all debt is homogeneous. Lasfer 
(1999) argues that when studying a firm’s capital structure, it is not only the amount 
of debt but also the type of debt that matters. The various characteristics of debt 
(leases, convertible loans, loan capital, bank loans, overdraft, notes, and bills) are 
important dimensions with respect to the capital structure decision. Lasfer (1999) 
studied the applied debt category across different firm sizes and finds there are 
significant differences in the selection of debt category, debt maturity in small and 
large firms.  
Jensen (1986) points out the benefit of debt in motivating organizational efficiency. 
He states that when a firm is highly leveraged, the threat caused by failing to repay 
the loan will motivate the organization to become more efficient. “The optimal 
debt-equity ratio is the point at which firm value is maximized, the point where the 
marginal costs of debt just offset the marginal benefits” (Jensen, 1986, p. 324). 
Therefore, leverage is also considered an important control with respect to agency 
conflict. 
2.6.2.5 Firm size 
Firm size closely relates to agency costs. Managers of firms who make decisions 
that conflict with the firm’s goal of maximizing shareholder wealth incur agency 
costs. The costs of ensuring the alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests 
are normally higher in larger firms than in smaller firms. There are several reasons. 
Firstly, the sheer size of larger firms creates significant agency problems. With a 
larger size and a multi-layered organization, the monitoring of managers becomes 
more complex and difficult. Secondly, monitoring costs for larger firms are higher. 
Larger firms, especially multinational firms with foreign subsidiaries, encounter 
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more difficulties in monitoring distant managers. Also, larger firms may incur costs 
in aligning the goals of employees from different cultures. When the firm size 
increases and the business expands internationally, it is common that employees 
from a different culture, with different backgrounds, start to diverge from a uniform 
goal. Thus, aligning the goals also becomes part of the firm’s costs in solving 
agency problems. Larger firms thus have relatively more problems in aligning the 
interests of the principals with the agents; larger firms usually have a higher level 
of agency cost.   
The size of a firm has an impact on its CG mechanisms (Baker & Hall, 2004). As 
mentioned above, large firm size may create more difficulties relating to monitoring 
and may cause severe agency problems. However, for this reason, large firms, in 
turn, are more motivated to devote more attention and put more effort into avoiding 
agency costs. As a result, larger firms tend to have a higher level of CG with strict 
governance rules. 
International evidence in the prior literature shows that larger firms, which have 
relatively more and better resources, tend to pay more attention to CG, and thus 
have more apparent CG mechanisms (Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006). In Malaysia, 
Ariff, Ibrahim, and Othman (2007) find a strong influence of firm size on firms’ 
ratings, but not so much evidence for the other CG factors. In Korea, firm size is 
also found positively related to CG quality (Guillen, 2000), and there is evidence 
showing it is relatively easier for large firms in Korea to introduce outside directors 
to their boards (Cho & Kim, 2003).  
Although there are many studies supporting the idea that firm size is positively 
related to CG quality, there is little evidence from the Chinese market. To 
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investigate the relationship between EM level and agency costs in the context of 
Chinese listed companies, this study employs firm size as a control variable.  
2.7 Summary 
This chapter provided the finance theories that support the AC/EM nexus. Agency 
theory is the predominant theory in agency problems. Along with agency theory, 
resource dependency theory and legitimacy theory were discussed as part of a 
theoretical rationale, and the theory-based CG variables that relate to agency 
problems were explained. The next chapter reviews prior empirical evidence around 
AC and EM and provides the background on corporate governance practices in 
China. 
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3 CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the prior studies on EM and agency costs. The phenomenon 
of EM is not new. Earnings are vital to managers’ decision-making processes and 
also powerfully affect companies’ business activities. EM is acknowledged in the 
flexibility afforded by GAAP. There are various incentives for managers to exploit 
flexibility in accounting policies to manage earnings. Simply to define EM as good 
or bad is too simplistic. What is evident is that EM aims to alter the apparent 
earnings, and by altering the earnings, it actually aims to alter the impression of a 
business’s performance. When managers manage earnings abusively to materially 
misrepresent or distort a firm’s performance, it produces misleading information 
for the firm’s information users, such as investors in the stock market. In such cases, 
EM is harmful in terms of accounting information quality and market transparency. 
However, it does not mean that altered earnings figures always result in a less 
meaningful indicator. On the contrary, it is possible that an altered figure is more 
realistic in terms of capturing a firm’s expected future earnings. Therefore, EM can 
be both opportunistic and beneficial.  
China is an interesting case in which to study EM activities due to its unique 
political control, institutional system and regulation. Unlike the US, the Chinese 
economy is centralized; regulators examine and approve economic decisions. The 
Chinese socialist system and special institutional background provide an interesting 
context for the study of EM activities. For example,  X. Chen et al. (2008) find that 
local governments in China manage earnings to help listed firms to circumvent the 
central government’s regulations on rights offerings. Chen and Yuan (2004) note 
that in order to overcome the accounting-based threshold (three years continuous 
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minimum 10% of ROEs) for rights offerings, increasing numbers of firms use their 
nonoperating income to manage earnings. Chen and Yuan (2004) find Chinese 
regulators have responded to EM behaviour by scrutinizing the excessive use of 
nonoperating income, and their ability to do so has improved over time. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate how EM practices affect agency 
conflicts in China. As discussed in Chapter 2, based on agency theory, it is natural 
to expect that managers will manage earnings to avoid problems with owners or to 
limit the visibility of minority shareholders. To review studies on the two key 
elements, EM and AC, the rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 
reviews the relevant issues on EM, while Section 3.3 discusses agency problems, 
especially PP agency conflict in China. Section 3.4 presents CG mechanisms that 
contribute to constraining agency conflicts, and Section 3.5 introduces the Chinese 
CG background for this study. 
3.2 Earnings management 
3.2.1 Early discussions of EM 
Research on EM can be traced back to the 1980s, originating in the US. Early work 
such as that of Lambert (1984) and Dye (1988) established the theory and brought 
insight to the understanding of EM. Lambert (1984) uses agency theory to examine 
the impact of owner/manager relationships on earnings. Lambert (1984) finds that 
the incentives for income smoothing arise to respond to principal-agent conflict. 
Later, Dye (1988) further rationalizes the internal and external demand for cosmetic 
EM. Dye (1988) asserts, on the one hand, that internal demand for earnings 
management is triggered by principal-agent conflict, which is consistent with 
Lambert (1984) argument. On the other hand, in the capital market, shareholders’ 
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attempts to alter investors’ perceptions of a firm’s value are the source of the 
external demand for EM. 
The studies of Lambert (1984) and Dye (1988) are the cornerstones of EM study in 
terms of theoretical contributions. In empirical research, the contributions of Healy 
(1985), Schipper (1989), and Jones (1991) are significant. Healy (1985) examines 
the association between company accruals and managers’ incentives under a 
company’s bonus contract. Healy (1985) finds that a bonus contract creates 
incentives for managers to choose accounting procedures selectively in order to 
maximise the value of their own compensation or bonus. Schipper (1989) reviews 
and summarizes studies on EM. Jones (1991) examines whether US companies 
manage earnings during import relief investigations to get import relief benefits. 
The Jones Model improves the measure of EM compared to prior research by 
DeAngelo (1986), Healy (1985), and McNichols and Wilson (1988), Jones (1991) 
measures the degree of earnings management through the proportion of 
discretionary components in the total accruals, and successfully explains around 
one quarter of the variation in total accruals. The Jones model is employed in many 
studies, such as those of Kasznik (1999), Klein (2002) and Teoh, Welch, and Wong 
(1998a). Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) evaluate the ability of different 
models to detecting earnings management, and they find a modified version of the 
Jones model is the most powerful in detecting EM.  
Standard accounting literature applies the discretionary accruals of the Jones model 
as a proxy for EM. The Jones model was conceived in the US market, and is thus 
more suitable for developed countries with similar circumstances in terms of 
politics, institutional structure, regulation and accounting standards. In the Chinese 
context, the relevance and suitability of discretionary accruals as an earnings 
management measurement has been questioned.  Ding, Zhang, and Zhang (2007) 
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suggest two main reasons for the unsuitability of employing discretionary accruals 
as an EM measurement in China. First,  it is difficult for Chinese firms to manage 
earnings through non-cash accruals due to the tax-oriented system in China. Second, 
given that related transactions are one of the dominant characteristics of the Chinese 
capital market, related party transactions tend to be a better measurement of EM 
than accruals in the Chinese context, as Jian and Wong (2004) 
recommend.However,  
Not all firms in China belong to groups. In regions where state 
enterprises are poorly developed and small in scale, such as those 
in less developed inland provinces, firms report directly to a state 
asset management bureau. Other non-group-controlled firms that 
are burgeoning in coastal regions are private businesses 
established by entrepreneurs, and township-village enterprises, 
which are under the supervision of the township or village 
governments. These firms are more likely to operate 
independently (Jian & Wong, 2004, p. 3).  
Therefore, for Chinese privately-owned and relatively small State-owned 
companies, discretionary accruals are still a relevant measure of EM. 
In addition to discretionary accruals derived from the Jones model, to capture EM 
in non-market-based, non-operating related party transactions, the earnings 
management proxy of “non-operating income/sales” is also employed (Bertrand, 
Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002; Jian & Wong, 2004).  
3.2.2 The evolving scope of EM 
Research on EM was initiated in the late 1980s (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). The 
definitions of EM in the literature are neither clear nor consensus-based (Dechow, 
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Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996). This section reviews two representative definitions of 
EM in the literature.  
3.2.2.1 A three-category classification 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) divide EM into three categories: beneficial, neutral and 
pernicious.  They consider “Beneficial earnings management enhances the 
transparency of reports; the pernicious involves outright misrepresentation and 
fraud; the grey (neutral) is manipulation of reports within the boundaries of 
compliance with bright-line standards, which could be either opportunistic or 
efficiency-enhancing” (p. 25).   
The first category includes studies inclined to stress the beneficial effect of EM. 
Researchers support the opinion that EM takes advantage of the available flexibility 
in choosing accounting treatments, without violating the requirements of 
accounting standards. EM is not always negative, and is expected and demanded 
from both inside and outside the business, and by stakeholders in the capital market 
(Parfet, 2000). EM can be beneficial in signalling managers about future cash flows 
(Beneish, 2001; Chtourou, Bedard, & Courteau, 2001; Demski, 1998; Demski, 
Patell, & Wolfson, 1984; Suh, 1990).  
The second category, which is the neutral group, refers to studies that portray 
neutral attitudes about EM. Researchers who support this idea believe that EM can 
be either opportunistic or economically efficient (Fields, Lys, & Vincent, 2001). 
Scott (2012, p. 423) states EM is “ the choice by a manager of accounting policies, 
or real actions, affecting earnings so as to achieve some specific reported earnings 
objective.” Also, Scott (2012) demonstrates both the positive and negative 
perceptions of EM. The positive effect of EM mainly rests on its function in opening 
up communication with outsiders. It can be difficult and costly to translate a 
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manager’s expertise and skills about a firm to the board directors and investors, and 
thus communication between managers, directors, and investors is blocked in many 
cases. Under these circumstances, EM can serve as a way to open up 
communication to give outsiders some inside information on management, the 
financial health of the firm, and the manager’s expertise, through financial 
statements. EM can also be beneficial in encouraging efficient contracting, given 
that EM provides an option for flexibility when a management contract imposes 
strict and incomplete terms on a manager. EM is considered “bad” when it reduces 
the reliability of financial reporting information. The negative effects of EM include 
being opportunistic, self-interested, and creating implications for accountants. 
Mulford and Comiskey (2002) explain that no matter whether it is within or beyond 
the flexibility afforded by GAAP, EM, as a tool to alter earnings, is desired and 
conducted to respond to certain motivations and incentives. 
The third category, the pernicious group, includes studies that regard EM as 
detrimental. Researchers such as Chtourou et al. (2001); Levitt (1998); Miller and 
Bahnson (2002); and Tzur and Yaari (1999)  assert that EM is harmful to the 
representation and transparency of financial reports. Schipper (1989) develops a 
framework to detect the intention to perform EM, and conditions that give rise to 
EM. Schipper (1989) notes that “by ‘earnings management’ I really mean 
‘disclosure management ‘in the sense of a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as 
opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process)” (p. 92). 
Although Schipper (1989) is in support of the argument that EM is harmful, he also 
acknowledges the beneficial aspects of EM; for instance, in revealing private 
information. One commonly cited study by Healy and Wahlen (1999) supports the 
view that EM is an abusive practice. “Earnings management occurs when managers 
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use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers” (Healy & Wahlen, 1999, p. 368). EM in the 
pernicious group is opportunistic and driven by self-interest. 
However, Arya et al. (2003) argue that unmanaged earnings are not necessarily 
always better for shareholders; to some extent, managed earnings to conceal 
information can also be beneficial to shareholders. The Chinese phrase 
“guoyoubuji”, from the Analects of Confucius, which states that excess is just as 
bad as a deficiency, precisely fits with Arya et al.’s observations on the extent of 
transparency and EM in financial reporting. Arya et al. (2003) suggest that 
transparency in financial report serves the shareholders only up to a turning point; 
beyond that point, the increased transparency will tend to damage the interests of 
shareholders due to the lack of company privacy. In other words, a certain level of 
transparency in financial reporting motivates better performance, but too much may 
inhibit it adversely. 
Ronen and Yaari (2008, p. 27) disagree and point out two main weaknesses of the 
definition of EM provided by Healy and Wahlen (1999). First, there is no clear 
separation between EM and normal activities that output earnings. Second, it is 
arbitrary to conclude that EM is harmful and misleading. To make up for the two 
deficiencies, Ronen and Yaari (2008) develop a three-part alternative definition of 
EM, where “Earnings management is a collection of managerial decisions that 
result in not reporting the true short-term, value-maximizing earnings as known to 
management. Earnings management can be beneficial, it signals long-term value; 
pernicious, it conceals short- or long-term value; neutral, it reveals the true short-
term performance. The managed earnings result from taking production/investment 
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actions before earnings are realized, or making accounting choices that affect the 
earnings numbers, and their interpretation after the true earnings are realized” (p. 
27). Ronen and Yaari (2008) propose that EM can fit in all categories, being 
potentially beneficial, neutral, or pernicious.  
Thus the definition of Ronen and Yaari (2008) tends to be more comprehensive in 
describing EM. 
3.2.2.2 A constructive definition of earnings management 
A constructive definition of earnings management was developed by Ning (2009). 
Ning (2009) reviews the literature and finds that EM, earnings manipulation, and 
earnings fraud are often considered as synonymous. To overcome the 
inconsistencies in definitions, Ning (2009) develops a deliberate definition of EM 
composed of earnings management, earnings fraud, and creative accounting.  
Earnings manipulation refers to “the management’s action taken to bring about the 
desired level of reporting earnings” (Ning, 2009, p. 36).  Ning (2009) differentiates 
the scope of earnings manipulation, EM, earnings fraud, and creative accounting. 
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Figure 3-1 The components of earnings manipulation  
 
(Source: adapted from Ning, 2009, p. 34) 
Based on Ning (2009), Figure 3-1 demonstrates the key components of earnings 
manipulation, comprising EM, earnings fraud, and creative accounting. As we can 
see from Figure 3-1, earnings fraud is the most aggressive type of manipulation, 
which violates accounting standards and corporate laws. Creative accounting is a 
relatively mild type of manipulation that uses the vagueness created by the lack of 
relevant standards and laws, while EM is undertaken using the discretion accorded 
by accounting standards and corporate law.  
In order to develop a comprehensive definition of EM, this study combines the 
definitions of Ronen and Yaari (2008) and Ning (2009). This study agrees with the 
opinion that EM can be beneficial, pernicious, or neutral. Also, this study accepts 
the classification of EM and its counterparts as specified by Ning (2009).  After 
adjustment and integration, this study defines EM as follows. 
Earnings 
Manipulation
in which 
“management takes 
deliberate steps to 
bring reported 
earnings to a 
desired level” (p. 
33).
Earnings Management
“refers to the earnings manipulation 
through exercising the discretion 
accorded by accounting standards and 
corporate laws, and/or structuring 
activities in such a way that expected firm 
value is not affected negatively” (p. 33).
Paper Earnings 
Management 
(PEM)
Real Earnings 
Management 
(REM)
Earnings Fraud
“refers to the earnings manipulation by 
violating accounting standards and 
corporate laws, and/or structuring 
activities in such a way that reduces 
expected firm value” (p. 33).
Paper Earnings 
Fraud 
(PEF)
Real Earnings 
Fraud (REF)
Creative Accounting,
“refers to the earnings manipulation 
practices that do not violate accounting 
standards or corporate laws because of the 
lack of relevant standards or laws, for 
example, when firms engage in business 
innovations” (p. 33).
Paper Creative 
Accounting 
(PCA)
Real Creative 
Accounting
(RCA) 
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EM refers to practices of management designed to bring reported earnings to the 
desired level.  It occurs either by using the discretion afforded by accounting 
standards and corporate laws, or through a lack of relevant accounting standards or 
corporate laws. EM can be beneficial, pernicious, or neutral.  
This section developed the definition of EM for this study. The next section briefly 
discusses the common strategies used in EM. 
3.2.3 EM practices 
The general strategies employed to manage earnings provide a way to perceive the 
incentives of EM (Scott, 2012).  Four common EM strategies are presented as 
follows.   
The first strategy has been described as “taking a bath” (Scott, 2012, p. 425).  
Taking a bath represents the behaviour that occurs when a definite loss is happening 
in a firm, and the firm reports a larger loss by writing off assets and taking 
advantage of accrual reversal to increase the chance of reporting profits in the future. 
The second strategy is minimizing income. Minimizing income usually happens for 
the purpose of income tax consideration, or in politically visible firms with a high 
profit where capital assets and intangibles are written off. Thirdly, maximizing 
income is prevalent for the purpose of bonuses or avoiding violation of a debt 
covenant. The fourth strategy is income smoothing (Wild, Subramanyam, & Halsey, 
2007).  The primary motivation for income smoothing is to satisfy risk-averse 
managers’ preferences for obtaining a stable bonus stream and guaranteeing 
relatively constant compensation. In addition, income smoothing helps to avoid 
violation of the covenant and smooths the covenant ratio over time.  Managers 
smooth income to protect themselves from the risk of low reported income and 
subsequent dismissal. 
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3.2.4 EM techniques 
Specific accounting techniques are used in practice to realise earnings strategies. 
This section reviews EM techniques. 
Mulford and Comiskey (2002) find that the most commonly used EM technique is 
to take advantage of the flexibility that exists in GAAP among earnings 
management examples detected by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
of the US.  A summary of EM within the boundaries of GAAP is presented in 
Appendix 3. 
When EM goes beyond the limits of the flexibility allowed by GAAP, it can become 
abusive by using fraud (e. g., improperly recognizing revenue, improperly charging 
asset write-offs against acquisition reserves, improper cost capitalization, 
misrepresenting the payment status of accounts, or improperly holding open 
accounting periods and continuing to book sales).  Among the examples of EM 
exposed by the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) of SEC, 
revenue recognition and expense recognition are identified as two major areas in 
which EM often occurs  (Mulford & Comiskey, 2002). 
The EM strategies and techniques employed by managers vary from situation to 
situation.  To a large extent, the EM strategy employed depends on a manager’s 
purpose or incentive. Therefore, management incentive plays an important role in 
the selection of the strategy to manage earnings.  The next section introduces 
examples of the common incentives and motivations for managers to manage 
earnings. 
3.2.5 Incentives for EM 
This section explores the main incentives for firms to undertake EM. A large body 
of prior literature has been dedicated to studying the drivers behind EM (e. g., Dodd 
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& Rozycki, 2008; Mulford & Comiskey, 2002; Ronen & Yaari, 2008; Scott, 2012).  
This study categorises the common incentives into four main areas: management 
purposes, maintaining a stable earnings stream, stock market purposes, and 
contracting. 
3.2.5.1 Management purposes  
Management compensation is one of the main incentives for EM (Dodd & Rozycki, 
2008).  A close relationship between a CEO’s potential compensation and the value 
of stocks and options holding is more likely to incur EM through discretionary 
accruals (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). When the ownership of the company is 
widely dispersed, and managers own a small fraction of the company, the managers’ 
personal income won’t be affected by the company’s value. In this circumstance, 
managers may act in ways to increase their private benefits, which may reduce the 
value of investors’ claims.  Therefore, the managers’ insulation from the company’s 
performance may lead to conflicts between owner and manager, and result in 
reducing the company value.  The alternative option is to associate managers’ 
compensation with the company’s share price, aiming to incentivize managers to 
act in line with the shareholders’ interests. However, with this setting, a new set of 
problems emerges. The sensitive association between managers’ bonuses and the 
company’s share price provides an incentive for managers to exploit their discretion 
in reporting earnings and to manipulate the stock price of their company 
(Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Scott, 2012).   
The other management incentives behind EM may include CEO turnover, insider 
trading and management buyout (Ronen & Yaari, 2008).  In the case of CEO 
turnover, the existing CEO is motivated to increase his or her bonus and thus to 
increase his or her chance of obtaining a directorship.  CEO turnover-motivated EM 
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is not rare in reality. One famous example refers to when Louis Gerstner took over 
the CEO position at IBM, and billions of dollars’ worth of charges comprised of 
expenses related to this turnaround and future business were written off in the same 
year. To a large extent, these write-offs were the reason for the earnings increases 
reported in subsequent years (Wild et al., 2007). 
Insider trading is based on private information. A violation of insider trading rules 
occurs when a trader takes advantage of material nonpublic information to make 
purchases or sales. Insider trading often motivates EM activities, given the fact that 
insider trading is closely tied to private information. Prior research shows that 
managers are more likely to sell their shares during a period when earnings are 
overstated, in violation of  GAAP (Beneish, 1999). Also, insider traders are found 
more likely to sell (buy) stocks when they manipulate earnings upward (downward) 
(Boyer, Ciccone, & Zhang, 2006). 
A management buyout is “a leveraged buyout in which managers of the firm to be 
taken private are also equity investors” (DePamphilis, 2009, p. 5). Managers who 
purchase the firm would like to pay as little as possible. Therefore the buyout 
process provides the managers with the incentive to manage earnings downward 
before buyout so that the purchase price decreases. Studies by Marquardt and 
Wiedman (2004); Perry and Williams (1994) provide evidence of downward 
earnings management before a management buyout. 
3.2.5.2  Stable earnings stream 
When smooth income brings a higher level of dividends and weakens the 
associative relationship between a firm’s expected returns and the market 
portfolio’s expected returns, there will be a demand for a stable earnings stream 
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(Beidleman, 1973).  Income smoothing deliberately normalizes a firm’s income 
with the aim of meeting a required target (Riahi-Belkaoui & Jones, 2004).   
Companies are motivated to engage in EM to smooth out any apparent volatility in 
returns. Through EM, the excess returns in good years can be hidden as a reserve 
for the bad years to smooth out undesired declines in earnings (Coffee Jr, 2004). 
Often the managers’ current-period compensation is conditional on the history of 
outcomes; managers would like to smooth the earnings stream at the time of the 
report. Apart from the reserve and compensation reasons, annual corporate income, 
proxy contests and foreign trade regulation also provide incentives for managers to 
smooth earnings (Riahi-Belkaoui & Jones, 2004). 
3.2.5.3  Stock market purposes  
A large body of prior study provides evidence that the practice of EM has an impact 
on firms’ stock performance (e.g., Chou, Gombola, & Liu, 2006; Rangan, 1998; 
Teoh et al., 1998a; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998b). Managers engage in EM to 
create an impact on the share price and aim to reduce the cost of capital (Wild et al., 
2007). 
The major incentive for EM from the stock market perspective refers to the issue of 
initial public offerings (IPOs) (Scott, 2012).  EM has been used by issuing firms to 
manipulate their stock price. Managers manage firms’ earnings to achieve a higher 
stock price before a firm goes public (Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson, & Sefcik, 
1992).  There is evidence that discretionary accruals (a proxy for EM level) are 
often unusually high around the IPO year (Teoh et al., 1998a).  Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), among others, find that issuing firms 
often have significant negative abnormal returns for up to five years after the 
offering date. Rangan (1998) finds discretionary accruals-associated EM in the 
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period surrounding seasoned equity offerings (SEO) are negatively correlated with 
the earnings changes in the subsequent year. Rangan’s study provides support for 
the argument that the stock tends to be overpriced during the offering because of 
EM and the subsequent reversal of discretionary accruals would cause earnings to 
decline in the post-offering period.  
Apart from the strong incentives for EM during the issuing period, when a firm fails 
to meet investors’ earnings expectations, it can also cause damage to the firm’s 
reputation and lead to an adverse influence on the firm’s share price and cost of 
capital.  Therefore, during the dividend payout period, firms are motivated to 
manage their earnings to meet the expectations of investors (Scott, 2012). In 
addition, they are motivated to meet certain target of earnings benchmarks, while 
mergers and acquisitions, bond covenants and debt, negotiations with employees, 
and regulatory constraints (tax consideration) also motivate firms to engage in EM 
(Ronen & Yaari, 2008). 
Other stock market-related factors that motivate firms to undertake EM may include 
the drive to meet the quarterly earnings predictions of financial analysts, to increase 
income before acquisition, and the desire to decrease earnings before leveraged 
management buyout (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Erickson & Wang, 1999; Wu, 
1997). 
3.2.5.4  Contracting 
In addition to stock market effects, contracting also provides motivations for 
managers to engage in EM.  For instance, managerial compensation contracts 
usually relate bonuses to the companies’ profit; thus in order to meet the required 
earnings level to acquire bonuses, managers may engage in EM (Wild et al., 2007).   
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Debt covenant is another type of contract that motivates EM. The debt covenant 
hypothesis of positive accounting theory predicts EM may be undertaken for 
covenant purposes (Healy, 1985; Scott, 2012). Wild et al. (2007) also suggest that 
EM provides a convenient solution for managers when they have to pay a high price 
for the violation of debt covenants. The rationale is that violation of a debt covenant 
can be very costly for firms; therefore, to avoid violation and avoid even being close 
to a violation of debt covenant, managers manage earnings. Debt covenant-
motivated EM has been discussed in a number of previous studies. Sweeney (1994) 
finds that managers manage earnings upward significantly in a sample of defaulted 
debt covenant firms.  DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that, in the year before the 
year a debt covenant is violated, EM or discretionary accruals are more active. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994) document conservative behaviour in 
troubled companies; they find companies facing a violation of debt covenant 
manage income downwards to use the reduced earnings as a signal to all the 
involved information users and in preparation for the subsequent contract 
renegotiations.   
This section has discussed the four main incentives (management purposes, stable 
earnings stream, stock market purposes, and contracting) behind EM; the next 
section reviews some other incentives triggering EM. 
3.2.5.5 Other incentives 
EM activities are also impacted by the trade-offs between benefits and costs of 
managing earnings. As Watts and Zimmerman (1990) assert, managers will engage 
in EM when the benefit of EM overcomes its cost. For example, the presence of 
adverse political activity may induce managers to manage earnings downward to 
minimize political cost; when the risk associated is high, smoothing earnings to 
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avoid volatility is required; and when there are changes in top management, 
aligning with the new managers’ interests becomes a strong incentive. 
A summary of earnings management motivation is provided by Mulford and 
Comiskey (2002), who differentiate the conditions that motivate EM and the 
underlying incentives to manage earnings. Table 3-1 presents the various incentives 
and the associated conditions that lead to the practice of  EM.  
Table 3-1 Conditions and associated incentives for earnings management 
Condition Incentive 
Earnings are somewhat short of the consensus 
earnings forecast in the market. 
To avoid a potentially sharp drop in share price. 
A firm is preparing for an initial public offering of 
its shares. 
To present the best possible earnings picture so as to 
maximise the price at which the issue is sold. 
Earnings are just above the minimum level required 
to earn incentive compensation, or close to 
exceeding the maximum beyond which no 
additional incentive compensation is earned. 
To cause earnings to remain between the minimum 
and maximum earnings level so as to maximise 
incentive compensation. 
A firm, either because of size or industry 
membership, or both, is a potential target for adverse 
political activity. 
To minimise the political costs of size and/or 
industry membership by avoiding what might be 
considered excessive profit levels. 
A firm is close to a violation of an earnings-related 
financial covenant in a credit or debt agreement. 
To avoid the potential adverse effects of a covenant 
violation, for example, an interest rate increase, a 
demand for security or immediate repayment. 
Earnings are either somewhat above or somewhat 
below a long-term trend believed by management to 
be sustainable. 
To avoid an improper market response to earnings 
being temporarily off trend. 
Earnings volatility is induced by a series of 
nonrecurring items. 
To reduce earnings volatility so that a valuation 
penalty, associated with a perceived higher level of 
risk, is not assessed. 
A change in the top management of the firm has 
taken place. 
To take large write-offs immediately upon the 
arrival of new management, relieving future results.  
Large losses associated with restructuring and 
related charges have been accrued in the past. 
To reverse any overstated portion of the accruals in 
order to achieve earnings goals in later periods. 
(Source: Mulford & Comiskey, 2002, p. 61) 
As Table 3-1 shows, the EM incentive arises in order to avoid undesirable situations. 
The management incentives behind EM include reducing political costs and 
intervention by government agencies (e.g., antitrust regulators and the Internal 
Revenue Service);  obtaining support from government (e.g., subsidies and 
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protection from external competition); and combatting demands from labour unions 
(Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Wild et al., 2007). 
Table 3-1 shows that the conditions that motivate EM are usually related to weak 
internal control, turnover of top management, complex transactions and 
inexperienced boards of directors. The next section further discusses the conditions 
that give rise to EM. 
3.2.6 Conditions giving rise to EM 
Regardless of whether EM is done within or outside the flexibility of accounting 
principles, it is purposeful and motivated by certain conditions and incentives, 
which can vary over a broad range. For managers, bringing earnings to a desired 
level is tempting and can be the main drive to engage in EM.  Different firm 
conditions generate different management incentives and lead to different 
expectations or desires with regard to earnings. The most discussed incentive is 
raised by conflicts between managers and shareholders (principal-agency conflict); 
for instance, managers’ compensation maximization. When managers’ 
compensation is tied to the performance of a firm or the level of earnings, it provides 
an incentive for managers to manage earnings to maximise their compensation 
packages, which may contain bonuses, cash payments, and/or stock. The life cycle 
position of the company also plays an important role in EM.  One typical example 
is when a company is facing the issuance of an initial public offerings (IPO). 
Whether it is to achieve the minimum level of earnings required for an IPO or to 
maximise the share price with a better earnings picture, threshold firms facing IPO 
issuance are motivated to manage earnings. 
Conditions that increase EM practices constitute an important research issue 
discussed in previous studies (Schipper, 1989). By reviewing the previous literature, 
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this section briefly discusses the conditions that give rise to EM. This study 
summarises three conditions that can give rise to EM activities, in Section 3.2.6.1, 
Section 3.2.6.2, and Section 3.2.6.3. Prior studies are divided into three topics: firm 
performance; information asymmetry; and accounting standards. 
3.2.6.1 EM, corporate governance and firm performance 
A firm’s corporate governance is closely related to the extent of EM. For example, 
the corporate or financial background of the board directors and audit committee 
members is an important factor in constraining EM. Also, there is evidence that 
frequent meetings between the board and audit committee reduce the probability of 
EM (Xie, Davidson III, & DaDalt, 2003). 
The relationship between EM and firm performance is one of the main streams in 
EM studies. Prior studies find EM is used by managers to window-dress their 
company’s performance. Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999) provide 
evidence in support of a positive correlation between discretionary accruals and a 
firm’s return on assets. Lee, Li, and Yue (2006) expand on the work of Dechow et 
al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999). Lee et al. (2006) present evidence consistent with 
that of Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999) concerning the relationship 
between EM and firm performance. In addition, Lee et al. (2006) find that EM is 
positively associated with expected earnings growth in the future. Therefore, prior 
studies in general indicate that EM is used to improve current firm performance as 
well as to increase the future expected earnings growth to achieve a favourable 
financial picture.  
3.2.6.2 EM and information asymmetry 
The extent of information asymmetry plays an important role in EM activities. 
Information asymmetry refers to the situation where one party has access to more 
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or better information than the other party. Information asymmetry causes an 
imbalance of power between managers and shareholders, information producers 
and information users (Mishra, Heide, & Cort, 1998).  
Information asymmetry between management and shareholders contributes to 
engagement in EM (Dye, 1988; Trueman & Titman, 1988). When the information 
asymmetry is severe, it is difficult and costly for shareholders to monitor the 
manager’s behaviour. Richardson (2000) conducted an empirical test to investigate 
the relationship between information asymmetry and EM, and the findings are in 
support of a positively and statistically significant relationship between the extent 
of information asymmetry and EM. Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) and Welker 
(1995) find a negative relationship between bid-ask spreads1 and firm disclosure 
policy; and provide support for the theory of a positive relationship between the 
presence of information asymmetry and the practice of EM. Therefore, the extent 
of information asymmetry is the second condition that gives rise to EM.  
3.2.6.3 EM and accounting standards 
Since EM is conducted by taking advantage of the flexibility in accounting 
standards, the adoption of accounting standards has significant implications for EM. 
The impact of accounting standards on EM has been studied in various markets.  
In the countries of the European Union, Callao and Jarne (2010) find the practice 
of discretionary accruals increased after the adoption of IFRS (international 
financial reporting standards). In contrast, Zéghal, Chtourou, and Sellami (2011) 
                                                          
1  In the literature, information asymmetry is measured in three main ways: analysts’ forecast 
measures (Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999); investment opportunity set measures (Gaver & 
Gaver, 1993; Penman, 1996); and microstructure measures (Choi, Salandro, & Shastri, 1988; George, 
Kaul, & Nimalendran, 1991; Stoll, 1989). The measurement of bid-ask spreads and dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts for information asymmetry are most prevalent (Brown & Han, 1992; Clarke & 
Shastri, 2000; Richardson, 2000). 
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show that the mandatory introduction of IAS/IFRS reduced the level of EM based 
on French listed companies from 2003 to 2006. Similarly, Barth, Landsman, and 
Lang (2008) find that 21 countries that apply IAS have a lower level of EM, 
indicating that the application of IAS may result in higher accounting quality. 
In Germany, German GAAP, IAS and US GAAP are all allowed (Goncharov & 
Zimmermann, 2007), and Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) present evidence 
that there is no significant difference in the level of EM under German GAAP or 
IFRS. However, Goncharov and Zimmermann (2007) find there is a lower level of 
EM under US GAAP than German GAAP or IAS. In general, the prior literature 
shows that the accounting standards employed by the company/country do 
influence the practice of EM. When the accounting standards are imprecise or 
nonexistent, the practice of EM tends to increase (Nelson, Elliott, & Tarpley, 2002).  
The other conditions that can affect the extent to which EM is practiced include 
non-audit service fees (Kinney Jr & Libby, 2002); the issuance of IPOs and SEOs; 
changes in top management; and large losses or being close to the minimum level 
required to earn management compensation (Mulford & Comiskey, 2002).  
This section reviews the EM topics in the prior literature. As discussed in Chapter 
2, agency problems are a strong driver for EM. However, despite the strong 
assertion of the AC/EM relationship suggested by agency theory, the empirical 
evidence for an AC/EM relationship is scant. Therefore, the next section introduces 
agency costs, which constitute the other key element in this study. 
3.3 Agency costs 
Agency theory provides a theoretical basis for research issues relating to the 
separation of ownership (principal) and management (agent) (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  The separation of principal and agent generates opportunistic acts by agents 
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to manage earnings to increase their wealth. Thus, agency theory studies frequently 
fall under the category of EM (Dodd & Rozycki, 2008). Agency costs occur due to 
the conflicts between not only principals and agents but also between principals and 
principals. The next section explains and compares principal-agent and principal-
principal agency costs. 
3.3.1 PA agency conflict 
PA agency costs occur as a result of the separation of principal and agent, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Agency theory asserts that an agent will be interested in 
pursuing his or her objectives, instead of always maximizing the benefits of the 
principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1979).  
Agency conflict varies with the economic, social, and political context (Scrimgeour 
& Duppati, 2014). The fixed image of PA agency conflict in developed countries 
does not suit the context of emerging economies. Typical PA agency conflict caused 
by the separation of ownership and management is not sufficient to describe the 
agency problem in emerging economies. This is because in emerging economies, 
with weak shareholder protection, ownership is often highly concentrated in a 
family or with the state instead of being widely held (Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999). When ownership is dominated by a controlling shareholder, agency 
conflict between controlling and minority shareholders is most likely to arise (Peng, 
Wang, & Jiang, 2008). 
3.3.2 PP agency conflict 
PP agency costs occur when there is a conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders. In developed economies, a large body of studies has focused on PA 
agency conflicts (Gillan, 2006; John & Senbet, 1998; Singh & Davidson III, 2003). 
However, in emerging economies, PP agency costs are the major concern of CG 
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(Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). PP agency costs in emerging 
economies originated from problematic agency conflicts in an attempt to adjust to 
suit the context of emerging economies (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 
2005; Young et al., 2008). A concentrated firm ownership structure has become 
prevalent in response to the traditional owner/manager conflict in emerging 
economies (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000). Without effective external 
governance mechanisms, a concentrated firm ownership structure intensifies 
conflict between controlling and minority shareholders (LaRiviere, McMahon, & 
Neilson, 2017; Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005), and it has become an important 
source of PP agency costs (Young et al., 2008). In India, the agency costs in mixed 
ownership firms are found to be lower than those in concentrated state-owned firms 
(Locke & Duppati, 2014). Conflict between family shareholders and non-family 
shareholders represents another form of PP agency conflict. Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) find that in family businesses, when a descendant serves as CEO, agency 
costs caused by the conflicts between family and non-family shareholders is higher 
than the traditional PA agency costs in non-family firms. Specifically, a comparison 
between PA conflict and PP conflict is provided in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2 Comparisons between PA and PP conflict 
 PA PP 
Goal 
incongruence 
Between fragmented, dispersed 
shareholders and professional 
managers. 
Between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders. 
Manifestations 
Strategies that benefit entrenched 
managers at the expense of 
shareholders in general. 
Strategies that benefit controlling 
shareholders at the expense of 
minority shareholders. 
Institutional 
protection of 
minority 
shareholders 
Formal constraints (e.g. judicial 
reviews and courts) set an upper 
bound on potential expropriation by 
majority shareholders. Informal 
norms generally adhere to 
shareholder wealth maximization. 
Formal institutional protection is 
often lacking, corrupt, or 
unenforced. Informal norms 
typically favour the interests of 
controlling shareholders over 
minority shareholders. 
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Market for 
corporate control 
Active as a governance mechanism 
‘of last resort’. 
Inactive even in principle. 
Concentrated ownership thwarts 
notions of takeovers. 
Ownership 
pattern 
Dispersed - holding 5% to 20% 
equity is considered as ‘concentrated 
ownership’. A shareholder with 5% 
equity stake is regarded as a 
‘blockholder’. 
Concentrated - often more than 50% 
of equity is held by a controlling 
shareholder. Often structured as a 
‘pyramid’ where cash flow rights are 
greater than ownership rights. 
Boards of 
directors 
Legitimate legal and social 
institutions with a fiduciary duty to 
safeguard shareholders’ interests. 
In emerging economies, boards often 
have yet to establish institutional 
legitimacy and thus are ineffective. 
Top management 
team 
Professional managers who often 
have made their way up through the 
ranks or are hired from outside after 
extensive search and scrutiny of 
qualifications. Monitored internally 
by boards of directors and externally 
by the managerial labour market. 
Typically family members or 
associates. Monitored mainly 
through family consensus or self-
regulation adhering to ‘gentlemen’s 
agreements’. 
(Source: adapted from Young et al., 2008)  
Both PA and PP agency costs are important components of agency costs. As Table 
3-2 shows, PA and PP agency conflicts occur in different contexts. PP agency 
conflicts often take place where shareholder protection is weak, boards are 
ineffective, and ownership structure is highly concentrated. When the shareholding 
is dispersed, and shareholders’ interests are safeguarded by legitimate legal and 
social institutions with a fiduciary duty, conflicts among shareholders tend to be 
replaced with conflicts between managers and shareholders. Therefore, ownership 
structure, institutional settings, legal protection, and CG mechanisms are 
fundamental in shaping agency conflicts. Emerging economies are characterized by 
having weak legal protection, high information asymmetry and concentrated 
ownership structure, which provide the economic and institutional roots for PP 
agency conflicts. In developed markets, with dispersed ownership structure and 
strong legal protection of minority shareholders, the balance is tilted towards PA 
agency conflicts.   
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3.3.2.1 Prevalence of PP agency conflict 
There is a large gap between developed countries and emerging economies in terms 
of corporate governance (Zhao, Anand, & Mitchell, 2005).   
“Emerging economies are low-income, rapid-growth countries using economic 
liberalization as their primary engine of growth” (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 
2000, p. 249).  Emerging economies are split into developing economies (e. g., 
developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East) and 
transition economies (e. g., the former Soviet and China) (Hoskisson et al., 2000).  
The economic and institutional development in emerging economies varies with the 
economies’ context (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005).  In response 
to the various institutional contexts in emerging economies, companies adjust their 
corporate governance strategies correspondingly (Boyer & Hollingsworth, 1997; 
Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002; Peng, 2003; Peng, Lee, & Wang, 2005; Peng & Zhou, 
2005). Many emerging economies, such as China, Russia, South Korea and 
Thailand, have adopted CG strategies from the Anglo-American system. However, 
these emerging economies have only inherited the form of CG in developed 
countries, not the substance (Backman, 1999).   
Compare to developed countries, institutional settings and organizational activities 
in emerging economies are relatively weak and unstable (Young et al., 2008).  
Concentrated ownership is the main attribute of the prevalent PP agency costs in 
emerging economies as minority shareholders would not exist with a dispersed 
ownership structure (Young et al., 2008).  
3.3.2.2 The consequence of PP conflict 
Young et al. (2008) summarise multilevel organizational consequences and primary 
manifestations of PP conflicts. PP conflicts have consequences at (from highest to 
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lowest) the country level, the intermediate level and the firm level. For individual 
firms, the effect of PP agency conflict is twofold. First, PP agency conflict affects 
monitoring and bonding costs, and second, it affects the company’s organizational 
strategy and competitiveness.  
Both monitoring costs and bonding costs are high in emerging economies because 
of PP conflicts. Young et al. (2008) propose three reasons for the high monitoring 
costs. First, due to the ambiguous institutional structure, the terms of contracts are 
difficult to specify and measure and this makes monitoring more difficult. Second, 
managers and controlling shareholders are bonded together; as a result, many of the 
traditional monitoring mechanisms, such as the board of directors, become 
inefficient. Third, concentrated ownership leads to decreases in stock market 
liquidity, share prices fail to reflect information sufficiently and this damages the 
monitoring capacity of the capital market in emerging economies. Bonding costs, 
as an implicit guarantee against expropriation, would tend to attract more minority 
shareholders. Examples of bonding costs include building up a reputation for being 
opposed to expropriation, and issuing American Depository Receipts (ADRs) to 
alleviate minority shareholders’ concerns. 
The other consequence of PP conflicts lies in their effect on organizational strategy 
and competitiveness. With concentrated ownership and inefficient monitoring 
mechanisms, firm strategies are likely to be corrupted. Actions such as employing 
related employees, enhancing controlling shareholder’s interests by harming firm 
performance, reducing expenditure on innovation, and increasing cost capital for 
higher dividends to attract minority shareholders, damage the firm’s valuation and 
competitiveness, and further worsen PP agency conflicts.  
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3.4 Corporate Governance mechanisms 
The definitions of CG provided in the literature are not unanimous (Gillan, 2006). 
In general, CG is considered as a system that controls and directs companies, and 
CG mechanisms are categorized into two groups: internal governance mechanisms 
and external governance mechanisms (Gillan, 2006; Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 
2002).   
3.4.1 Internal governance mechanisms 
Internal governance mechanisms include the controlling mechanisms operating in 
the various groups inside a firm, as demonstrated in Figure 3-2.   
Figure 3-2 Internal corporate governance mechanisms 
 
(Source: adapted from Gillan, 2006, p. 384) 
Figure 3-2 shows that internal corporate governance can be divided into five 
categories, including the board of directors, (e.g., the director’s roles, the board 
structure, and the board incentives); managerial incentives; capital structure; bylaw 
and charter provisions; and internal control systems. The following five subsections 
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provide reviews of each of these five components of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
3.4.1.1 Board of directors 
The board of directors is comprised of a group of individuals who are elected to 
represent stockholders to monitor a firm’s management (Weisbach, 1988). A large 
body of prior studies has focused on the board of directors as an important factor in 
internal CG mechanisms, and shows that management characteristics have a 
significant impact on the engagement of EM (e.g., Du, Lai, & Pei, 2016; Qi, Lin, 
Tian, & Lewis, 2017).  
The primary roles of the board of directors are to make decisions on behalf of their 
shareholders and to fairly represent the interests of shareholders. Board directors 
are divided into two categories: inside directors who are also the managers of the 
company, and outside directors who are independent employees of the company.  
The board characteristics present great potential for agency conflict. The prior 
research presents evidence that a high proportion of inside directors motivates the 
board to make decisions more beneficial to the managers (Reddy, Locke, & 
Scrimgeour, 2010).  In China, Chen et al. (2006) find that an increase in the 
proportion of outside directors on the board contributes to the reduction of fraud 
committed by companies.  
Other board characteristics include board size, board diligence, and board expertise. 
Board size is an important element in the internal CG mechanism and closely relates 
to agency problems. There are pros and cons for both small and large board sizes. 
Small boards are easier to manage and tend to be more effective. However, large 
boards tend to have expanded resources since more board members have external 
sources of information  (Eisenberg et al., 1998).   
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A large body of prior literature has established that board diligence and board 
expertise are essential board characteristics.  For instance,  researchers have found 
that more diligent boards lead to more effective management (Conger, Finegold, & 
Lawler, 1998; Vafeas, 1999). The diligence of the board can be observed in terms 
of the number of board meetings, the level of preparation for meetings, attention in 
meetings, and action after meetings. (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, & Riley, 2002).  
A more diligent board is expected to be more efficient, caters for shareholders’ 
demands better, and aligns manager’s incentives with shareholders better. 
Therefore board diligence is considered an important indicator of agency conflicts.  
The monitoring role of board directors is important in improving CG quality 
(Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). There are several factors that limit boards’ effectiveness 
in carrying out their monitoring functions. The first factor that hinders board 
effectiveness relates to the limited time spent by the directors on each meeting or 
on the business of the board. Outside directors may take a role in many boardrooms, 
and typically, when they finally sit in a boardroom, most of the time they will be 
occupied by formalities like management reports, which leave no time for directors 
to exchange meaningful ideas. Particularly with large boards, there is often 
insufficient time for all the members to express their ideas.  
Secondly, the complexity of information makes it difficult for board directors to 
carry out their duties. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) emphasize that managers and 
directors are supposed to devote themselves to organizing and conceptualizing the 
provided data, instead of drowning in the complexity of the data they receive. Even 
with well-organized data, outside directors may still find it difficult to make a 
decision based on the existing information, considering that outside/independent 
directors may lack sufficient experience and knowledge in the particular industry 
or company affairs. This phenomenon has led to the proposition that the more time 
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directors spend on company affairs, the more diligent they are, and the more open 
exchange of ideas they have, the better they can manage and monitor the company.  
Other factors that limit board effectiveness include lack of cohesiveness, 
overpowered CEOs/top management, and confused accountability (Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992, p. 23). To help board directors monitor a company’s performance 
more efficiently, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) propose measures such as reducing the 
board size moderately, maintaining at least a 2% ratio of independent directors to 
other directors, and increasing board meeting frequency and board meeting duration. 
Board directors are expected to be diligent enough to spend at least 100 hours 
annually on each board to prepare for regular meetings, reviewing reports in 
advance. Notably, board diligence has an important impact on how effectively 
boards carry out their monitoring functions, and is thus an important indicator of 
the company’s CG.  
The importance of board diligence is supported by empirical studies. For example, 
in Malaysia, Foo and Zain (2010) tested the relationship between board diligence 
and the firm’s liquidity, and suggest that board diligence indicates active 
monitoring of the firm’s management and more alignment between managers’ 
incentives and shareholders. Thus board diligence is expected to mitigate agency 
conflicts as well as information asymmetry and to positively associate with liquidity. 
Their empirical results support the hypotheses. However, there are also opposing 
arguments in the literature. For instance, Vafeas (1999) examines whether the 
frequency of board meeting addresses CG problems, and finds a negative 
association between the frequency of board meetings and firm performance, which 
indicates that board meetings with regard to CG serve as a reactive approach instead 
of a proactive one. The increased number of board meetings, in this case, led to 
weaker CG or firm performance.  
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Board independence is another important factor in CG (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990).  
An independent board is considered a necessity for good corporate governance. 
Outside or independent directors with multiple directorships have a strong incentive 
to contribute to the decision-making process in order to build their reputations as 
experts (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  However, the effectiveness of 
independent board members can be compromised in a number of ways. One 
example relates to the expertise of outside directors. Lacking sufficient background 
may limit outside directors’ insight into a particular business, and consequently, 
affect the firm’s development in the long run. The ‘busyness’ of board directors is 
also associated with CG quality. Prior research indicates that directors with multiple 
directorships tend to be more at risk of opportunistic behaviour (Gilson, 1990). To 
prevent directors with multiple directorships engaging in EM, the quality of audit 
service must increase with the number of directors with multiple directorships 
(Carcello et al. 2002). Also, when a director is sitting on a large number of boards, 
due to the level of distraction, the director may not be able to provide thoughtful 
and quality oversight of the firm’s executives. To measure the degree of board 
independence, the percentage of inside directors on the board is often used (Ahmed 
& Duellman, 2007).  
3.4.1.2 Managerial incentives 
Managerial incentives are important components of internal governance 
mechanisms, and managerial incentives are, to a large extent, influenced by 
ownership structure. As in other emerging economies, the ownership of listed 
companies in China is highly concentrated, as a result of the antecedent institutional 
conditions.  
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The concept of corporate governance was introduced in China by the end of the 
1980s.  As a first step to introducing CG, a legalistic CG system was developed, 
similar to the Anglo-American CG system. However, the previously enforced 
central planning economy led to the phenomenon of a concentrated ownership 
structure with dominant state-shareholders in Chinese listed companies (Wei & 
Geng, 2008). In China, State-owned enterprises are invested in or participated in 
not only by the Chinese central government but also by local and provincial 
governments. Under China’s multi-layered governmental system, the target 
interests of central State-owned enterprises and local State-owned enterprises are 
different from each other.  Central government pays more attention to preserving 
or increasing the value of state-owned assets.  Local governments focus mainly on 
state-owned enterprises’ contributions to the local economy, municipal 
construction, employment, and tax revenue. Chinese local governments even 
provide subsidies to the relevant local state-owned listed companies to manage their 
earnings and further enhance their operating performance. In other words, “local 
governments intimately dance with listed firms to the tune set by the central 
government” (X. Chen et al., 2008, p. 273). Therefore, highly concentrated 
ownership in China produces managerial incentives that have the potential to 
worsen agency problems.  
3.4.1.3 Capital structure 
Debt and equity are the two main means for companies to raise capital externally 
in capital markets. The proportions assigned to debt and equity establish the 
company’s capital structure. There are pros and cons for both debt financing and 
equity financing. The most obvious advantage of financing with debt refers to the 
interest tax shield since the interests on borrowings are often tax-deductible.  
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Prior literature has suggested that debt can act as a self-enforcing governance 
mechanism.  This is because, with the presence of debt, managers are obligated to 
generate enough cash flow to pay off interest and principal, and the potential agency 
costs of free cash flow can be mitigated (Grossman & Hart, 1982; Jensen, 1986, 
1993). However, the opposing argument suggests that the interest on debt is 
relatively cheap and can be easily paid off from the company’s earnings; therefore, 
there is not enough incentive for managers to generate more cash flow.  
The advantage of equity investment is that companies do not take on debt and thus 
have no need to repay an investment. However, the ownership of the business will 
be diluted, as the company accepts the equity investment in exchange for partial 
ownership.   
3.4.1.4 Bylaw and charter provisions 
“The bylaw and charter provisions pertain to those governance features that serve 
as potential barriers to the market for corporate control” (Gillan, 2006, p. 388). 
Examples of governance features acting as bylaw and charter provisions include 
poison pills (a tactic used by companies to make stock shares of the company look 
unattractive, and thus to prevent or discourage hostile takeovers), staggered 
elections, and classified boards. Staggered elections refer to a strategy by which the 
board directors are elected for separated times. In a classified board, the board 
directors serve for different term lengths depending on their particular 
classification.  Poison pills, staggered elections, and classified boards are bylaw and 
charter provisions used by companies to prevent takeover attempts. The advantage 
of these bylaw and charter provisions is to make hostile takeover attempts more 
difficult. The existing literature opposes such CG features, and provides evidence 
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of a negative association between antitakeover measures and firm performance 
(Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Daines & Klausner, 2001; Field & Karpoff, 2002). 
3.4.1.5 Internal control systems 
Internal control systems encompass a set of rules, policies, and procedures by which 
companies maintain environments that stimulate incorruptibility and prevent 
fraudulent activities by management and employees. Internal control systems help 
to provide reasonable assurance on matters such as the reliability of the company’s 
financial report, the company’s effective and efficient operation, and the 
compliance of the company’s activities with applicable laws and regulations. The 
Sarbanes Oxley Act Section 404, as an example of internal control systems, aims 
to reduce corporate fraud by increasing the stringency of procedures and 
requirements for financial reporting. Another example refers to the company codes 
of ethics, which provide a guide to ethical principles that are consistent with the 
company’s core values and a set of standards to which professionals should adhere. 
Breaking the codes of ethics may result in termination or dismissal of management. 
Therefore, an internal control system is an effective measure to make universal 
compliance from all employees easier and to set up better environments for 
management to implement CG.  
3.4.2 External governance mechanism 
External governance mechanisms refer to the outside influences on the governance 
of the firm. As shown in Figure 3-5, consumer groups, clients, and government 
regulations are all sources of eternal governance.  
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Figure 3-3 External governance mechanisms 
 
(Source: adapted from Gillan, 2006, p. 384) 
In a publicly traded firm, external shareholding is one of the external governance 
mechanisms (Gillan, 2006). External shareholding refers to those shares that are 
held by institutions, blockholders, and individuals outside the company. External 
information users usually obtain their financial information from company financial 
reports, which convey the company’s financial information to those outside of the 
firm. When managers’ compensation or promotion is evaluated based on the firm’s 
performance in the stock market, managers are motivated to manage earnings to 
meet the investors’ expectations for their own personal benefit. Therefore, the 
higher the proportion of external shareholding, the greater the potential for agency 
costs. Also, external shareholders provide more incentive to ensure effective 
monitoring. Prior studies provide evidence that increased external shareholdings 
result in better firm performance (Leech & Leahy, 1991; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
Publicly traded firms operate under legal constraints. As a disciplining mechanism, 
corporate control can be effective when internal mechanisms fail. Companies with 
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inappropriate internal control would most probably be associated with poor firm 
performance. As a result, it is easy for other management teams in the market to 
gain control of the company. Therefore, the threat of takeovers in the market 
motivates management to enhance their firm’s performance (Kennedy & Limmack, 
1996; O'Sullivan & Wong, 1999).   
3.5 Research background in China 
This section presents the relevant background of listed companies and the stock 
market in China. Chinese listed companies have less corporate information 
available than do listed companies in developed economies. The gap between 
Chinese listed companies and listed companies in developed economies is 
significant (Wang & Claiborne, 2008).  The main differences include, for instance, 
the ownership structure, and political control of CG. In this section, the distinctive 
features of Chinese CG are discussed.  
3.5.1 State-owned ownership in China 
The State is often the majority shareholder in companies listed in China, and State-
owned enterprises (SOEs) make up a large portion of Chinese listed companies. By 
investigating all the listed companies in China from 1994-2000, X. Chen et al. (2008) 
found that Chinese local governments helped related local State-owned listed 
companies with EM by granting subsidies.  Furthermore, they provide evidence that, 
to a great extent, this behaviour of local governments helped listed companies to 
cross the offering threshold (an average return on equity of 10%, from 1994 to 2001, 
which was regulated by the central government).  With boosted profit, there is less 
chance of listed companies being delisted.  However, from 2001, after the Chinese 
central government became aware that local governments had been involved in EM, 
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the CSRC started to exclude the effect of transitory non-operating profits to refine 
the return on equity (ROE) benchmark. 
In the original work on agency costs by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a zero agency-
cost scenario, by definition, refers to cases of firms owned by a single owner-
manager.  When the firm’s equity is partially owned by managers and partially 
owned by shareholders, agency costs occur due to the separation of management 
and ownership. In modern corporations, which are publicly traded, it is rare that 
managers entirely own the firm’s equity. Therefore, there cannot be no-agency-
costs-based firms among publicly traded firms. Without no-agency-costs-based 
firms, the study of agency costs often lacks a reference point.  
Ang et al. (2000) use data on non-publicly traded firms, where some firms’ 
managers own 100 percent of the equity, to investigate agency costs. Their study 
contributes significantly by estimating agency costs in the so-called no-agency-
costs-based case firms. Their empirical result suggests that agency costs are 
inversely related to the manager’s ownership share, indicating that managerial 
ownership helps to reduce agency costs.  
Ang et al. (2000) find managerial ownership reduces PA agency costs in the US 
market. Agency problems in China are subject to the unique Chinese economic 
environment and institutional system. In China, more than 60% of listed companies 
are State-owned, which is much higher than for their counterparts worldwide. For 
instance, only 0.8% of listed companies in Japan are State-owned, and State 
ownership is  0.08% in the UK, 6.3% in Germany, 5.11% in France, and 23.5% in 
Singapore (Li & Zhang, 2010).  
It is noteworthy that the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms is very different 
and unique compared to other countries. An ownership structure dominated by the 
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State creates conflict between minority shareholders and majority shareholders, 
which is different from the traditional agency costs between the principal (owner) 
and agent (managers). The agency costs caused by conflict between minority 
shareholders and majority shareholders are categorized as PP conflict. PP conflict 
is prevalent in emerging economies with weaker investor protection and companies 
with concentrated ownership structure, as discussed in Section 3.3.2.  
3.5.2 Accounting standards implementation in China 
The Chinese Ministry of Finance issued a series of new accounting standards that 
were convergent with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2006. 
The convergence process of Chinese GAAP with IFRS was divided into four stages 
(Peng & van der Laan Smith, 2010).   
The first stage was from 1993 to 1997, in which a market-oriented accounting 
model was introduced to the Chinese accounting system. The second stage was 
from 1998 to 2000, during which China’s Ministry of Finance issued an Accounting 
System for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises, replacing the 1992 system. Meanwhile, 
ten specific Chinese Accounting Standards were promulgated.  The third stage was 
from 2001 to 2006.  The 2001 Accounting System replaced the 1998 Accounting 
System. The ten specific standards extended to sixteen Chinese Accounting 
Standards that comprised five premier standards, five modified standards, and six 
new standards. The fourth stage was implemented from 2006. On February 15, 2006, 
China’s Ministry of Finance officially released an enterprise system of accounting 
standards. The regulations were put in force for listed companies on January 1, 2007.  
The Basic Standard was modified to replace the 1992 Basic Standard. A total of 38 
Chinese Accounting Standards were issued to replace the accounting system 
implemented in 2001, as well as the 16 Chinese Accounting Standards promulgated 
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in 2001. The 2006 enterprise system of accounting standards shows the tendency 
of Chinese accounting standards to be more and more consistent with the IFRS. 
Prior literature provides evidence that the level of earnings management is affected 
by the adoption of accounting standards. For example, Callao and Jarne (2010) 
found the level of EM increased after the adoption of IFRS in the European Union. 
In contrast, Zéghal et al. (2011) showed that the mandatory introduction of 
IAS/IFRS reduced the level of EM in French listed companies from 2003 to 2006.  
Similarly, Barth et al. (2008) argue that adopting IAS contributed to a lower level 
of EM in 21 countries, and Ho, Liao, and Taylor (2015) also find evidence of 
reduction in accrual-based earnings management after IFRS adoption in China. 
3.5.3 Define A-shares, B-shares, and H-shares in Chinese stock 
market 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) are 
two independently operating stock exchanges in mainland China. The SSE and 
SZSE are both directly supervised by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK), located in Hong Kong China, is the 
second largest stock exchange in Asia.   
The majority of companies listed on the Chinese exchanges offer two types of 
shares: A-shares and B-shares. A-shares are issued by domestic Chinese companies, 
and are only available for purchase by domestic institutions, organizations and 
mainland Chinese citizens. A-shares are only quoted in Chinese RMB.  By the end 
of 2012, the State-owned holding amounted to a total of 953 listed companies, 
accounting for 38.5% of A-share listed companies in China. The total market 
capitalization of State-owned holding companies was 13.71 trillion Yuan, 
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accounting for 51.4% of the A-share listed companies’ total market capitalization 
in 2012 (Wang, 2013). 
In China, B-shares are quoted in foreign currencies (US dollars on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Hong Kong dollars on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange) and are 
open to both domestic and foreign investment. From 2001, the government has 
allowed mainland Chinese residents to invest in both A-shares and B-shares instead 
of limiting investment to A-shares only (with a proviso that requires locals to set up 
a foreign currency account). 
H-shares in China are shares issued by companies (after receiving approval from 
the CSRC) that are registered in the mainland but listed in Hong Kong.  Domestic 
institutions and organizations are allowed to invest in H-shares, but not mainland 
citizens. Besides B-shares and H-shares, foreign shares in China also include the 
N-share, L-share, and S-share, which are issued by Chinese companies listed on the 
New York, London and Singapore stock exchanges. However, very limited 
numbers of N-shares, L-shares and S-shares are issued; the majority of foreign 
shares issued in China are H-shares. Figure 3-6 shows the shareholding structure of 
the Chinese stock market. 
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Figure 3-4 Shareholding structure in the Chinese stock market 
(Source: adapted from Yi & Davey, 2010, p. 328) 
3.5.4 Shareholders in China: An Overview 
There are three equity types in China’s listed companies: State-owned shares, 
corporate shares, and trading shares. Entities or institutions are eligible to make 
investments on behalf of the state to purchase State-owned shares using State-
owned assets. Corporate shares represent the equity owned by corporations, 
institutional organizations, or social societies that are equivalent to corporations. 
Trading shares or public shares are available to individuals or to company 
employees who make investments using their personal assets. 
State-owned listed companies comprise a large portion of Mainland China’s capital 
market. On behalf of the State, the State Council and local governments invest in 
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companies and generate State-owned shares, to maintain investors’ rights as well 
as obligations in line with related laws and regulations.  
Shareholders whose equity investment exceeds half of the total capital or who 
exercise significant influence on the company with even less than a 50% 
shareholding can be considered as controlling shareholders. In Mainland China, for 
the State to maintain controlling ownership in enterprises in certain sectors is a State 
policy, and China’s Corporate Law also stems from this policy. Instead of the 
common goal of entrepreneurship, which is to maximize the shareholders’ wealth, 
the State pursues the firm’s efficiency for political purposes.  
The Chinese government takes the role of controlling ownership and serves the 
State’s purposes other than the maximization of wealth as a shareholder. Political 
purposes may include the maintenance of urban employment, or direct control over 
sensitive industries The blended purpose of the State makes monitoring more 
difficult, and increases the conflict between the State as the controlling shareholder 
and other shareholders (Clarke, 2003).  When the State controls the purposes of the 
company, it is convenient for the State to intervene in the firm’s management, alter 
the purpose of the firm, and exploit minority shareholders’ interests.  
Expropriation behaviour by the controlling shareholder can lead to PP agency costs, 
which is prevalent in emerging economies. There is a trade-off between political 
costs and agency costs (Chang & Wong, 2004). On the one hand, with political 
control over firms, the purpose of firms may be altered to reflect political and social 
objectives, and firms’ goals of maximization of wealth may be compromised. On 
the other hand, the existence of political control may mitigate agency problems and 
in turn improve firms’ performance. Although firms may have objectives other than 
wealth maximization under political control, agency conflicts can be alleviated by 
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the presence of the State as a controlling shareholder. This is because it is in the 
State’s interests to avoid conflict with managers to prevent the reduction of 
resources with which the State, as controlling shareholder, can exercise discretion 
(Brada, 1996). Therefore, the net effect of political control is determined by the 
balance of political costs after offsetting agency costs.  
China's economic system before the late 1990s was a centrally planned economy. 
The government had full control over the demand and supply of goods and services 
for the country. This type of economy was also applied in the former Soviet Union.  
In a centrally planned economy, the government owns certain industries and has 
central control over the planning and financial system. For instance, the government 
decides what goods and services will be produced, the amount of each good or 
service that will be produced and the prices of those goods and services. Advocates 
of centrally planned economic systems believe that a planned economy, with 
control of every resource in the society, is more efficient than a free market 
economy: the government can attempt to put the country’s wealth to the best 
possible use and allocate the country’s resources to all its citizens. However, even 
if the government has control of every resource in the country, it is unable to control 
the invisible forces of the market. Also, there are various unknown factors that 
affect the demand for and supply of goods. Therefore, it is unlikely that a central 
planner can accurately predict and plan the amounts to be produced.  
Given that the Maoist version of the central planning economic system had failed 
to promote economic growth, the reform of the economic system in China began in 
1978, as decided by the Party leader in the Third Plenum of the National Party 
Congress’s 11th Central Committee. The Communist Party conducted the reform 
aiming to stimulate economic growth and make communism work better, by 
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introducing a market mechanism in the system and by reducing the direct control 
of the government.  
The term “the socialist market of the economic system” was officially introduced 
by Deng in the 14th National Communist Party Congress, 1992. From then to the 
present, the Chinese government has carried out substantial efforts to push for 
market reform and to establish a socialist market in the economic system, and has 
made significant achievements. During the transition to this new economic system 
created by China, the increasing non-State sector has played an important role in 
facilitating economic growth. 
The economic reforms shifted SOE financing from the government to the market, 
and the establishment of the stock exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchange) aimed to help the former failing SOEs acquire finance by raising capital 
on the open market. The Chinese SOEs have obtained some autonomy as 
independent economic entities with the progress of the transitional reforms in China 
(Qian, 2000).  
China’s company law requires Chinese companies to establish a two-tier board 
which consists of a board of directors and a supervisory board. The members of the 
supervisory board typically include one person from the company’s internal 
Communist Party committee. The role of the supervisory board in the Chinese CG 
is explored by Xiao, Dahya, and Lin (2004). First-hand evidence from a survey 
investigation shows that the supervisory boards in Chinese companies perform as 
“honoured guests, friendly advisors, and censored watchdogs,” with only two 
companies indicating that the supervisory board fulfilled a role as independent 
monitors (Xiao et al., 2004, p. 53). In China, the structure of two-tier boards is 
adopted in the transitional CG environment; the supervisory board represents a 
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fading but still strong influence from the Chinese Communist Party and the 
government.  
In China, the State has long been focused on the improvement of the CG of SOEs. 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange has published CG reports in China every year since 
2003. The 2006 report that focused on SOEs points out that government forces are 
more powerful with respect to  CG than market forces, tending to push Chinese CG 
to move backward rather than forward, and the hierarchy of approval is often more 
influential than regulation and enforcement (Sina Finance, 2006, November 29). 
Supervisory boards in Chinese listed companies are representatives of the 
Party/government. The tight control of the Party over firms can be attributed to 
several factors including highly concentrated State ownership. Party or government 
officials are accustomed to intervening in corporate affairs and are unwilling to give 
up their corporate power and interests (Xiao et al., 2004). Due to the fundamental 
influence of the government on supervisory boards, it is doubtful whether the 
supervisory boards are able to play a neutral and independent role in monitoring. 
When the chairperson of the supervisory board is a Party/government official, it is 
very likely that Party loyalty leads to negligence or sacrifice of the interests of 
minority shareholders. 
3.5.5 Supervision Committees in Mainland China 
Supervision committees are another distinctive feature of Chinese CG. “China’s 
law requires Chinese companies to establish a ‘board of supervisors,' usually 
chaired by an employee representative from the China Federation of Trade Unions, 
the company’s only governance-sanctioned union. Other members of the 
supervisory board typically include an official from the company’s internal 
Communist Party committee and at least one other person elected by shareholders. 
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Company directors and other senior managers are not allowed to sit on the board of 
supervisors” (Mitchell, 2008, April 2, p. 1). 
To improve the quality of corporate governance and to reduce the risk of 
governance failure, improvement in internal CG oversight is quite important, as 
internal CG is presumed to carry out the primary aspects of control over a 
corporation (Gillan, 2006). According to Chinese Company Law, a limited liability 
company or a joint stock company is required to have a Supervisory Committee 
(Deloitte, 2017). According to the Code of Corporate Governance for listed 
companies in China, all listed companies must establish a supervisory committee 
(State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2008). In smaller companies with 
fewer shareholders, members of the supervisory committee can be appointed 
without setting up a formal committee.  
In particular, for a joint company or a limited liability company, a Supervisory 
Committee should comprise at least three people. For small-scale, limited liability 
companies with a small number of shareholders, the establishment of a Supervisory 
Committee is not necessary, but one or two supervisors are required. In a 
Supervisory Committee, both shareholder and employee representatives should be 
included. Company employees elect employee representatives. However, directors 
and senior officers of the company are not allowed to be included in a Supervisory 
Committee. As for a board of directors, a Supervisory Committee requires a 
chairperson, and a vice-chairperson if necessary (Central Government of China, 
2008). For SOEs2, regardless whether they are fully-owned or simply controlled by 
                                                          
2 In Chinese SOEs, “the supervisory committee was introduced to monitor management in 2007. 
For these companies, the responsibilities of the supervisory committee have gradually changed, from 
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the State, their Supervisory Committee requires at least five members, and no less 
than one-third of the Supervisory Committee should be employee representatives. 
The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
designates the supervisors of SOEs’ Supervisory Committees, while the employee 
representatives’ assemblies elect employee representatives to the Supervisory 
Committee. SASAC appoints the chairperson of the Supervisory Committee.  
In Mainland China, the establishment of a supervisory committee aims to monitor 
the activities of board directors and CEOs. The supervisory committee can require 
board directors or managers to correct any breaches of company policy and to 
rectify any procedures that may be harmful to company’s interests.  
The responsibilities of supervisory boards in China also include reviewing the 
financial affairs of the company, monitoring directors’ performance, and proposing 
shareholder meetings. As clarified in the “State-Owned Enterprises Supervisory 
Committee Interim Provisions,” the responsibilities of supervisory boards include 
monitoring financial conditions, monitoring financial activities and management 
activities; and more specifically, reviewing the company’s compliance with laws, 
administrative regulations; verifying the authenticity and legitimacy of financial 
reports by reviewing the financial and accounting information; reviewing the 
                                                          
simply monitoring last year’s activities to monitoring those of the current year and submitting the 
annual inspection report within the first half of the following year. This approach assumes daily 
supervision, where the committee conducts a focused annual inspection of the company’s activities 
together with the annual financial audit. The committee may also integrate the financial inspection 
with the annual external audit so as to focus on key points in the course of an inspection by 
referencing and using the audit result of its external auditor” (Deloitte, 2017).  
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company’s operational efficiency with regard to state-owned assets management 
and other conditions; and lastly, proposing rewards, penalties, appointment, and 
removal of management by evaluating its performance.  
3.5.5.1 Does the supervisory board become a source of PP conflict?  
In China, the supervisory board, which represents the Communist party and the 
government, imposes political influence on companies’ CG activities.  
The supervisory board represents the State’s interests while the board of directors 
represents the shareholders’ interests. This two-tier board structure makes agency 
conflicts in China more complex. PP agency costs emerge especially when the State 
holds the majority share of a company’s stock. When the State acts as the 
controlling shareholder, the supervisory board and the board of directors share a 
common agenda, which is to align CG activities with the State’s incentives, and CG 
activities become biased toward benefiting the controlling shareholder. In such 
cases, the minority shareholders are powerless in CG activities and exposed to 
expropriation by the controlling shareholders. 
Clarke (2003) points out several problems under the Chinese CG system that may 
exacerbate agency problems. For instance, the Chinese CG policy allows the State 
to maintain full or controlling ownership of enterprises in some industries. Also, 
the majority of Chinese listed companies, which are mostly restructured and 
decentralized former SOEs, are still State-controlled. This makes monitoring 
difficult in Chinese companies and stirs up conflict between the State, as the 
controlling shareholder, and other shareholders. The primary purpose of the 
Chinese government in controlling firms is to increase the firms’ efficiency to fit 
political purposes, which are necessarily in line with the purpose of wealth 
maximization. As a result, minority shareholders are exposed to expropriation since 
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they have no other way other than wealth to benefit from their investment in the 
company.  
In the Berle and Means (1991) model of the modern corporation, ownership is 
dispersed and almost completely divorced from control, and members of a 
corporation debate serious company affairs at the shareholders’ meetings. The 
Chinese style of CG, where government representatives dominate the shareholder 
meetings, means that the shareholder meeting loses its primary function and 
become less effective and inevitably reduced to mere formalities.  
Despite the problem of PP agency conflict, the Chinese CG style with imposed 
incentives from central government through the supervisory board, led to local 
protectionism, an issue of the relationships between various layers of government. 
The Chinese government started reforms from the 1980s to decentralize companies, 
which provides strong motives for local governments to shield local firms and 
industries from interregional competition. However, the Chinese government has 
not promulgated or implemented any policy to prohibit interregional trade barriers 
(Bai, Du, Tao, & Tong, 2004).  
X. Chen et al. (2008) provide evidence of Chinese local government engaging in 
EM (e.g., by providing fiscal transfer) to help local firms to circumvent central 
government regulations. The CSRC issued a series of regulations on IPOs and rights 
offering to protect shareholders from management expropriation. The CSRC 
regulations on rights offerings require a continuous two year profit and a minimum 
average 10% ROE for three years (and a minimum 6% of ROE for each of the 
previous three years since 1999) (X. Chen et al., 2008). When the regional 
government’s performance is closely related to the local listed SOEs’ performance, 
the CSRC rigid regulations on rights offerings trigger rampant EM by local 
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government, central government, and SOEs; this phenomenon is referred to as 
Chinese Tango.  
In addition, the setting up of institutions also has significant implications on a 
country’s CG system. In China, there is doubt about whether the legal institutions 
can perform their expected tasks or play the roles that were assigned to them. Clarke 
(2003) suggests too much cannot be expected from these legal institutions in China, 
and uses the example of private plaintiff-driven litigation in the courts. “Listed 
companies got that way because they and their officers had political backing; 
Chinese courts are not politically powerful and are hence reluctant to take cases 
involving large sums of money and powerful defendants”  (Clarke, 2003, p. 503). 
If it is unlikely that the court will act on private rights in China, what about other 
legal institutions like CSRC, which is the Chinese equivalent of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the US? First, considering the scale of CSRC’s task in 
overseeing all the listed companies in China, its staffing levels are inadequate. 
Second, similar to SEC, the primary task of CSRC is to supervise companies’ 
disclosure instead of guarding companies’ profits. Although the CSRC issues 
regulations on the minimum number of independent board directors and assigns 
duties, such as good faith, diligence and loyalty, to board directors; the duties are 
probably meaningless in the context of the current Chinese legal system, 
considering that Chinese Company Law allows very limited disciplinary actions 
against directors.  
As Clarke (2003, p. 504) documents, in China, “The financial information industry 
is significantly crippled by the State’s continuing insistence on control over all 
information. Control over information is a cornerstone of the Chinese Communist 
Party’s system of political control and is unlikely to disappear much before the 
Party itself. Other intermediary institutions such as law firms, accounting firms, 
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investment banks, brokerages, and stock exchanges all exist - like any organization 
in China - only with government permission and cannot simply spring up in 
response to market demand. There is no real market for corporate control, and the 
market for managerial talent is still very small”. A more recent study by Fan, Wong, 
and Zhang (2007) again provides evidence of the negative political influence on 
CG in China. In particular, they find that politically connected CEOs in China are 
associated with poorer post-IPO performance, and that politically connected CEOs 
are more likely to recruit or appoint a board of directors who are bureaucrats, rather 
than board directors who are more qualified with relevant professional backgrounds.   
In China, there are three predominant groups of shareholders: the State, legal 
persons (institutions), and individuals (Xu & Wang, 1999). Prior studies that 
examined the impact of ownership on firm performance in China often neglected 
the political influence imposed on listed companies by the supervisory board. 
Despite the potential agency problem caused by concentrated ownership, Chen, 
Firth, and Xu (2009) find that the State controlling shareholder in China may not 
be a bad thing, compared with the other types of ownership control; the SOEs 
affiliated to the central government in China show better performance than the State 
Asset Management Bureau controlled companies, SOEs affiliated to local 
government, and private investors. However, it is possible that this phenomenon is 
due to political intervention in listed companies and the result of expropriation of 
resources from non-SOEs.  
Chen et al. (2009) point out that firms controlled by State Asset Management 
Bureaus and State-owned enterprises are both ultimately owned by the State, but 
they differ in many ways. The officials of State Asset Management Bureau 
controlled companies typically have no experience in relevant business and lack the 
necessary skills and knowledge to monitor managers; their promotion is unlikely to 
88 
 
depend on how much they contribute to improving the firm’s performance or how 
much value they create, but mostly depends on how well they follow the central or 
local government’s instructions to exert pressure on the firm’s directors to do things.  
Given the context of the Chinese CG system and institutional settings, it is 
reasonable to suspect that political intervention by the government remains even 
when the State does not hold the majority share or even a mere minority. In one 
assumed instance, a manufacturing company needs to choose either a State-owned 
transport company or a privately-owned transport company as their cooperative 
partner (assume that the costs for both companies are similar, or the costs for the 
state-owned company are even slightly higher than the private-owned one). The 
manufacturing company’s board of directors are dictated to by the supervisory 
board, which represents the State’s will. In such a situation, most likely the 
manufacturing company will sign a contract with the State-owned transport 
company. Such underlying cases in Chinese corporate governance tend to 
exacerbate agency conflicts, especially PP conflicts given the government’s will 
penetrate the management of companies with or without the State as the controlling 
shareholder. 
In China, efforts have been made to segregate the responsibilities of the company 
and the controlling shareholder. Chinese Company Law requires the controlling 
shareholder not to act against the company’s interests through related-party 
transactions. Also, in 2002, the CSRS released the Corporate Governance Code for 
Listed Companies to prevent controlling shareholders from influencing the 
company’s decision-making or its business operations, and stipulated that 
controlling shareholders should not act against the interests of the company and 
other shareholders. However, the real effects of such regulation are in doubt since 
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various studies have reported evidence on the severity of controlling shareholder 
associated related-party transactions in China (Cheung, Jing, Lu, Rau, & Stouraitis, 
2009; Jian & Wong, 2010; Lo, Wong, & Firth, 2010). 
3.5.6 PA, PP agency conflict and EM in China 
PA agency conflict occurs through the separation between and divergence of 
ownership and management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and has been considered 
as one of the fundamental problems in improving the corporate governance 
mechanism (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Even in the advanced economies, such as 
the US market, where the governance mechanism is extensively studied, there is 
still ongoing debate on how to better align the owner-manager interests and to 
mitigate managerial expropriation (e.g., Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009; Bebchuk, 
Cohen, & Ferrell, 2008; Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008; Lazonick & O'sullivan, 
2000). 
PA agency problem is an important subject for CG in China (Clarke, 2003). 
Although the ownership structure in Chinese listed companies is often State-
concentrated. However, owner management does not eliminate the PA agency 
problem (Schulze et al., 2001). Especially in China, managers/agents are often simply 
government officials (professional managers) appointed (hired) by the State, and they do 
not take responsibility for the results of business operations. In practice, government 
officials may as well pursue their welfare (e.g., job promotions or increases in salaries and 
other benefits) at the expense of the interests of the state (Lin et al., 2006), and indicating 
serious PA agency problems in spite of the concentrated State-ownership (e.g., Lin 
et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2005). 
Figure 3-5 Ownership structure of listed firms in Asia  
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(Source: adapted from Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005, p. 89) 
Su, Xu, and Phan (2008) provide evidence that conflicts between principal and 
principal create high agency costs in China. In China, the phenomenon of 
concentrated ownership is particularly prominent and unique among emerging 
economies. Allen et al. (2005) investigate and compare the ownership structure of 
emerging economies in Asia, and Figure 3-5 presents the ownership structure of 
listed firms in Asia.  As Figure 3-6 shows, there is a great difference between 
concentrated ownership in China and other Asian economies.  In Asian countries, 
excluding Japan, 59.36% of listed companies have a family-dominated ownership 
structure; however, in China up to 60% of listed companies are state-owned. 
Figure 3-5 shows that ownership structure in Asian businesses is generally 
concentrated in family or the Government, and this phenomenon is particularly 
acute in China with a large portion (more than half) of the shares under the State’s 
control. Based on data from 2007, 63.15% of Chinese listed companies are state-
owned (Li & Zhang, 2010), as shown in Figure 3-6. 
Figure 3-6 Ownership structure of listed firms in China compared with other 
countries 
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(Source: adapted from Li & Zhang, 2010, p. 634) 
Due to the highly concentrated ownership structure, listed companies in China face 
more severe PP agency conflict than PA agency conflict. Unlike other emerging 
economies, the concentrated ownership structure in China is unique as the majority 
of Chinese listed firms are under State-dominated control instead of being family-
dominated. This distinct characteristic of concentrated ownership structure in China 
offers a brilliant opportunity to investigate the extent of EM and its relationship 
with agency conflict. This section discusses the different types of agency conflicts. 
PA agency costs are the focus in the developed market, while PP agency costs are 
more of a concern in emerging markets. In China, with its relatively 
underdeveloped legal system, CG faces severe agency problems. However, there is 
evidence that certain CG mechanisms help to constrain agency conflicts. The next 
section discusses CG and the CG mechanisms that alleviate AC. 
Management’s incentive to change a firm’s financial picture to become more 
favourable connects AC with EM. Since the practice of EM can bring reported 
earnings to the desired level, it is natural for the managers to engage in EM to satisfy 
self-interest (Schipper, 1989; Scott, 1997). Managers manage earnings to add 
information value, reduce information asymmetry, and mitigate AC (e.g., Arya et 
al., 2003; Louis & Robinson, 2005; Warfield et al., 1995). EM can also be used 
opportunistically to deteriorate AC when managers undertake EM to benefit 
themselves (e.g., Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Guidry 
et al., 1999; Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995). 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on EM, AC, CG, and developed a 
foundation for researching the AC/EM relation in China.   
Section 3.2 reviewed the literature on EM and discussed the essential factors in 
earnings management study, such as the definition of earnings management, the 
techniques needed to undertake earnings management, the incentives for firms to 
engage in earnings management, and the conditions giving rise to EM.  Section 3.3 
reviewed agency costs including both PA agency and PP agency costs.  Specifically, 
the literature on PP agency costs in an emerging economies context provided a 
robust background for the investigation of PP agency costs in China and identified 
the gap in the literature and the contribution to be made.  Subsequently, Section 3.4 
discussed relevant research issues relating to corporate governance.  More 
background about ownership structure, accounting standards, and specific stock 
market characteristics in China was provided in Section 3.5.   
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4 CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH QUESTION AND 
HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on AC 
and EM. Based on the discussion in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, this chapter 
establishes the research question and develops theoretical hypotheses.  
Based on the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, agency theory combines with 
stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory to provide support for the AC/EM nexus. 
Agency theory and stakeholder theory contend that managers tend to undertake EM 
to maximise their interests at the expense of the firm’s stakeholders. Legitimacy 
theory contends that managers are motivated to engage in EM to fulfil stakeholders’ 
expectations to maintain organizational legitimacy and to obtain social support.  
In Chapter 3, the prior literature on AC and EM was discussed. Engagement in EM 
activities aims to bring earnings to the desired level (Ning, 2009). Managers are 
often motivated to engage in EM activities to maximize their wealth and to avoid 
problems from the owners, by which AC arises. There are two types of agency 
conflicts, PA and PP conflicts. In developed markets with dispersed ownership 
structures, the different interests between ownership and management (i.e., PA 
conflict) form the main driver for managers to manage earnings to cater for 
shareholders’ interests or to increase managers’ personal wealth.  
In emerging economies where the ownership structure is concentrated, the major 
agency conflict is that between majority shareholders and minority shareholders 
(i.e., PP conflict) since managers, to a large extent, affiliate with the majority 
shareholder. As a result, the majority shareholder is motivated to employ EM to 
expropriate profits from minority shareholders. Therefore, based on agency theory, 
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this study hypothesizes that, in the context of CG mechanisms in Chinese listed 
firms, engagement in EM activities and the level of agency costs (PA and PP agency 
costs) are closely associated. 
4.2 The Context in China 
As discussed in Chapter 3 Section 3.4, in China, the ownership structure is 
significantly State-dominated instead of family-controlled (Li & Zhang, 2010). The 
distinctive characteristics of concentrated ownership structure in China offer a 
unique opportunity to investigate the AC/EM nexus.  
Jiraporn et al. (2008) apply agency theory to evaluate whether EM is opportunistic 
or beneficial. Based on agency theory, Jiraporn et al. (2008) relate the degree of EM 
with the magnitude of agency costs, and find that a higher degree of EM leads to 
lower agency costs in the US market.  
CG in emerging economies is different. In response to the economic contexts in 
emerging markets, companies adjust their CG strategies correspondingly (Boyer & 
Hollingsworth, 1997; Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002; Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2005; Peng 
& Zhou, 2005).  
Compared to the developed countries, institutional and organizational settings in 
emerging economies are not stable, are relatively weak, and concentrated 
ownership is prevalent (Young et al., 2008). Young et al. (2008) find two reasons 
why concentrated ownership is more common in emerging economies. First is the 
information asymmetry that exists between founders and professional managers. 
Due to the institutional environment in emerging economies, there is a lack of trust 
between unfamiliar parties. It is common that the founders of a company are not 
willing to share information with their managers and outside investors.  Second, 
firms in emerging economies depend on concentrated ownership to keep 
95 
 
managerial opportunism under control.  The reason for this phenomenon is that in 
emerging economies, external governance is not effective. Therefore internal 
governance becomes crucial in terms of CG. However, as an important element of 
internal governance mechanisms, boards of directors in emerging economies are 
not powerful enough to monitor companies’ behaviour without sufficient 
institutional support. As a result, concentrated ownership becomes prevalent, and 
without strong legal protection for minority shareholders, PP agency conflicts have 
become problematic in China and other emerging economies. PP agency costs arise 
when the dominant owners pursue their targets by sacrificing the minority owners’ 
interests (Chen & Young, 2010).  Therefore in addition to the traditional PA agency 
costs, which are the focus of agency theory, it is important to address the issue of 
PP agency costs when studying CG in emerging economies, especially in China, 
with its dominant State ownership. 
4.3 Hypothesis 
This study hypothesizes that agency costs and EM are closely related to each other 
in China. Managers’ incentives are often sensitive to earnings (Bushman & Smith, 
2001). Management incentives to create an altered impression of business 
performance connect AC with EM. Various studies define EM in terms of its links 
with management incentives.  
For example, Schipper (1989, p. 92)  defines EM as “a purposeful intervention in 
the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private 
gain”. The dependence placed on accounting information strongly motivates 
managers to manage earnings for their personal benefit (Rahman & Ali, 2006). 
Such opportunistic acts by managers to increase their interests incur principal-agent 
agency costs  (Jensen & Meckling, 1979). 
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Management’s incentive to change a firm’s financial picture to be more favourable 
connects AC with EM. The practice of EM can bring reported earnings to the 
desired level. Hence, it is natural for  managers to engage in EM to satisfy their self-
interest (Schipper, 1989; Scott, 1997). The case for a nexus between PA agency 
costs and EM has been strongly asserted in prior studies. For instance, based on 
agency theory, Lambert (1984) examines the impact of principal and manager 
relationships on earnings and finds that EM (income smoothing) incentives arise 
with the presence of PA agency costs. Dye (1988) argues that not only agency 
conflict but also the perceptions of a potential investor about the firm’s value can 
trigger EM. EM can be used to add information value, reduce information 
asymmetry, and mitigate AC (e.g., Arya et al., 2003; Louis & Robinson, 2005; 
Warfield et al., 1995). However, EM is often used opportunistically to exacerbate 
agency conflicts when managers undertake EM to benefit themselves (e.g., 
Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Guidry et al., 1999; Healy, 
1985; Holthausen et al., 1995).  
Despite the strong linkage between AC and EM suggested by agency theory and 
the prior literature, the empirical research on this issue is scant. To the best of my 
knowledge, the work of Jiraporn et al. (2008) is the only study that empirically 
examines the relationship between PA agency conflicts and EM, and they find that 
EM reduces PA agency costs in the US market. Several corporate scandals, such as 
Enron and WorldCom, have cast a negative light on EM. From the perspective of 
agency theory, Jiraporn et al. (2008) argue that EM is not as totally detrimental to 
firms as it appears to be. The advocates of opportunistic EM argue that companies 
engage in EM when managers’ and shareholders’ interests misalign, to distort the 
reported earnings. In contrast, the proponents of beneficial EM believe that EM 
enhances the information value of earnings. The beneficial aspect of EM refers to 
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the use of EM to unblock communications between managers and owners, and 
alleviate AC. However, the wider public, by intuition, tends to prefer absolute 
transparency in financial reporting. Arya et al. (2003, p. 111) defend their position 
by arguing that it is too simplistic to draw the conclusion that EM definitely reduces 
transparency, since “a fundamental feature of decentralized organizations is the 
dispersal of information across people. Different people know different things and 
nobody knows everything. In such an environment, a managed earnings stream can 
convey more information than an unmanaged earnings stream”. Specifically, EM 
can play an effective role in various corporate governance events, such as 
communicating expertise, limiting owner intervention, and posturing. In the 
example of communicating expertise, being able to achieve certain goals in 
earnings, in particular, smooth earnings, requires hard work from a manager, and 
by doing it successfully, managers demonstrate their expertise in predicting future 
earnings (Demski, 1998). In this case, EM works as a demonstration or proof of 
managers’ ability, and leads to better communication between managers and 
owners. Therefore, engaging in EM can be beneficial or detrimental with regard to 
agency problems, and it is important to expand the literature by studying the 
AC/EM nexus in China. 
In an advanced economy such as the U.S. market where governance mechanisms 
have been extensively studied, there is an ongoing debate on how to better align 
owner-manager interests and to mitigate managerial expropriation (e.g., Bates et al., 
2009; Bebchuk et al., 2008; Harford et al., 2008; Lazonick & O'sullivan, 2000). 
Agency problems are important aspects of CG in China (Clarke, 2003). Unlike the 
widespread shareholding found in developed markets, the ownership structure in 
Chinese listed companies is often State-concentrated. Previous studies in developed 
markets suggest that managerial ownership may moderate agency conflict (e.g., 
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Ang et al., 2000; Singh & Davidson III, 2003). However, owner management is not 
a panacea for eliminating agency problems (Schulze et al., 2001). Especially in 
China, managers are rarely significant shareholders in listed companies3 (Jiang & 
Kim, 2015), thus indicating serious agency problems (e.g., Lin et al., 2006; Xu et 
al., 2005; Zhang, Tang, & Lin, 2016). Therefore, my first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis1: There is a significant relationship between EM and PA agency costs 
in China. 
Consistent with Jiraporn et al. (2008), a positive relationship between PA and EM 
indicates the opportunistic use of EM, and a negative relationship between PA and 
EM indicates a beneficial use of EM. 
PA agency costs are the focus of developed markets such as the US. In China, in 
addition to the traditional PA agency costs, PP conflicts are prevalent due to the 
concentrated ownership structure, severe information asymmetry and weak legal 
protection for minority shareholders, as discussed in Chapter 3 Section 3.3. 
Minority shareholders are exposed to profit expropriation by controlling 
shareholders, in which managers/controlling shareholders tend to maximise their 
benefits and limit the visibility of PP conflict to minority shareholders by managing 
earnings. Therefore, research on PP agency costs is important in the context of 
China, where companies exhibit skewed shareholder interests. The second 
hypothesis of this study is as follows: 
Hypothesis2: There is a significant relationship between EM and PP agency costs 
in China. 
                                                          
3 The State is a major shareholder in many public listed companies in China. Managers/agents of 
State-owned companies are often simply government officials (professional managers) appointed 
(hired) by the State, and they do not take responsibility for the results of business operations. In 
practice, government officials may as well pursue their own welfare (e.g., job promotions or 
increases in salaries and other benefits) at the expense of the interests of the state (Lin et al., 2006). 
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Consistent with Jiraporn et al. (2008), a positive relationship between PP and EM 
indicates the opportunistic use of EM, and a negative relationship between PP and 
EM indicates a beneficial use of EM. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter reviews the corporate governance context in China. Based on Chapter 
2 and Chapter 3, this chapter establishes the research question and develops theory-
based hypotheses on the relationship between EM and AC. The next chapter, 
Chapter 5 will describe all the variables used in this study, and their measurements.   
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5 CHAPTER 5 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes all the variables employed in the study. To obtain a robust 
result, this study employs different proxies for variables of interest, including AC 
and EM. Measurement of control variables is also discussed in this chapter. Section 
5.2 explains accruals and the representative models for detecting EM. The 
measurement of PA and PP agency costs is discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 
presents the measurement of the control variables employed. 
5.2 How can earnings management be detected? 
5.2.1 Accruals 
As discussed in Chapter 3, most studies detect EM through the level of discretionary 
accruals. “Accruals arise when there is a discrepancy between the timing of the cash 
flows and the timing of the accounting recognition of the transaction” (Ronen & 
Yaari, 2008, p. 371). 
Reported earnings with a high level of accruals are considered to be of poor quality 
(Chen, Lin, & Lin, 2008).  In order to examine the magnitude of EM current 
accruals are divided into two parts; non-discretionary accruals (NDAs hereafter) 
and discretionary accruals (DAs hereafter). NDAs are caused by the company’s 
normal business activities, while DAs are considered abnormal  (Healy & Wahlen, 
1999; Xie, 2001).  DA is commonly employed as a proxy for EM (Chou, Gombola, 
& Liu, 2006). 
Jones (1991) defines total accruals as “the change in the noncash working capital 
before income taxes payable less total depreciation expense, and the change in the 
noncash working capital before taxes is defined as the change in current assets less 
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current liabilities” (p. 207). Most of the variation in total accruals is driven by 
current accruals; that is, the current accruals lead to most of the changes in total 
accruals (Dechow, 1994; Roosenboom, van der Goot, & Mertens, 2003).  
Specifically, identification of working capital accruals or current accruals from 
companies’ operations is as follows: 
Current accruals are revenues and expenses that firms include in 
a period’s net income although the cash flows associated with 
these revenues and expenses take place in earlier or later periods. 
These current accruals can be broken up into nondiscretionary 
and discretionary parts. Whereas nondiscretionary current 
accruals are constrained by rules, institutions, and economic 
circumstances, only discretionary current accruals are subject to 
management (Roosenboom et al., 2003, p. 251) 
Following standard accounting literature, this study employs DA as one of the 
proxies for EM.  
5.2.2 Accrual Models 
Early models employed in studies such as that of Healy (1985) were random walk 
models (Yoon & Miller, 2002).  Jones (1991) proposes a novel model to estimate 
the discretionary component of the total accruals instead of the discretionary 
component of a single accrual. In order to test whether the estimated discretionary 
accruals are managed to decrease income during the import relief investigation 
period, Jones implements a cross-sectional analysis. To extend the methodology 
employed by other earnings management studies, Jones develops time-series 
models to measure the applied total non-discretionary accruals and cross-sectional 
tests of hypothesised EM.  The Jones model and four other models are discussed by 
102 
 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) as representing the evolution of models for 
generating non-discretionary accruals.  The other four models are the Healy (1985) 
model, the DeAngelo (1986) model, the Dechow et al. (1995) model and the 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) model.  
According to Dechow et al. (1995), these five models had a significant influence 
on the development of earnings management measurement. Table 5-1 demonstrates 
the five accrual models. 
Table 5-1 Models to detect earnings management 
Models  Where, 
The Healy 
Model 
 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝜏 =
∑ 𝑇𝐴𝑡𝑡
𝑇
 
 
NDA= estimated non-discretionary accruals; 
TA= total accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 
t= 1,2,3…T is a year subscript for years included 
in the estimation period; 
 = a year subscript indicating a year during the 
event period. 
The 
DeAngelo 
Model 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝜏 = 𝑇𝐴𝜏−1 
 
NDA= estimated non-discretionary accruals; 
TA= total accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 
 = a year subscript indicating a year during the 
event period. 
The Jones 
Model 
 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝜏
= 𝛼1(1 𝐴𝜏−1⁄ )
+ 𝛼2(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝜏) + 𝛼3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝜏) 
 
REV = revenues in the year   fewer revenues 
in the year 1  scaled by total assets at 1 ; 
PPE = gross property plant and equipment in the 
year   scaled by total assets at 1 ; 
1A = total assets at 1 ; 
321 ,,   = firm-specific parameters. 
The 
Modified 
Jones 
Model 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝜏
= 𝛼1(1 𝐴𝜏⁄ )
+ 𝛼2(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝜏 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝜏)
+ 𝛼3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝜏) 
REC = net receivables in the year   less net 
receivables in the year 1  scaled by total assets 
at 1 . 
The 
Industry 
Model 
 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝜏
= 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐼(𝑇𝐴𝜏) 
 
 TAmedianI = the median value of total 
accruals scaled by lagged assets for all non-sample 
firms in the same 2-digit SIC code. 
21 , = estimated using OLS on the observations 
in the estimation period. 
(Author created) 
According to Dechow et al. (1995), the five models in Table 5-1 are the most 
representative models for detecting EM. In particular, by evaluating accrual-based 
earnings management models, Dechow et al. (1995) find that a modified version of 
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the Jones (1991) Model is the most efficient and robust. Figure 5-1  illustrates the 
development process for the EM models, as well as their major assumptions and 
limitations. 
Figure 5-1 Relationships and major assumptions of five models to detect 
earnings management 
(Author created) 
The Jones Model has been widely used and modified by many researchers of EM, 
such as Klein (2002), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Teoh et al. (1998a), and 
Kasznik (1999). As an illustration, Table 5-2 shows the previous studies that have 
applied the Jones Model and the Modified Jones Model and the major adjustments 
they have made to the models. As widely employed as the Jones model is, it is 
subject to some limitations. When the sampled firms experience extreme 
performance, the Jones and modified Jones models can be mis-specified (Kothari, 
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Leone, & Wasley, 2005). Kothari et al. (2005) propose that a performance-matched 
discretionary accruals measure is applicable if researchers aim to calibrate the 
degree of EM of firms experiencing extreme performance, relative to the firms in 
the control group that represent regular performance.  
In this section, I introduce the accruals models that have been employed to detect 
EM in the literature. Of these models, the Modified Jones model is used in this 
study, because it is an efficient and robust estimator (Dechow et al., 1995). The next 
section presents the process of DA estimation using the Modified Jones model. 
Table 5-2 Previous studies using the Jones Model and the Modified Jones 
Model 
Authors Model Adjustment 
Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) 
The Jones Model No major adjustment 
Klein (2002) The Jones Model No major adjustment 
Becker, DeFond, 
Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam (1998) 
The Jones Model No major adjustment 
Kothari et al. (2005) The Modified Jones 
Model 
Add a return on assets (ROA) as an explanatory 
variable. 
Kasznik (1999) The Modified Jones 
Model 
Add the change in operating cash flows as an 
explanatory variable. 
Chung, Firth, and 
Kim (2002) 
The Modified Jones 
Model 
No major adjustment 
Frankel, Johnson, and 
Nelson (2002) 
The Modified Jones 
Model 
No major adjustment 
Roosenboom et al. 
(2003) 
The Modified Jones 
Model 
Remove the gross property plant and 
equipment (PPE) as an explanatory variable. 
Yoon and Miller 
(2002) 
The Modified Jones 
Model 
Add the change in cash expenses, noncash 
expenses multiplied by the growth rate of PPE 
as explanatory variables. 
Remove PPE as an explanatory variable. 
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5.2.3 Measurement of earnings management level 
This study follows the Modified Jones Model approach (Dechow et al., 1995) to 
measure discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM.  The following process is used 
to calculate discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model. 
1. Generate the coefficients 321 ,, aaa  estimated by the following model, 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡4 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ = 𝑎1(1 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) + 𝒶2 (∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1)⁄ + 𝑎3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) + 𝜀 (1)  
2. Use the estimated coefficients, estimate the NDAs, 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ = 𝒶1(1 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) + 𝒶2(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ +
𝒶3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡) 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄                                                                                                  (2)  
3. Calculate DAs, 
𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡                                                                                         (3) 
Where tiTA ,  = the total accruals of firm i in year t; 
           tiNDA ,  = the non-discretionary accruals of firm i in year t; 
           tiDA ,  = the discretionary accruals of firm i in year t; 
           1, tiA  = total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
          tiREV ,  = revenues of firm i in year t less revenues in year t-1; 
          tiPPE ,  = gross property plant and equipment of firm i in year t; 
          tiREC ,  = net receivables of firm i in year t less net receivables in year t-1. 
As indicated above, there are three steps in estimating discretionary accruals using 
the Modified Jones model. The first step aims to generate the coefficients 𝑎1,𝑎2 
and 𝑎3. The generated coefficients from the first step are then applied in the second 
                                                          
4 Following Jones (1991), 𝑇𝐴𝑡  is calculated as [(∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡) −
(∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 −
∆𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡) − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡], where the change 
(Δ) is the difference between time t and time t-1. 
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equation to calculate NDA. The last step is to take the difference between TA and 
NDA to calculate DA.  
There are two ways to run the regression of equation (1) to generate the coefficients. 
One way is to run a time series regression, and the other is to run it cross-sectionally.  
For the time series approach, equation (1) is used to regress the variables from the 
same firm across different time periods. In this way, the generated coefficients will 
vary across firms but not years. In the cross-section approach, equation (1) is used 
to regress the variables from different firms in the same industry for the same time 
period. Thus, the generated coefficients will vary across years but remain the same 
for firms in the same industry.  
It is noteworthy that when applying the cross-section approach, it is very important 
to run the regression within each industry, so that the influence of different 
industries on DA can be controlled for (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Ding et al., 2007). 
Both the time-series approach and the cross-sectional approach are subject to some 
disadvantages. Time-series analysis requires a relatively longer observation period 
to obtain reliable parameter estimates for a linear regression (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 
1994). In this study, the panel dataset contains data from 1999-2014, which covers 
16 years, so the length of the estimation period is adequate. The other disadvantages 
of the time series approach include, for example, non-stationary coefficients due to 
the fact that the variables used in time series estimation may not be stationary. The 
disadvantages of the cross-sectional approach include, for example, the fact that 
real world data hardly fits the assumption that the coefficients are same for all firms 
within a particular year for a particular industry (Kasznik, 1999). 
The discretionary accruals estimated have an important implication for the quality 
of a firm’s earnings. Large discretionary accruals indicate low-quality earnings and 
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are a signal of active EM behaviour. Following DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), 
Kasznik (1999), and Cohen et al. (2008), the current study employs both time-series 
and cross-sectional approaches to estimate DA as a proxy of EM. DA estimated 
using cross-sectional model is applied as a robustness check. The results are 
presented in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. 
A large absolute value of discretionary accruals indicates active EM behaviour, 
while the signs of discretionary accruals indicate the strategy adopted by firms 
(Ding et al., 2007). Positive discretionary accruals show maximisation of earnings; 
negative discretionary accruals show minimisation of earnings. Following Jiraporn 
et al. (2008), Cohen et al. (2008), Bartov, Gul, and Tsui (2000), Klein (2002), and 
Warfield et al. (1995), this study uses the unsigned absolute value of discretionary 
accruals to capture the extent of EM. 
Abnormal accruals (discretionary accruals) from the Modified Jones model have 
been used as a proxy for EM in research in most western countries (e.g., Dechow 
et al., 1995; Kasznik, 1999; Klein, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005). This study focuses 
on China, and cultural diversity has a remarkable impact on corporate governance 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, & Tondkar, 2005). As 
mentioned in Chapter 3 Section 3.2, in addition to discretionary accruals, the ratio 
of non-operating income to sales is applied to measure EM, following Ding et al. 
(2007).  The non-operating to sales ratio captures non-operations-related earnings 
tunnelling, which is prevalent in India (Bertrand et al., 2002). Given the prior 
evidence on the severity of tunnelling and the minority shareholder expropriation 
problem in China, this study incorporates the non-operating income ratio as a 
supplemental measure of EM. 
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5.3 How can agency costs be detected? 
5.3.1 Measurement of principal-agent (PA) agency costs 
Prior studies have used proxies to measure PA agency conflict.  For example, Ang 
et al. (2000) and Singh and Davidson III (2003) use the asset utilization ratio to 
measure PA agency costs.  They argue that the asset utilization ratio evaluates the 
efficiency of how a company’s assets are being used by managers.  In other words, 
the asset utilization ratio indicates managerial effectiveness by measuring the 
relationship between a firm’s investment (or input, i.e., assets) and the manager’s 
output (sales or income).  PA agency costs are inversely related to the asset 
utilization ratio.  A weak asset utilization ratio implies poor output (sales), and 
hence poor managerial effectiveness with higher PA agency costs.  McKnight and 
Weir (2009) argue that the ratio of assets utilization as a proxy for PA agency costs 
has many potential drawbacks.  For example, total sales do not represent the 
managers’ output or ability to create value because sales are not always generated 
from profitable activities.  However, the assets utilization ratio still provides a 
useful indicator of PA agency conflict.  Thus, this study employs the asset 
utilization ratio as the first proxy to gain an insight into PA agency conflict. 
PAasset_utilisation =
Annual Sales
Total Assets
 
To conduct robust tests, this study also uses other proxies to measure PA agency 
costs.  Aligning with Singh and Davidson III (2003), this study uses SGA (selling, 
general, and administrative) expenses standardized by total assets as the second 
proxy for PA agency costs.  SGA expenses refer to the selling, general, and 
administrative expenses reported on firms’ income statements.  Since SGA 
expenses occur as a non-production cost, a high level of SGA expenses is 
considered a sign of poor managerial effectiveness.  Without being assigned to the 
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cost of products, SGA expenses, as a percentage of total sales, indicate whether 
managers are spending firms’ resources efficiently or wasting valuable cash flow.  
Thus, a high percentage of SGA expenses in total sales reflects a severe PA agency 
conflict. 
PASGA =
SGA expenses
Total Sales
 
5.3.2 Measurement of principal-principal (PP) agency costs 
In addition to traditional PA agency costs, which are the focus of agency theory, PP 
agency costs in emerging economies are attracting more and more attention.  PP 
agency costs arise when the dominant owners pursue their targets by sacrificing 
minority owners’ interests (Chen & Young, 2010). Especially in emerging 
economies, PP conflicts are prevalent with concentrated ownership structures and 
weak legal protection. The minority shareholders are exposed to expropriation by 
controlling shareholders.  
“Dividends signal the severity of the conflicts between the large, controlling owner 
and small, outside shareholders” (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003, p. 733). The extent of 
dividend payment reflects insider expropriation as the dividend payment releases 
the company wealth from insider control.  Given the concentrated ownership 
structure, PP agency conflicts are expected to rise in response to higher levels of 
dividend pay-out or distribution ratios in emerging economies. The underlying 
reason is that when the ownership structure is highly concentrated, the dividend 
pay-out amount rises in alignment with the preferences of controlling shareholders, 
since the controlling shareholders’ wealth is highly associated with particular firms 
(Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002).  
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Ownership concentration or type of ownership has important implications for PP 
agency conflict (Dahya, Dimitrov, & McConnell, 2008; Kim, Kitsabunnarat-
Chatjuthamard, & Nofsinger, 2007; Setia‐Atmaja, 2009).  Firms with highly 
concentrated ownership tend to pay low dividends, because the largest shareholders 
prefer to keep the money inside the company to use for their private benefit (La 
Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Pinkowitz, Stulz, & 
Williamson, 2006).  Compared to ownership structure, the percentage of the cash 
dividend of total assets is a more direct measure of PP agency conflict (Banchit & 
Locke, 2011).  Some studies use the extent of private benefit consumption to 
measure ownership concentration as well as PP agency conflict (Barclay & 
Holderness, 1989; Dyck & Zingales, 2004). Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) 
developed a synthetic index using a set of variables to measure the extent of PP 
agency conflict instead of relying on one variable such as the percentage of a cash 
dividend of total assets, or the extent of private benefits consumption.  They argue 
that their synthetic index includes variables that increase the ability of major 
shareholders to extract private benefits, and the variables used in their synthetic 
index are linked to the severity of agency conflicts.   
Compared to well-regulated, transparent financial markets, emerging markets that 
are characterized as having weak legal systems and weak shareholder protection 
face more agency problems between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders. Unlike the dispersed ownership in western countries, in emerging 
markets with very concentrated ownership, the problem of expropriation of 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders emerges. The expropriation 
problem can be reflected in the dividend payments of the firm.  
Dividend payment removes corporate wealth from insider control; higher dividends 
are paid by companies where the country’s legal protection of minority shareholders 
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is strong (La Porta et al., 2000). Dividend payment provides insight into insider 
expropriations and gives a perspective on agency conflicts between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. Therefore, this study uses dividend 
payment as a PP proxy. Following  Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001), the dividend 
payment is measured by four ratios, including the dividend/sales ratio; the 
dividend/total market value of common and preferred stocks ratio; the 
dividend/earnings after tax and interests ratio; and the dividend/total cash from 
operations ratio. In addition to the four dividend ratios, the percentage of cash 
dividends to total assets is also used as a PP agency costs proxy, following  Banchit 
and Locke (2011). 
For those firms that rarely pay out dividends, there will not be sufficient data to 
compute dividend ratios. Thus this study uses a sixth proxy for PP agency costs. 
Hewa Wellalage and Locke (2011a) studied the PP agency costs in unlisted small 
companies in New Zealand. Since unlisted small companies do not pay out 
dividends as a method of distributing profit, net income apportioned to a number of 
working owners is used to capture the distribution of profit and extent of 
expropriation. Following Hewa Wellalage and Locke (2011a), this study uses (net 
operating income/share number)/sales as an alternative measure of dividend ratio. 
All the PP agency cost proxies are regressed against EM and control variables. 
In sum, the six ratios of PP agency costs proxies include the dividend to cash flow 
ratio, the dividend to earnings ratio, the dividend to sales ratio, the dividend to 
market capitalization ratio, the dividend to total asset ratio, and the (net operating 
income/share number)/sales ratio. When insider expropriation is severe, lower 
dividends are paid to outside shareholders. Therefore a decrease in dividend 
payment measures indicates higher PP agency conflicts. The reason for using six 
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ratios is to create diversified measures of the dividend rate to insulate the 
conclusions from individual measure biases. 
5.4 Other control variables  
Agency costs occur when the interests of a firm’s managers do not match the 
interests of the firm’s owners (Ang et al., 2000).  To examine the relationship 
between agency costs and EM, it is important to control the internal governance 
mechanisms, such as board size, board independence, CEO duality, leverage and 
firm size, that tend to have effects on agency costs.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, board characteristics are an important part of the internal 
CG mechanism. Research on boards of directors has expanded from traditional 
issues of board structure to include board size, board independence, and board 
activity (Gillan, 2006). The primary roles of the board of directors are to make 
decisions on behalf of their shareholders and to fairly represent the interests of 
managers and shareholders.  To investigate the relationship between EM and 
agency costs in China, this study uses a group of elements (i. e., board size, board 
diligence, board expertise, board independence, CEO duality, CEO characteristics) 
to control for the influence of board characteristics. This section briefly explains 
each of the control variables included and how each is measured. 
Board size 
Board size and board independence are the two main board characteristics. Board 
size is an important element in the internal CG mechanism and relates to agency 
problems (Eisenberg et al., 1998).  The relationship between board size and agency 
costs is inconclusive according to the existing literature. Agency theory suggests 
that a relatively small board size is more effective and efficient, thus alleviating 
agency conflicts and enhancing firm performance (Jensen, 1993). As Lipton and 
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Lorsch (1992, p. 65) describe it, “when a board has more than ten members, it 
becomes more difficult for them all to express their ideas and opinions in the limited 
time available”. This is supported by Firstenberg and Malkiel (1994), who argue 
that a large board size endangers focus as well as genuine interaction and debate 
inside the boardroom.  
In contrast, resource dependence theory provides a rationale for a large board size. 
From the resource dependence theory perspective, a large board size is considered 
a source of effective external linkage and is hence associated with positive corporate 
outcomes (Alexander, Fennell, & Halpern, 1993; Dalton et al., 1999; Goodstein, 
Gautam, & Boeker, 1994).  To investigate the impact of board size on agency costs, 
following Yermack (1996), this study measures board size as the natural log of the 
total number of directors on the board. The research question of this study is 
established using agency theory as the foundation; therefore, based on agency 
theory, we expect relatively smaller boards to be efficient and to alleviate agency 
costs. 
Board independence 
A higher proportion of outside/independent directors tends to have a positive impact 
on the firm, given that independent directors often provide natural, unbiased 
opinions (Reddy et al., 2010). The prior literature provides evidence of beneficial 
effects of independent directors in the Chinese market. For example, Chen et al. 
(2006) show that increased proportions of outside directors on boards are negatively 
associated with frauds committed by companies.  
Ahmed and Duellman (2007) use the percentage of inside directors on a board as a 
measurement of board independence: in this case, the lower the board independence 
metric, the higher is the level of board independence. This current study uses the 
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percentage of independent directors on the board as a measure of board 
independence. Therefore a higher board independence metric in this study indicates 
a higher level of board independence. If outside/independent board members 
enhance monitoring, a negative association between board independence and 
agency costs can be expected. 
CEO duality 
The term CEO duality is used to describe a Chief Executive Officer who is also the 
chairperson of the board of directors. CEO duality has been widely discussed as a 
CG phenomenon (Dalton et al., 2007). Prior studies have examined the relationship 
between CEO duality, firm performance, and agency problems (Hewa Wellalage & 
Locke, 2011b; Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014). One of the agency problems 
caused by CEO duality is managerial entrenchment, which occurs “when managers 
gain so much power that they can use the firm to further their interests rather than 
the interests of shareholders" (Weisbach, 1988, p. 435).  Based on agency theory, 
CEO duality increases managerial entrenchment and reduces the effectiveness of 
board monitoring, which would result in greater agency problems (Finkelstein & 
D'aveni, 1994).  Correspondingly, investors appear to react negatively to a firm with 
CEO duality, due to the high potential for managerial entrenchment 
(Sundaramurthy et al., 1997). Other CEO characteristics, such as CEO educational 
level and CEO past functional experience, also have some impact on internal CG 
mechanisms (Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996). 
In this study, CEO duality is included in the regression model as a dummy variable. 
The CEO duality dummy takes the value of 1 when there is CEO duality, and is 
otherwise 0. Using agency theory as the theoretical rationale, the presence of CEO 
duality can be expected to increase agency conflicts. 
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Leverage 
Leverage is included as another control variable. The debt to equity ratio is used to 
measure the level of leverage in this study. Highly levered firms and highly 
distressed firms tend to have weak CG (Friedman, Johnson, & Mitton, 2003). Also, 
there is evidence to show that managers use increases in the firm’s leverage level 
to realize their own interests. For example, Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) 
find that managers increase firms’ leverage levels in order to increase their shares’ 
voting power to maintain their job tenure. From this perspective, a positive 
relationship between a firm’s leverage level and agency costs is expected. 
However, there are also arguments that leverage is negatively associated with 
agency costs (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Gillan (2006, p. 388) argues that debt in 
capital structure contributes to alleviating the potential agency costs of free cash 
flow, as “debt can act as a self-enforcing governance mechanism” by forcing the 
managers to generate enough cash to fulfil the company’s obligations related to 
interest payments and loan repayments. This study predicts a positive relationship 
between leverage level and agency costs given the interest on debt is relatively 
cheap and can be easily paid off by the company’s earnings.  
Firm size 
Firm size has a strong influence on CG, as discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.6.2. 
Given that larger firms have relatively more problems in aligning the interests of 
the principal with the agent, larger firms usually have a higher level of agency costs 
(Guillen, 2000).  However, larger firms, which generally have relatively more and 
better resources, tend to pay more attention to CG and thus have more apparent CG 
mechanisms (Ariff et al., 2007; Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2004; 
Black et al., 2006). To investigate the relationship between EM level and agency 
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costs in Chinese listed companies, firm size is controlled for in the regression model.  
Following Klapper and Love (2004), this study measures firm size as the natural 
log of total sales, and the expectation is that larger firms have more agency costs.  
In addition to the control variables described above, in order to capture the stock 
exchange-specific effect, the industry-specific effect, and the time-specific effect, 
this study includes three types of dummies (i.e., a stock exchange dummy, industry 
dummy, and year dummy) in the regression model. A description of all variables 
used in the regression model is presented in Table 5-3. 
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Table 5-3 Variables Description 
Proxy Description 
PA PA asset  Annual Sales/total assets  
PA sga SGA expenses/total assets  
PP PP income (Net operating income/share numbers)/sales  
PP divpayout Cash dividend to total assets  
PP divsale Dividend/sales 
PP divmar Dividend/total market value of common and preferred stocks  
PP divearn Dividend/earnings after tax and interests  
PP divcf Dividend/total cash from operations  
EM EM1 Discretionary accruals estimated by time-series analysis (absolute 
value) 
EM2 Non-operating income/sales 
EM3 Discretionary accruals estimated by cross-sectional analysis (absolute 
value) 
 Board size Natural log of the total number of the directors on the board 
 Board independence The percentage of inside directors on the board 
 CEO duality Dummy variable, 1 if CEO duality exists; 0, otherwise 
 Leverage Total liability/total assets  
 Firm size the natural log of total assets 
 Industry type Industry type1=Properties;  
Industry type2=Conglomerates;  
Industrytype3=Industry;  
Industry type4=Commerce;  
Industry type5=Utilities;  
Industry type 5 is the omitted dummy variable. 
Industry1dummy equals 1 if firm belongs to industry type1; 
Industry2dummy equals 1 if firm belongs to industry type2; 
Industry3dummy equals 1 if firm belongs to industry type3; 
Industry4dummy equals 1 if firm belongs to industry type4; 
 Stock exchange 
dummy 
Stock type1= SSE share; 
Stock type2=SZSE share; 
Stock type3 = GEM5; 
Stock type 1 SSE share is the omitted dummy variable. 
SSE dummy equals 1 if stock type is type1; 
SZSE dummy equals 1 if stock type is type2; 
 Year dummy The year 1999 is omitted 
 
                                                          
5 GEM, growth enterprise market, is the second board market, subordinate to the main board market. 
China’s GEM refers to the Shenzhen GEM. It differs a lot from the main board in listing threshold, 
regulatory system, information disclosure, trader requirement, investment risks, etc. It aims to 
support small and medium enterprises, typically high-growth enterprises, build up normal exit 
mechanisms for venture capitals and provide a strategic financing platform for countries with 
independent innovation. 
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This study constructed a sample including all the listed companies in the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 1999 to 2014.  The data were collected from 
DataStream and China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR).  The 
data codes for DataStream and CSMAR differ, so the full names of the companies 
were used to merge both sets of data. Banking industries and financial institutions 
were deleted from the sample, as is commonly done, reflecting the different 
regulation, liquidity, and governance for finance and banking industries (Bauer, 
Frijns, Otten, & Tourani-Rad, 2008). Also, extreme values were removed from the 
dataset via 5% winsorization. Based on the above discussions on the variables in 
this Chapter, Table 5-4 summarizes the expected signs of the variable coefficients. 
Table 5-4 Predicted signs of the estimated coefficients on controlling 
variables 
 PA asset 
ratio 
PA sga 
ratio 
PP proxies 
Board size - + - 
Board independence + - + 
CEO duality - + - 
Firm size - + - 
leverage - + - 
 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter describes the dependent variable and independent variable for the 
empirical analyses of the thesis. The modified Jones model is used to obtain the 
level of EM activities, and financial ratios from prior studies are used to measure 
PA and PP agency costs. Board size, board independence, CEO duality, leverage, 
and firm size are used to control for corporate governance characteristics which are 
well-documented in the corporate governance literature. In addition, industry, stock 
exchange, and year dummy are used to control for industry specific, stock exchange 
specific, and time specific effects. Chapter 6 will describe the data source and 
empirical methods used in this thesis.   
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6 CHAPTER 6 METHOD 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical method used in this study. Section 6.1 describes 
the data type and the data sources. Section 6.2 discusses the research method for 
this study. Sections 6.3 to 6.9 explain the method and econometric tools used in this 
study. Prior studies investigating the AC/EM relationship have used a static 
framework.  In this study, the dynamic nature of CG is integrated into the modelling 
and a more advanced method (generalised method of moments) is applied.  
The research methodology is positivist, following the ideas of Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986).  Positivist accounting and finance studies have been popular 
since the 1960s (Ball & Brown, 1968; Beaver, 1968). Positivist researchers propose 
that “given an objective, a researcher can turn a prescription into a conditional 
prediction and assess the empirical validity” (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990, p. 9).  
Positivists believe that reality is objective, singular and separate from the researcher 
and that the researcher is independent of the reality being researched (Creswell, 
2017).  Reality is observable, and guides the choice of empirical method.  The 
positivist approach in economics provides a platform for finance and accounting 
studies to investigate relevant issues (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990).  Early positivist 
thinking in relation to accounting choice studies arose from the perspective of 
agency costs in debt and compensation contracts. “The agency cost associated with 
debt and management compensation contracts and the agency, information, and 
other contracting costs associated with the political process provided the hypotheses 
tested in the early empirical accounting choice studies (bonus plan, debt/equity, and 
political cost hypotheses)” (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990, p. 134). 
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Another frequently cited example of early positivist accounting and finance 
research lies in the detection of managers’ compensation contracts and agency costs 
(Smith & Watts, 1982). In positivist accounting theory, a quantitative approach is 
used in the strategy of inquiry.  “Certain types of social research problems call for 
specific approaches” (Creswell, 2017, p. 21).  It is important to match the research 
approach to the research problem.   
When the problem is identifying factors that influence an outcome, 
the utility of an intervention or understanding the best predictors 
of outcomes, then a quantitative approach is best. It is also the 
best approach to use to test a theory or an explanation. (Creswell, 
2017, p. 22). 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the interrelationships between EM level, 
PA agency costs and PP agency costs in the CG context in the Chinese market.  
Specifically, this study aims to ascertain the influence of the selected factors (EM 
level) on an outcome (PA agency costs, and PP agency costs). 
Therefore, this research adopts an underpinning positivist paradigm and uses 
quantitative methodology. The extent of EM and agency costs are observable 
phenomena and quantifiable. The next section describes the data types and the data 
sources. 
6.2 Data 
Panel data are sets of data in which the behaviour of each entity (individuals, firms, 
etc.) is observed over time. Panel data are also known as longitudinal or cross-
sectional time-series data. Panel data contains observations of the same set of 
entities obtained over multiple time periods. Time-series and cross-sectional data 
can be thought of as special cases of panel data. Time series and cross-sectional 
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data represent two sets of information, which have only one dimension, and can be 
derived from panel data. The cross-sectional component reflects the differences 
observed between entities, while the time series component reflects the differences 
observed for one entity across multiple time periods. Panel data sets come in two 
forms, balanced and unbalanced. In the case of balanced panel data, every cross-
sectional entity is observed for the same time period. In the unbalanced panel case, 
the cross-sectional entities are observed for different time periods; in other words, 
some observations for some time periods are missing.  
To support a thorough examination of the research question, a comprehensive 
dataset was prepared.  Therefore, a panel regression approach was the preferred 
analytic model, and the panel approach requires data for individual company 
variables, cross-sectional data, and the same variables for the same companies over 
a number of years (the time-series component). 
The dataset compiled for the study covers the majority of the publicly traded 
companies listed on China’s domestic stock exchanges (i.e., the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges). A panel set is often considered to be efficient in 
handling econometric data since it captures two-dimensional aspects of 
observations by including data for X cross-sections and Y time periods. To examine 
the impact of EM level on agency costs for listed Chinese companies from 1999 to 
2014, a panel data set is appropriate. The panel data set applied in this study is 
unbalanced because of missing values for some companies over some years. 
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The data collected combines two separate data sets; CSMAR6 and DataStream7. 
CSMAR and DataStream use different codes for the same company, although each 
database has a distinct code for each company. In order to merge the CSMAR and 
DataStream data, this study combines the CSMAR company code and DataStream 
company code via the unique full name of the company.  This is the first study, as 
far as I am aware, that has developed a unique code that matches companies listed 
in both CSMAR and DataStream. Specifically, accounting and CG data (including 
total assets, total sales. total liability, leverage ratio, non-operating income, the 
number of directors, and the number of independent directors) were collected from 
CSMAR, while the industry type and stock exchange type data were collected from 
DataStream. CSMAR specializes in China stock market data and there are fewer 
missing values relative to other databases. Where necessary, any additional data 
were collected from DataStream or individual company websites. 
Next, the research paradigm employed in this study is briefly discussed. In this 
study, the criteria used in the selection of the sample of companies are as follows. 
First, all the companies included in the sample must be listed companies on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Second, financial firms 
and banks are excluded from the sample. Third, the data or information for all firms 
included in the sample must be available in CSMAR and DataStream. 
Research involves scientific practices that are “based on people’s philosophies and 
assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge; in this context, about 
                                                          
6 The China Stock Market &Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database provides high-quality data 
on China’s stock markets and the financial statements of China’s listed companies. The CSMAR is 
jointly produced by GTA Information Technology Co. Ltd (the leading global provider of Chinese 
financial market data, Chinese industries and economic data) to cater for the needs of Chinese 
economic analysis and research by scholars from universities and financial institutions.  
7 DataStream is a global financial and macroeconomic data platform covering equities, stock market 
indices, currencies, company fundamentals, fixed income securities and key economic indicators for 
175 countries and 60 markets. 
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how research should be conducted” (Collis & Hussey, 2013, p. 46). Therefore, the 
research paradigm (i.e., the way researchers design research, collect data and 
analyze data) is based on researchers’ basic beliefs about the world. 
Bryman and Bell (2011, p. 24) comment that “[a] research paradigm is a cluster of 
beliefs and dictates which for scientists in a particular discipline influence what 
should be studied, how research should be done, and how results should be 
interpreted”. The basic research paradigm for this study was developed after 
examining two research approaches; qualitative and quantitative (Burrell & Morgan, 
2007). The two fundamental research paradigms (or research philosophies) are 
given different names in different circumstances (Collis & Hussey, 2013). The 
alternative terms for the quantitative paradigm are positivist, objectivist, scientific, 
experimentalist, and traditionalist. The alternative terms for the qualitative 
paradigm include phenomenological, subjectivist, humanistic, and interpretivist. 
Based on the researcher’s subjective or objective view of social reality, research 
paradigms are classified as either qualitative or quantitative. Given their significant 
influence on the entire research process, it is important to identify research 
paradigms. Each research paradigm has assumptions based on fundamental aspects 
of ontology, epistemology, axiology, rhetoric, and methodology.  
Quantitative and qualitative research paradigms vary in many aspects (Collis & 
Hussey, 2013; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The first relates to data and 
sampling. In a quantitative approach, quantitative data that is highly specific and 
precise are generated, while in a qualitative approach, data are more subjective, 
narrative, and may contain more literal descriptions instead of continuous numeric 
data. To pursue a quantitative approach, large samples are often required, as 
statistics generated from a larger population tend to be more reliable. In a qualitative 
approach, researchers tend to focus on a small sample in order to study the emerging 
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phenomena in depth. The second area of difference is in the method applied. A 
quantitative study usually concerned with hypothesis testing, while a qualitative 
study is concerned with theory generation. In quantitative studies, an econometric 
and statistical method is commonly applied to generalize from sample to population. 
With the help of econometric techniques, researchers are able to eliminate the 
confounding influences of many variables and only use the variables of interest to 
assess the underlying cause and effect relationship more credibly. In contrast, a 
qualitative approach relies less on econometrics and focuses more on providing 
understandings and descriptions of people’s personal experiences, or the 
participants’ own categories of meaning. Thus, the qualitative approach is often 
used to describe complex phenomena. The third difference lies in the reporting of 
results. The results of quantitative approach are relatively independent of the 
researcher, and primarily based on statistical significance calculated using an 
econometric model. However, in reporting the outcomes of qualitative research, 
researchers can describe phenomena in rich detail using narrative.  
Although the quantitative and qualitative approaches are different in many ways, 
they are not actually as discrete as they appear. There is an emerging approach 
named the mixed method, which combines quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
The belief is that combining the two approaches can provide a more complete 
understanding of the research problem than either the quantitative or qualitative 
approach alone. 
6.3 Proposed research method  
“Certain types of social research problems call for specific approaches” (Creswell, 
2017, p. 21). It is important to match the research approach with the research 
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problem. A quantitative approach is best when the research agenda is to identify 
factors that  
Influence an outcome, the utility of an intervention, or to 
understand the best predictors of outcomes. In addition, it is 
convenient to use a quantitative approach to test a theory or an 
explanation. On the other hand, if a concept or phenomenon 
needs to be understood because little research has been done on 
it, then it merits a qualitative approach (Creswell, 2017, p. 22). 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between AC and EM in 
China based on agency theory; in other words, to investigate the influence of several 
selected factors (such as EM level, board size, board independence, CEO duality 
and firm size) on an outcome (such as AC). The quantitative approach is suitable in 
this situation.  
6.4 Multiple regression 
Regression is a statistical measure, which has been commonly applied to examine 
the strength and direction of the relationship between a dependent variable (usually 
denoted Y) and a series of independent variables (usually denoted X). Typically, a 
correlation coefficient matrix is estimated first to test whether two variables are 
associated with each other, and then regression is undertaken to take the analysis 
further to gain an idea of what kind of relationship is involved. Simple linear 
regression and multiple linear regression are the two basic types of regression 
analysis. There are also regression methods for non-linear relationships.  
Simple linear regression involves only one independent variable to predict the 
outcome of the dependent variable. In contrast, multiple regression uses at least two 
126 
 
independent variables (i.e., predictor variables or explanatory variables) to explain 
the outcome of Y (the dependent variable, also known as the response variable, or 
outcome variable). To achieve a good model, a lot of work is needed. Constructing 
regression models involves much decision-making in order to ensure that the 
models meet certain validity criteria. For example, a serial correlation among model 
variables should be avoided (this is because one of the classical linear regression 
model (CLRM) assumptions is serial independence, and violations of this 
assumption may lead to autocorrelation issues). Another example refers to the 
selection of variables employed in the model. Too many explanatory variables may 
lead to unneeded variables misspecification, while too few may cause omitted 
variables misspecification (Asteriou & Hall, 2015). 
6.4.1 Correlation  
The correlation coefficient in statistics is used to measure the strength and direction 
of a linear relationship between two variables. The value of a correlation coefficient 
is always between +1 and -1, where the absolute value of 1 implies a perfect 
positive/negative linear relationship and 0 implies no linear relationship at all. A 
correlation coefficient measures how closely two variables are related or the extent 
to which two variables tend to change together, but not the causation between 
variables. Covariance also measures the relationship between two variables; 
however, covariance values range from negative infinity to positive infinity, and 
are thus not standardized like correlation coefficients. The disadvantage of 
covariance is its dependence on the units of measurement of the variables; it is the 
expected value of the product of the deviation of one variable from its mean and the 
deviation of the other variable from its mean. As a result, if the units of 
measurement for the variables change, the covariance also changes (Dougherty, 
2011). The correlation coefficient in mathematics is calculated as the covariance 
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divided by the product of each variable’s standard deviation. In the other words, the 
correlation coefficient is a function of the covariance by taking a normalizing term 
(the production of variance) into account.  
For a regression model, analysts would expect the independent variables and 
dependent variable to be correlated, as correlation indicates the potential impact of 
independent variables on the dependent variable. However, the correlation 
coefficients between independent variables are not expected to be too high (e.g., 
higher than 0.5), since high values would violate the assumption of CLRM that 
there is no linear relationship among explanatory variables. Violation of this 
assumption may cause multicollinearity problems.  
Often correlation analyses refer to the Pearson correlation and the Spearman 
correlation. The Pearson correlation measurement is suitable for continuous 
variables, while the Spearman correlation measurement is often used to evaluate 
relationships involving ordinal variables (Hauke & Kossowski, 2011). Given that 
the financial data is continuous for this study, the Pearson correlation coefficient is 
applied. 
6.4.2 Hypothesis testing 
A hypothesis test is a statistical test that proceeds by making an assumption and 
examining whether the evidence from the sample data is enough to infer a certain 
condition to be true for the entire population. A hypothesis test is composed of two 
mutually exclusive hypotheses about a population; the null hypothesis, and the 
alternative hypothesis. Only one of the null or alternative hypotheses can be true. A 
null hypothesis (normally denoted 0H ) is the statement being tested, and analysts 
maintain the belief that the null is true unless the sample test statistics suggest the 
opposite, and in which case the analysts reject the null. When the null hypothesis is 
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rejected, the alternative hypothesis (normally denoted
1H ) is considered more 
appropriate. 
Usually, the null hypothesis states there is no relationship between variables. A 
hypothesis test will remain on the null until enough evidence emerges to support 
the alternative. A p-value is often applied to determine whether to reject the null or 
not. When the p-value is smaller or equal to the chosen level of significance (1%, 
5%, or 10%; this study uses the 5% significance level), the null hypothesis will be 
rejected (Hill et al., 2008).  
In a hypothesis test, the hypothesized mathematical relationship is known as the 
regression model. In practice, the hypothesis is made based on theories, and 
empirical analysis is implemented with the purpose of evaluating the plausibility of 
the hypothesis. Alternatively, an empirical analysis can be performed first and then 
fitted into a proper theoretical framework (Dougherty, 2011). In general, 
researchers or scholars configure the implications of theory into hypotheses, and 
the hypotheses constitute a regression model. Therefore, regression models, derived 
from theoretical arguments, represent simplified complex real-world relationships 
and contain theoretical explanations of economic phenomena.  
In regression modelling, there are dependent and independent variables. The 
dependent variable is also known as the outcome variable. It is called dependent 
because it "depends" on the independent variable.  The independent variable is also 
known as the explanatory variable. The independent variable is stand-alone and 
does not change dependent on the other variable.  The dependent variable responds 
to the independent variable. A regression model tests how the dependent variables 
vary with the independent variables. The results of model testing explain the extent 
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and character of the effects that the independent variables have on the dependent 
variables.  
The objective of this study is to examine the association between AC and EM. As 
discussed in Chapter 3 Section 3.4, the traditional focus of AC is PA agency costs, 
while PP agency costs are more prevalent in emerging economies due to the 
concentrated ownership structure. AC can decompose into PA and PP agency costs, 
and the relationship of EM with PA and PP is tested separately in this study. 
Following the hypothesis testing procedure, this study proposes the null hypothesis 
that there is no relationship between AC and EM.    
6.4.3 Dummy variables 
A variable, as a measurement of a characteristic, number or quantity, tends to 
increase or decrease and takes different values. However, a dummy variable, which 
is an artificial variable created and added to a regression model in order to 
differentiate distinct categories of observations, takes one of only two values; 0 and 
1. A dummy variable is also known as an indicator variable, design variable, 
categorical variable, binary variable, or qualitative variable.  
Dummy variables are assigned a value of 0 or 1 to represent subgroups of the 
sample. Dummy variables are used to code different categories with numerical 
values, capture the qualitative effects of observations and to sort the sample data 
into mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. For example, to differentiate the 
gender of all observations, a gender dummy with value 1 when female, otherwise 
0, can be added to the regression model. A dummy variable can have more than two 
categories. While applying multiple dummy variables, it is important to pay 
attention to the “dummy variable trap”. The number of dummies added into a 
regression should always be one less than the total number of available categories. 
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This is because, when the number of dummies equals the number of available 
categories, exact multicollinearity will occur, which is also known as the dummy 
variable trap. The omitted category or omitted dummy is used as a reference group. 
Mathematically, it does not matter which category is omitted; however, in general, 
the dominant or most normal category is omitted for convenience in practice 
(Asteriou & Hall, 2015; Dougherty, 2011).  
In this study, in order to check industry-specific effects, stock exchange-specific 
effects and time-specific effects, an industry dummy, stock exchange dummy and 
year dummy are used in the model.  
6.4.4 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
After developing the regression or econometric model, the next step in a regression 
analysis is to estimate the unknown parameters of the model. Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) is a statistical method used to estimate the parameters of the linear regression 
model. The goal of the OLS method is to minimise the sum of squares of differences 
between objective observations and those predicted by a linear function.  In other 
words, OLS closely fits a function with data by minimising the sum of squares 
errors (or RSS, which is short for residual sum of squares) from the dataset. The 
smaller the RSS, the better the model fits the data. When a perfect fit occurs, the 
residuals equal zero. However, in general, disturbance terms make a perfect fit 
impossible (Dougherty, 2011). 
According to Seddighi (2013, p. 38), “ Amongst all methods of estimation available, 
there are only two types which satisfy the efficiency criterion, given the 
assumptions. These are the OLS estimator and the maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimator. The OLS estimator can be obtained without reference to the normality 
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assumption, whilst ML estimators require the assumption of normality to hold. Both 
methods generate identical estimators of parameters.” 
Unlike OLS, ML estimators are obtained by maximising the probability of 
observing the sample data set. The basic idea of ML estimation is to maximise the 
“agreement” between the developed model and the observed sample data, starting 
by writing a likelihood function of the sample data (Fields et al., 2001). 
6.4.5 Fixed effect and random effect OLS 
A fixed effect estimator, also known as a within-group estimator, is used when it is 
suspected that time-constant effects for each entity are correlated with the 
explanatory variables. The fixed effect estimator allows the intercept for each entity 
to vary, but keeps the slope parameters constant across all the entities and time 
periods. Notably, the intercept for each entity in the fixed effect estimator only 
varies across individuals but not over time. By doing so, all the behavioral 
differences among individual entities across different time periods are captured by 
the intercept; thus the fixed effect estimator allows different intercepts for each 
observed group (entity). The purpose of treating intercepts as group (entity)-specific 
in the fixed effect estimator is to control for the effects of time-invariant variables 
with time-invariant effects, or in other words, to control for specific differences 
among all the observed entities.  
“In the fixed effects model, we assumed that all individual differences were 
captured by differences in the intercept parameter. In the random effects model, we 
again assume that all individual differences are captured by the intercept parameter, 
but we also recognize that the individuals in our sample were randomly selected, 
and thus we treat the individual differences as random rather than fixed” (Hill et al., 
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2008, p. 398). The random effect estimator assumes that the error term is 
uncorrelated to the explanatory variables.  
The Hausman test and the Breusch-Pagan test can be used to check for any 
correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables, and hence help 
analysts in making a choice between the fixed effect estimator or the random effect 
estimator (Gujarati, 2009). “The Hausman test compares the coefficient estimates 
from the random-effects model to those from the fixed effects model. The idea 
underlying Hausman’s test is that both the random effects and fixed effects 
estimators are consistent if there is no correlation between error term and the 
explanatory variables “ (Hill et al., 2008, p. 404). The random effect estimator is 
preferred under the null hypothesis of the Hausman test due to the higher efficiency 
of the random effect, while the fixed effect estimator is preferred in the alternative 
hypothesis. Thus, if the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is rejected, it indicates 
that the random effect estimator is inconsistent and inefficient, and the fixed effects 
estimator should be used to estimate the model parameters.  
6.5 Statistical Criteria for regression results evaluation  
This section introduces two types of basic statistical criteria that are commonly used 
to evaluate regression results: R-squared and tests of significance. We estimate the 
“goodness of fit” of the model to the sample data using R-squared and the adjusted 
R-squared. Subsequently, tests of significance on each of predictors are applied to 
check whether the statistical evidence is against or in favour of the inclusion of each 
predictor. A joint test of significance is applied to estimate whether all the predictors 
jointly have a significant impact on the dependent variable, which is also called the 
overall significance of regression (Seddighi, 2013). 
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6.5.1 R-Squared 
OLS minimizes the sum of squared residuals. In general, a model fits data well 
when the differences between observed values (actual value) and the model’s 
predicted values are small and unbiased. R-squared is a statistical measure used to 
determine how well the model fits the data. Total sample variation (TSS, the total 
sum of squares) in Y (the dependent variable) can be decomposed into a part that 
has been explained by the regression model (ESS, explained sum of squares) and a 
part that is unexplained (RSS, the residual sum of squares).  
R-squared (also known as the coefficient of determination) is measured by using 
ESS divided by TSS, which is the percentage of the explained variance in Y out of 
the total variance in Y. Hence, the closer R-squared approaches 1, the better the 
model fits the data. When R-squared has a value between 0 and 1, it implies “the 
proportion of the variation in Y about its mean that is explained by the regression 
model” (Hill et al., 2008, p. 81). R-squared can be negative, but it is usually not. 
However, there are some drawbacks of using R-squared to estimate the goodness 
of model fit. The first problem is, as Greene (2012, p. 42) puts it, “R-squared will 
never decrease when another variable is added to a regression equation”. Every time 
a new predictor is added, R-squared increases. As a result, a model may appear to 
have better model fit, or higher R-squared, simply because it has more independent 
variables. Another problem with R-squared is that it is not comparable across 
models with different dependent variables. R-squared would change even if the 
model was simply rearranged, with an identical RSS (Brooks, 2014). 
When the R-squared estimator is misleading, the adjusted R-squared can provide a 
better inference. The adjusted R-squared is a modification to R-squared which takes 
into account the number of predictors in the model. Unlike the R-squared, the 
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adjusted R-squared only increases if the newly added predictor improves the model 
fit more than could be expected by chance. If a newly added predictor improves the 
model to an extent less than what would be expected by chance, the adjusted R-
squared decreases. The adjusted R-squared is always lower than R-squared. 
The R-squared and adjusted R-squared produces very similar results in the GLS and 
GMM analysis. The fixed-effect OLS produces only R-squared (within, between, 
overall). To be consistent, I report R-squared for all the three models. 
6.5.2 Tests of significance 
Generally, a t-test is used to test the hypothesis on each of the individual slope 
coefficients in regression, while an F-test is used to test the joint hypothesis that 
contains multiple hypotheses or a hypothesis on multiple coefficients 
simultaneously. The t-test tests the significance of each explanatory variable; the F-
test tests the overall significance of an estimated regression equation.  
6.5.2.1 T-test 
The t-test is perhaps the most commonly used statistical analysis procedure for 
hypothesis testing. The t-test examines whether the means of two data sets are 
statistically different from each other. There are different types of t-test, including 
the one-sample t-test, unpaired two-sample t-test, and paired two-sample t-test. The 
one-sample t-test is used to compare the mean of sample data and a hypothesized 
value, while the two-sample t-test is used to compare the means of two groups or 
two data sets. When the two groups or samples are independent of each other, an 
unpaired t-test is appropriate to use, while if the two data sets are paired, for 
example, one set of data is recorded for a group before treatment and a second set 
of data is recorded from the same group after treatment, then a paired t-test is 
appropriate. 
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The t-test statistics in a regression result report are used to determine a p-value that 
indicates whether to reject the null hypothesis or not. The null hypothesis for a t-
test in a regression equation hypothesizes that individually, the independent 
variable is not significant in explaining dependent variable Y.  The p-value is 
commonly referred to as the exact significance level. A large absolute value in a 
test statistic will lead to a small p-value, and vice versa. As with t-test statistics, p-
values are almost always provided by software packages automatically. The p-value 
is useful because it contains all the information required to conduct a hypothesis 
test. Instead of calculating the test statistics and looking up critical values from the 
table, researchers can decide on whether to reject the null hypothesis or not, directly 
from the p-value. If the p-value for an independent variable is less than or equal to 
the chosen significance level (α), the test suggests that the observed data is 
inconsistent with the null hypothesis, so the null hypothesis must be rejected, 
indicating that this specific independent variable has a significant impact on the 
dependent variable (Brooks, 2014). 
6.5.2.2 F- test 
As mentioned above, in multiple regression, the t-test can be used to test whether 
an individual independent variable affects the dependent variable significantly or 
not. However, testing the individual significance of a regression coefficient (using 
the t-test) and testing the overall significance of the regression is not the same thing. 
The t-test cannot be used to test the joint impact of all independent variables. One 
or more individual regression coefficients having no impact on a dependent variable 
does not mean the impact of all the independent variables collectively on the 
dependent variable is also insignificant. The F-test is commonly used to test the 
hypothesis on the joint impact of all independent variables. As Brooks (2014, p. 96) 
puts it, “Any hypothesis that could be tested with a t-test could also have been tested 
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using an F-test, but not the other way around. So, single hypotheses involving one 
coefficient can be tested using a t- or an F-test, but multiple hypotheses can be tested 
only using an F-test”. The null hypothesis of an F-test states that all the slope 
coefficients of independent variables are simultaneously equal to zero, or in other 
words, all the independent variables jointly have no influence on dependent variable 
Y (Gujarati, 2009).  
The F-test statistic and p-value are routinely reported in the regression results 
prepared by statistics software. To interpret the F-test statistic, researchers can 
compare the value of the F-test statistic and the critical value of the F-test at a 
chosen significance level, and reject the null when the test statistic is greater than 
the critical value. Alternatively, the p-value approach can be used. The p-value 
reports the probability that the null hypothesis is true. By comparing the p-value 
and the chosen level of significance, the outcome of a test can be determined. For 
example, if the p-value of the F-test is 0.1%, which is smaller than the chosen 
significance level of 5%, it means that there is only a 0.1% chance that the null 
hypothesis of the F-test is true; thus one should reject the null, and draw the 
conclusion that all the independent variables collectively have a significant impact 
on the dependent variable. 
6.6 The assumptions of classical linear regression models 
(CLRM) 
There are some underlying assumptions in classical linear regression models 
(CLRM), which are illustrated in Table 6-1. These assumptions are important for 
OLS estimates to produce the best estimators available. When the classical 
assumptions of CLRM hold, OLS produces linear and unbiased estimators with the 
smallest variance (referred to as BLUE, an acronym for best linear unbiased 
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estimators). When one or more assumptions are violated (excluding the assumption 
on the normal distribution of residuals), OLS is no longer BLUE.  
Table 6-1 CLRM assumptions 
Assumption Violation may imply 
1) Linearity of the model Wrong regressors 
Non-linearity 
Changing parameters 
2) X has some variation Errors in variables 
3) X is non-stochastic and fixed in 
repeated samples 
Autoregression 
4) Expected value of disturbance is 
zero 
Biased intercept 
5) Homoskedasticity Heteroscedasticity 
6) Serial independence Autocorrelation 
7) Normally distributed disturbance Outliers 
8) No linear relationship among 
explanatory variables 
Multicollinearity 
(Source: adjusted from Asteriou & Hall, 2015, p. 37) 
Table 6-1 shows that violation of the assumptions of CLRM would lead to an 
inconsistent and biased estimator. Therefore, before relying on OLS regression 
results, checks on the validity of these assumptions are needed. In the following 
subsections, the common problems of multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation are introduced, and the tests used to detect the problems, and their 
solutions, are also discussed.  
6.6.1 BLUE 
The basic framework of regression analysis is the CLRM, and the CLRM is based 
on a set of assumptions. Under these assumptions, the least-squares estimator 
generates the minimum variance among all unbiased linear estimators, providing 
best linear unbiased estimation (BLUE).  In a regression context, an OLS estimator 
produces BLUE when three conditions hold. These conditions are: (1) linear (that 
is a linear function of a random variable); (2) unbiased (which means the estimator’s 
average or expected value is equal to the estimator’s real value); and (3) efficient 
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(that is an unbiased estimator with the least or smallest variance) (Gujarati, 2009). 
This is also the basis of the Gauss-Markov theorem.  
6.6.2 Multicollinearity 
One of the CLRM assumptions requires that there are no exact linear relationships 
between the independent variables. Violation of this assumption may lead to 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity in regression refers to the phenomenon in which 
two or more independent variables are highly correlated, indicating that one 
independent variable can be explained by a linear function of other independent 
variables. Perfect multicollinearity occurs when one independent variable can be 
expressed as an exact linear function of one or more of the others. However, perfect 
multicollinearity rarely arises with real data. Perfect multicollinearity is often 
correctable in actual cases; for instance, perfect multicollinearity can be corrected 
by avoiding the dummy variables trap or by excluding X and 2X in the same 
equation. However, imperfect multicollinearity still occurs when independent 
variables are correlated, and cannot be corrected as easily as perfect 
multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2009). 
In general, multicollinearity does not affect the goodness of fit or the goodness of 
prediction. If the research is only aimed at predicting a dependent variable from a 
set of independent variables, with the presence of multicollinearity, the predictions 
made by the regression would still be accurate; the overall 2R would still provide an 
accurate indication of how well the independent variables together predict the 
dependent variable. Multicollinearity does not adversely affect the predictive power 
of the regression model as a whole, but it can be problematic if the purpose of 
regression is to estimate the contributions of individual independent variables. In 
this case, regression coefficient estimators change erratically in response to small 
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changes in the model or data, the regression coefficient becomes unstable and 
difficult to interpret, and thus is no longer valid regarding individual predictors.  
Multicollinearity inflates the variance of the parameter estimators; variance 
inflation factors (VIF) measure how much the variance of estimated regression 
coefficients are inflated compared to the coefficient estimator in the absence of 
multicollinearity. If the VIF value exceeds 10, it indicates the existence of 
problematic multicollinearity (Asteriou & Hall, 2015). 
6.6.3 Heteroscedasticity 
Multicollinearity occurs when the assumption of no linear relationship between 
independent variables fails, while heteroscedasticity occurs when the CLRM 
assumption of homoskedasticity (meaning the variance of the error term is constant) 
is violated. In the homoskedasticity assumption, variations in the values of 
independent variables are assumed not to affect the variance of dependent variables. 
The existence of heteroscedasticity can invalidate statistical tests of significance, 
thus it is considered a major concern in the application of regression analysis. 
“Significant variations in the independent variables cause the variance of the 
dependent variable/disturbance term to change, resulting in heteroscedasticity” 
(Asteriou & Hall, 2015, p. 83). Therefore, heteroscedasticity most often arises with 
cross-sectional data, where the values for each individual may change significantly 
from one to the next. 
Even though the OLS estimator is still unbiased and consistent (but no longer 
efficient, and thus no longer BLUE) in the presence of heteroscedasticity, the 
standard errors of the estimates will be adversely affected and become biased with 
heteroscedasticity. If the standard errors are biased, the t statistics and F statistics 
will generate misleading results and are no longer reliable. In addition, the 2R
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estimator will also overestimate the degree of linear relationship in the regression 
model (Seddighi, 2013). 
There are informal and formal methods that can be used to detect heteroscedasticity. 
The informal approach refers to visual inspection (graphical method). In the case 
of multiple regression with more than one independent variables, heteroscedasticity 
can be detected if the scatterplot of least squares residual exhibits a systematic 
pattern; in other words, a ‘healthy’ model should have no patterns of any sort in the 
residuals (Asteriou & Hall, 2015; Gujarati, 2009). 
Two common formal tests of heteroscedasticity are the Breusch-Pagan test 
(Breusch & Pagan, 1979a) and the White test (White, 1980). Both tests can be 
performed in most statistical software, such as EViews, Stata, SAS, and MATLAB. 
The Breusch-Pagan test detects any linear form of heteroscedasticity by testing 
whether the error variance depends on anything observable. The White test is a 
special case of the Breusch-Pangan test; in the White test, the normal distribution 
assumption of errors is relaxed (Gujarati, 2009). 
Heteroscedasticity is harmful to the reliability of regression estimates and there are 
tests that can detect it, but is there a way to resolve heteroscedasticity problems; 
what are the remedial measures? When heteroscedasticity is found in an OLS 
regression model, before proceeding with the regression, the first step should be to 
have a look at the specification of the model or try to transform the variables. This 
is quite important because sometimes heteroscedasticity occurs due to improper 
model specification (for example, some important variables may be omitted in the 
model), or the effects of variables are not linear. In such cases, heteroscedasticity is 
not the actual problem, model misspecification is; heteroscedasticity may disappear 
once the model is properly re-specified (Williams, 2015). A second way to deal 
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with heteroscedasticity is to use robust standard errors. As mentioned above, 
heteroscedasticity may lead to biased standard errors, where OLS assumes that the 
errors or residuals are independent and identically distributed. The application of 
robust standards errors tends to be more reliable in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity because it relaxes the OLS assumptions on errors. Another way 
to proceed with heteroscedasticity is to apply the generalized (or weighted) least 
squares method (GLS or WLS) (Asteriou & Hall, 2015; Gujarati, 2009). Under GLS, 
the OLS variables are transformed to satisfy the CLRM standard assumptions on 
least squares and thus generate a set of parameter estimators that are BLUE. 
6.6.4 Autocorrelation 
One of the CLRM assumptions for BLUE states that the error terms should be 
uncorrelated with each other. Autocorrelation, also known as serial correlation, 
occurs when the error terms are correlated. Autocorrelation most likely occurs in 
regressions using time series data sets. In time series data where the observations 
are successive, the error term in one period may affect the error in other time periods.   
In the case of autocorrelation, the OLS estimators are still unbiased and consistent. 
However, OLS estimators are no longer efficient, and therefore no longer BLUE. 
That is, among all the unbiased estimators, OLS no longer generates estimates with 
minimised variance. Additionally, with autocorrelation, OLS methods tend to 
underestimate the standard errors of estimators and regression, thus the t-test, F-test, 
and R-squared become unreliable. This means that almost all the basic tools of 
regression analysis become biased and inconsistent. Most likely, R-squared and t-
statistics will be overestimated, producing an image of better model fit and higher 
estimate significance than the correct one (Asteriou & Hall, 2015; Dougherty, 2011; 
Seddighi, 2013). 
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There are various causes of autocorrelation. Asteriou and Hall (2015) summarise 
three main causes. First, omitted variables can cause autocorrelation. For instance, 
when the dependent variable Y is related to two independent variables but only one 
independent variable is included in the model, the effect of the omitted independent 
variable will be captured by the error term. Especially in time series data sets, where 
the omitted variable depends on its previous values, and the previous error terms 
capture the effects of omitted variables in previous time periods, the current error 
term becomes dependent on the previous error terms, and unavoidably correlated 
with the previous error terms. Second, model misspecification can also lead to 
autocorrelation. For instance, when a researcher wrongly assumes a straight-line 
relationship that is in fact a quadratic relationship, then the error term obtained by 
the straight-line model will be correlated with the quadratic term. Then the changes 
in error terms are dependent on the changes in independent variables, which leads 
to autocorrelation. The third possible cause of autocorrelation is systematic errors 
in measurement. When systematic measurement errors accumulate over time, the 
errors reveal themselves as auto-correlated. 
The Durbin-Watson (DW) test is one of the statistical tests for detecting the 
presence of autocorrelation or serial correlation (Asteriou & Hall, 2015). The DW 
test can detect whether autocorrelation exists, but is incapable of identifying its 
cause (Seddighi, 2013). There are a few assumptions that must be met in order to 
assure the validity of a DW test. First, a constant term or intercept needs to be 
included in the regression model requiring a DW test. Second, the serial correlation 
is assumed to be first order only and the regression model should not include a 
lagged dependent variable as one of its explanatory variables. There are different 
orders of autocorrelation. First order correlation is often denoted as AR(1), which 
is the simplest form of autocorrelation, describing the situation where successive 
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values of the same variable are correlated, or in other words, where consecutive 
errors are correlated. Second-order autocorrelation occurs when the error terms two 
periods apart are correlated, and so forth (Seddighi, 2013). 
Autocorrelation can have two types, positive or negative. In positive autocorrelation, 
positive error terms are almost always followed by positive error terms, and 
negative error terms are almost always followed by negative error terms. In other 
words, the consecutive errors in positive autocorrelation usually have the same sign. 
In negative autocorrelation, consecutive errors usually have opposite signs; positive 
errors are almost always followed by negative errors, and negative errors are almost 
always followed by positive errors. 
6.7 Endogeneity 
Endogeneity occurs when there is a correlation between the independent variable 
and the regression equation’s error term. When the independent variables are not 
correlated with error, the situation is described as exogenous (Verbeek, 2008).  
Endogeneity results in biased and inconsistent parameters that make regression 
estimators unreliable. Endogeneity commonly has three forms: omitted variables, 
simultaneity, and measurement error (Roberts & Whited, 2012).  
Omitted variables refer to those variables that should be included in the regression 
equation, but in fact are not. There are various reasons for the existence of omitted 
variables. For instance, omitted variables bias can arise when a relevant predictor 
or explanatory variable that is correlated with the included predictors fails to be 
included in the model. Also, omitted variable bias can arise when factors that 
happen to be correlated with the included explanatory variables are difficult to 
quantify or observe. When the relevant variables fail to be included in the model as 
explanatory variables, they will appear in the error term of the regression model. 
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When the omitted variable is correlated with any of the included explanatory 
variables, the composite error term in the regression model will become correlated 
with the explanatory variables. In this case, the OLS parameter estimates become 
inconsistent and biased.  
The second cause of endogeneity is called simultaneity or reverse causality. 
Simultaneity occurs when independent variables have an impact on the dependent 
variable, and at the same time, the dependent variable has an impact on the 
independent variables. In this case, it becomes plausible to argue that either the 
independent variable causes the dependent variable or that the dependent variable 
causes the independent variable. Statistically, simultaneity violates the assumptions 
in the error terms and results in inconsistent OLS estimators (Roberts & Whited, 
2012; Verbeek, 2008).  
The third form of endogeneity refers to measurement error. In most cases, 
researchers use proxies or metrics to measure, quantify, and represent unobservable 
variables. However, variables in CG sometimes are abstract and hard to quantify or 
observe; for example, the extent of information asymmetry or conflicts of interest. 
Measurement error arises when there is a discrepancy between the real or true 
values of the variables of interest and the chosen proxy. As a result, the raised 
measurement error becomes part of the composite error term in regression analysis. 
Measurement error may occur in both the dependent variable and independent 
variables. OLS estimations produce consistent estimates as long as the 
measurement error is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, and vice versa. 
Therefore, endogeneity issues arise when explanatory variables are correlated with 
error terms. Omitted variables, simultaneity and measurement error are the three 
main causes.  
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When one or more explanatory variables in a regression equation are endogenous 
(i.e., correlated with the composite error term) the OLS estimates are biased and 
inconsistent. To address the endogeneity problem, alternative estimators are needed.  
According to Roberts and Whited (2012), the standard remedy for endogeneity is 
the instrumental variable (IV) method. For a variable to fit as a qualified instrument, 
it needs to satisfy two conditions, which are relevance and exclusion conditions. 
The first condition, the relevance condition, requires the instrument variable to be 
partially correlated with the endogenous variable. The second condition, the 
exclusion condition, requires the instrument variable to be uncorrelated with the 
composite error term in regression. When there are more instrumental variables 
than endogenous variables, the model is said to be overidentified.  
Two stage least squares (2SLS or TSLS) is another popular alternative estimation 
to deal with endogeneity. The 2SLS technique generates estimators in two stages. 
The first stage generates proxies systematically to replace endogenous explanatory 
variables. The second stage simply substitutes the proxies for endogenous variables 
and estimates the parameters using OLS. Most econometrics packages support 
2SLS.  
When endogeneity presents, methods like instrumental variables and 2SLS produce 
consistent and efficient estimators. However, when there is no endogeneity problem, 
using instrumental variable (IV) or 2SLS methods will result in consistent but no 
longer efficient (i.e. smallest variance) estimators. Therefore, testing whether 
endogeneity is present is important before discarding the OLS estimates. Testing 
for the presence of endogeneity is actually testing whether there is a correlation 
between explanatory variables and the error term. The Hausman specification test 
can be used for this purpose (Hausman, 1978). The Hausman specification test is 
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used to determine whether a variable or a group of variables is endogenous or 
exogenous. 
6.8 Instrumental variable (IV) estimates 
Instrumental variable (IV) estimation uses additional variables as “instruments” to 
replace endogenous variables. The endogenous variables are correlated with the 
error source for various reasons, including omitted variables, measurement errors 
in the regressors, and simultaneous causality, as discussed in Section 6.7. The 
fundamental idea of IV estimation is to find a valid instrument variable Z, and then 
replace the endogenous variable X with Z to examine the effect on dependent 
variable Y. Basically, the instrumental variable Z is used to isolate the exogenous 
part of X. Valid instrumental variables need to satisfy two conditions; instrument 
relevance and instrument exogeneity. Instrument relevance requires that the 
instrument Z must correlate to the endogenous variable X. If the correlation 
between instrument Z and endogenous variable X is weak, then the instrument is 
considered as a weak instrument and no longer desirable, since weak instruments 
may result in bias. Instrument exogeneity requires that instrument Z to be 
uncorrelated to the error term. Therefore, a valid instrument must be relevant and 
exogenous. One way to find a valid instrument is to look for exogenous variations 
that affect X.  
In the CG context, it is difficult to identify legitimate instruments that are exogenous 
and at the same time correlated with the endogenous variable (Bhagat & Bolton, 
2008; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). Most empirical studies apply imperfect 
instruments, such as weak instruments, semi-endogenous, or quasi-instrumental 
variables (Renders, Gaeremynck, & Sercu, 2010). Weak instruments are exogenous 
but have a very low correlation with the endogenous variable; semi-endogenous or 
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quasi-instrumental variables are those highly correlated with the endogenous 
variable but not strictly exogenous. A related approach relies on a dynamic panel 
data model to resolve the endogeneity problem. For example, in a CG-FP 
relationship, the lagged value of CG is used as the instrument for the current CG, 
since past performance is unlikely to be impacted by the current CG, and is thus 
exogenous (Love, 2010). However, because CG tends to be persistent, slow-moving 
and almost all explanatory variables in CG are considered as endogenously 
determined, this approach is also plagued with the weak instruments problem. Due 
to the difficulty in finding valid exogenous instrumental variables in CG, the IV 
approach is compromised. The next section introduces the generalized method of 
moments (GMM), which is considered the most feasible solution for taking account 
of endogeneity. 
6.9 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
The endogeneity issue is pervasive in empirical corporate finance studies. “The 
combination of complex decision processes facing firms and limited information 
available to researchers ensures that endogeneity concerns are present in every 
study” (Roberts & Whited, 2013, p. 6). Studies on CG inevitably encounter 
endogeneity problems, given the dynamic nature inherent in CG. The process of 
CG is consecutive and the CG of the last period always influences the CG in the 
next.    
Wintoki et al. (2012) emphasize that the dynamic nature inherent in CG as a source 
of endogeneity is often ignored. In CG, the current CG features are often correlated 
with past CG features; in other words, the current CG features are often a function 
of past GC features. Ignoring the direct influence imposed by past CG features on 
current CG features often yields inconsistent estimates.    
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The dynamic panel model is introduced to capture the influence of lagged 
dependent variables on the current outcome, by including lagged dependent 
variables as explanatory variables. However, the inclusion of lagged dependent 
variables violates the CLRM assumption of no correlation between the explanatory 
variable and the error term; therefore, the OLS estimates become biased and 
inconsistent (Anderson & Hsiao, 1982; Arellano & Bond, 1991).  
The advantages of the dynamic panel GMM (generalized method of moments) 
estimator are reflected in at least three aspects. First, the dynamic panel GMM 
estimator accounts for the entity-specific fixed effect to mitigate unobservable 
heterogeneity. Second, the dynamic panel GMM estimator accounts for the impact 
of past dependent variable values on the current ones to keep only exogenous 
attributes. The third advantage is the instrument advantage. In the traditional 
instrumental variable approach, it is known to be difficult to find proper external 
instruments in CG studies (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). The dynamic panel GMM 
estimator uses a combination of variables from the entity’s history as valid 
instruments. Therefore, compared to the traditional IV approach that requires valid 
external instruments, which are never easy to find, the dynamic panel GMM 
estimator is much more convenient given the instruments are internal, and already 
contained in the panel data. 
The method of moments (MM) estimation is also superior to the ML estimation. 
The ML estimator is sensitive to its distributional assumptions, which is not 
convenient since the collected sample data are often not normally distributed. 
“Unlike ML estimation, GMM does not require complete knowledge of the 
distribution of the data. Only specified moments derived from an underlying model 
are needed for GMM estimation. In some cases in which the distribution of the data 
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is known, ML estimation can be computationally very burdensome whereas GMM 
can be computationally very easy” (University of Washington, 2005, p. 1).  
The idea of the method of moments relies on the analogy between sample and 
population. Each sample statistic has a counterpart in the population; for example, 
the sample average and the expected population average. MM or GMM use the 
sample data to infer the population character (Zsohar, 2012). In general, “ a GMM 
estimator of the true parameter vector is obtained by finding the element of the 
parameter space that sets linear combinations of the sample cross products as close 
to zero as possible” (Hansen, 1982, p. 1029). 
The advantage of GMM stems from the fact that it optimally 
exploits all the linear moment restrictions specified by the 
model…It is essential to ensure that there is no higher order 
serial correlation to have a valid set of instruments independent 
of the residuals. This can be investigated by using Sargan’s test 
of overidentifying restrictions. This two-step GMM methodology 
can control for the correlation of errors over time, 
heteroscedasticity across firms, simultaneity, and measurement 
errors due to the utilization of the orthogonal conditions on the 
variance-covariance matrix (Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal, 2008, 
p. 70). 
In the dynamic GMM estimator category, there are differenced GMM and system 
GMM. Differenced GMM was introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen 
(1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991). The differenced GMM estimation uses first-
differenced equations to eliminate unobserved fixed effects and lagged instruments 
for correcting for the simultaneity in the first-differenced equations. The basic 
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procedure of differenced GMM consists of three steps. The first is to develop a 
dynamic model. A dynamic modelling framework is used when the problem being 
investigated indicates a dynamic nature, where the independent variables are 
dynamically associated with the dependent variables. In a dynamic model, the 
lagged dependent variables are included as one of the explanatory variables. The 
number of lags of dependent variables included should be sufficient to capture the 
influence of past dependent variables on the current dependent variable value. If we 
include n lags of the dependent variable, any historical data of dependent variables 
that are older than the lags should have no direct influence on the current value of 
the dependent variable; thus historical dependent variables beyond n lags are 
expected to be exogenous in order to avoid the presence of endogenous variables in 
the model. The second step in differenced GMM is to transform the developed 
dynamic model to the first-differenced form. The third step is to apply the GMM 
estimator to estimate the transformed dynamic model in a first-differenced form, 
using the lagged values of independent variables as instruments for the current 
independent variables. 
However, there are at least three shortcomings of differenced GMM estimators 
(Wintoki et al., 2012). The first problem comes along with the process of 
transforming levelled equations to the first-differenced form. The differencing 
procedure reduces the variation in the explanatory variables, and thus reduces the 
test power. The second shortcoming involves the instruments used. In differenced 
GMM, lagged variables in levels serve as the instruments of the transformed 
differenced equation. Arelleno and Bover (1995) note that the levelled instruments 
are not sufficient and may be weak for the differenced equation. The third drawback 
is that the impact of measurement error on the dependent variables can be 
exacerbated by the differencing procedure.  
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To moderate the shortcomings of difference GMM, Arelleno and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) propose system GMM estimation, which consists of both 
levelled and differenced equations. In addition to the differenced equation from 
difference GMM, system GMM estimation uses the original equation in levels, and 
then uses the lagged differences as the instruments. Therefore, the system GMM 
estimation composes a system of equations by stacking the differenced equation up 
with the equation in levels, and using lagged levels and lagged differences as 
instruments in the differenced equation and the levels equation, respectively.   
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose that in differenced GMM, the absence of 
information in level variables leads to substantial loss of efficiency. The 
instruments used in the differenced GMM estimator contain little information about 
the endogenous variables in first difference, and the lagged first-differenced values 
are informative instruments for the endogenous variables in levels. When the 
instruments are only weakly correlated to the endogenous variables, bias may 
emerge from the instrumental estimators (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995; Staiger & 
Stock, 1994; Stock & Yogo, 2002). A subsequent study by  Blundell and Bond 
(1998) asserts that the system GMM estimator, which uses both lagged first-
differenced and lagged levels instruments, reveals gains in efficiency of estimation. 
By adding an additional instrument set, the system GMM estimator successfully 
reduces the bias of a finite sample.  “Under the system GMM technique, the model 
is estimated in both levels and first differences, as level equations are 
simultaneously estimated using differenced lagged regressors as instruments. In this 
way, apart from controlling for individual heterogeneity, variations among firms 
can partially be retained” (Antoniou et al., 2008, pp. 70-71). In particular, the 
system GMM suits CG studies, considering the endogeneity issues and dynamic 
nature inherent in CG. Taking the instance of governance/performance relationship, 
152 
 
“the system GMM model enables us to estimate the governance/performance 
relation while including both past performance and fixed-effects to account for the 
dynamic aspects of governance/performance relation and time-invariant 
unobservable heterogeneity, respectively” (Wintoki et al., 2012, p. 596).  
Differenced and system GMM are popular mainly because they are able to handle 
important concerns, such as fixed effects and endogenous explanatory variables, in 
modelling. Although the GMM estimator has obvious advantages over many other 
estimators, it is noteworthy that the GMM estimator is also subject to some 
deficiencies. For example, in the differenced GMM, instruments often contain 
inadequate information about the endogenous variables. Thus,  the differenced 
GMM is associated with weak instruments and often yields unsatisfactory, low and 
statistically insignificant parameter estimates (Blundell & Bond, 2000).  
The caveat for using the system GMM is that it may create too many instruments 
and lead to overidentified models. Roodman (2009) addresses the problem of too 
many instruments or instrument proliferation in GMM estimation. He proposes two 
techniques to reduce the instrument count. One way is to limit the lag depth, and 
the other is to collapse the instrument set. Also, Mehrhoff (2009) provides a solution 
to the problem of too many instruments in the form of factorization of the standard 
instrument set. Factorization of the standard instrument set is optimal and a valid 
transformation to ensure the consistency of GMM.  
6.10 Dynamic nature of CG 
Various studies in CG, especially in internal CG studies, have adopted the dynamic 
model to capture its dynamic nature and address the potential endogeneity issues 
(e.g., Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2014; Wintoki et al., 
2012).  Wintoki et al. (2012) find no causal relation between board structure and 
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firm performance under a dynamic modelling framework, which contradicts prior 
evidence. Wintoki et al. (2012) attribute the contradictory result to ignorance of the 
relationship between current and past firm performance in the prior studies. In CG, 
it is often hard to ascertain the cause and effect relationships among underlying 
factors; for example, whether the firm performance drives CG or the CG drives firm 
performance. Ignorance of potential reversed causation and application of 
estimators that are inefficient in alleviating endogeneity issues, such as OLS, has 
caused the endogeneity issue to plague CG studies.  
Flannery and Hankins (2013) examine and compare the performance of various 
econometric methodologies estimating dynamic panel models under realistic 
statistical conditions, where the dataset tends to be unbalanced and contains 
endogenous repressors. They find that GMM performs better with the presence of 
dynamic lagged dependent variables, while the traditional OLS estimator performs 
poorly.  
In the implementation of GMM estimation, it is important to decide the length of 
lags of CG variables to ensure dynamic completeness. In a dynamic model, the lags 
that contain influence from the past should be included. Failure to capture all the 
information from the past may incur potential model misspecification due to 
omitted variable bias and endogeneity, given the omitted lags are relevant in 
explaining current performance (Wintoki et al., 2012). To avoid the bias caused by 
omitted and endogenous instruments, one may want to include both recent and older, 
(i.e., more lagged) instruments, expecting that with expanded lag-length, the 
instrument set becomes more comprehensive and leaves fewer loopholes in 
capturing all influences from the past. However, there is a fundamental trade-off in 
including more lags. Expanded lag-length may help to capture past influences, but 
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the more lagged the instruments are, the weaker they become. Weak instruments 
also incur bias in instrument estimation.  
Glen, Lee, and Singh (2001) and Gschwandtner (2005) suggest that two lags are 
sufficient to capture the influence of past performance in CG studies. Wintoki et al. 
(2012) compare the performance of lag two and older lags, and find that in the 
presence of the most recent two lags, the older lags become insignificant. Thus they 
suggest that the most recent two lags subsume sufficient information to capture the 
dynamic governance/performance relationship, which is consistent with Glen et al. 
(2001) and Gschwandtner (2005).  
Additionally, Wintoki et al. (2012) examine how strongly the present is correlated 
with the past in CG. They find that not only the governance variable but also the 
frequently used control variables (i.e., board size, board independence, CEO duality, 
firm size, market to book value, standard deviation of stock returns, leverage, 
number of business segments) in CG studies are dynamic, endogenous and adjust 
in response to firm performance. They compare the result of different models (the 
OLS model, fixed effect model, dynamic OLS model and system GMM model), 
and find the coefficient sign of the same variable flips. For example, board 
independence presents a positive and significant coefficient in the static fixed-
effects model, but it is negative in static OLS estimates, which suggest that bias 
may arise due to ignorance of unobservable heterogeneity and dynamic 
relationships (Wintoki et al., 2012).  
Using a dynamic GMM model, Wintoki et al. (2012) demonstrate no significant 
effect of board structure on firm performance after controlling for the endogeneity 
problem, which is in sharp contrast to prior studies.  However, when they examine 
the determinants of board structure on firm characteristics, the overall inference 
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stays unchanged from the OLS estimation of a static model to the dynamic GMM 
model. According to Wintoki et al. (2012, p. 601), “this difference (of OLS and 
GMM inferences on ‘performance on structure’ regression and ‘structure on 
structure’ regression) provides some insight as to what aspects of empirical 
corporate finance analysis may be the most susceptible to biases arising from 
ignoring the combination of unobservable heterogeneity and the dependence of 
present corporate finance variables on the past, and correspondingly, where analysis 
using dynamic panel estimation may be the most important”. In the 
governance/performance relationship, which is a “performance on structure” 
regression, dynamic relationship-associated endogeneity is especially important, 
because the relationship between past performance and the current governance is 
strong. However, in the firm characteristics/board structure relationship, which is a 
“structure on structure” regression,  the relationship between the past value of the 
dependent variable (board structure, or governance) and the current value of 
explanatory variables (firm characteristics) is not as strong and less important. 
Therefore, although the effect of past firm characteristics on current governance is 
strong, the effect of current governance on past firm characteristics is much weaker. 
In the “structure on structure” regression, the status of current governance is not 
strongly determined by the past, and thus less susceptible to biases due to 
endogeneity arising from unobservable heterogeneity and dynamic relationships. In 
fact, if there were any link between past governance and current structure, it would 
be indirectly through the effect of “performance on structure”.  
What Wintoki et al. (2012) emphasize is that, when encountering a “performance 
on structure” model, more attention should be paid to the inference of dynamic 
GMM estimation and less attention to the inference of static OLS estimation. This 
is because past governance has strong implications for current firm performance, 
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and in such cases, the dynamic GMM model controls for simultaneity, unobservable 
heterogeneity, and the potential effect of CG’s dynamic nature to eliminate biases. 
On the contrary, when encountering a “structure on structure” model, equal weight 
should be placed on the static OLS estimation and dynamic GMM estimation. 
Based on Agency theory, this study examines the association between agency costs 
and EM. This study argues that the relationship between AC and EM is dynamic 
and endogenous. The potential endogeneity in the AC/EM relation derives from 
three sources: (1) omitted exogenous variables; (2) simultaneity; and (3) the 
dynamic nature inherent in internal governance.  
Omitted variables are a common source of endogeneity in CG studies since CG is 
complex and a synthesis of various factors, so capturing all the variables that have 
a role in the relationship is not easy. Endogeneity issues also exist because of 
simultaneity. As in the CG/FP relationship, in the AC/EM relationship, it is difficult 
to determine whether EM drives AC or AC drives EM. Dynamic relationships are 
another concern with regard to endogeneity, as the past current AC could be the 
result of previous management, and previous AC should be included to explain the 
current AC.  
Therefore, this study uses the two-step system GMM to tackle the endogeneity 
problem, as the two-step system GMM is considered the most feasible solution for 
endogeneity issues in a dynamic panel setting (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008; Schultz 
et al., 2010). 
6.11 Summary 
This chapter introduced the data sources and methods used in this study. The 
potential sources of endogeneity issues and the techniques employed in this study 
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to tackle endogeneity were discussed.  The next chapter specifies the regression 
models used to test the hypotheses and to answer the research questions.
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7 CHAPTER 7 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter specifies the regression models for this study and is organized as 
follows. Section 7.1 summarizes the variables used in the model. Specifically, 
Section 7.1 briefly describes the dependent and independent variables. All of the 
variables and variables’ proxies are chosen based on suggestions in the prior 
corporate governance literature. Section 7.2 conducts the Granger causality test and 
discusses the model specification of the current study.  
7.2 Variables 
7.2.1 Dependent variable 
This study employs a linear regression model 8  and uses agency costs as the 
dependent variables. Specifically, the dependent variables used in this study include 
the traditional PA agency costs as well as the PP agency costs that are prevalent in 
emerging economies.  
7.2.2 Explanatory variables 
The variable of interest in this study is EM. Other than EM, this study also employs 
five firm-level explanatory variables to control for corporate governance 
characteristics. The five firm-level explanatory variables are: (i) board size; (ii) 
board independence; (iii) firm size; (iv) leverage; and (v) CEO duality.  
                                                          
8 Ding et al. (2007) find evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between EM and ownership 
in China. From the perspective of agency theory, there is no obvious reasoning to support a non-
linear AC/EM relationship; thus, following Jiraporn et al. (2008), a linear regression model is used 
for the AC/EM relationship. 
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7.2.3 Other control variables 
In addition to the explanatory variables on CG characteristics, to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity and to alleviate the potential bias caused by omitted 
variables, this study includes an industry dummy, stock exchange dummy and year 
dummy in the model. Unobserved heterogeneity is common within observation 
groups. Potential unobserved heterogeneity may arise due to, for example, 
differences in local economic environments or difference in industries.  
For a panel data set, it is suggested to always include a year dummy, since year 
dummies are helpful in capturing the influence of time series trends. The panel data 
set may have the individual fixed-effects eliminated but not the time fixed-effects. 
Year dummies will pick up variations in the outcome that happen over time but are 
not attributed to other explanatory variables. Without the use of year dummies, time 
series regressions or panel regressions can be biased due to the influence of the 
aggregate time series trends, which has nothing to do with the causal relationship 
(Gormley & Matsa, 2013). The use of industry, stock exchange and year dummies 
also contributes to controlling for the aggregate trending in time series.  
7.3 Model specification 
7.3.1 Granger causality test 
To check the direction of the relationship between AC and EM, this study conducted 
a Granger (2001) causality test. The Granger causality test requires the data to be 
stationary; in other words not possessing any unit roots, prior to the causality 
analysis. 
“To obtain a satisfactory econometric model with respect to economical and 
statistical assumptions, it is important to have knowledge about the trend behaviour 
of the economic variables that are modeled” (Vogelvang, 2005, p. 278). If the data 
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sets are trending, then transformation of variables is needed to remove the time 
trend from the data. Standard methods to remove the time trend include taking the 
log form, or taking the first differences of the data. Unit roots refer to a stochastic 
trend in the time series (also known as a random walk with drift). If the data has a 
unit root, it means there is a systematic pattern in the data set. A unit root test can 
be used to determine if the data are trending or stationary. If the result suggests no 
presence of unit roots using levels of data, transformation of the variable to remove 
the time trend is not needed. 
Initially, unit root tests are used to test for stationarity in time series data. The panel 
unit root test generates multiple series instead of single series in a time series unit 
root test (EViews, 2017). This study applies four different panel-based unit root 
tests to check both the common root and individual root. The Levin, Lin, and Chu 
(2002) test is used to test for the common root, while three other tests: Im, Pesaran, 
and Shin (2003); Fisher-type tests using ADF (i.e., augmented Dickey-Fuller); and 
PP  (Phillips-Perron) are used to test for the individual roots (Maddala & Wu, 1999). 
The common unit root test assumes the autoregressive coefficient is identical across 
cross-sections, while the individual unit root test allows the autoregressive 
coefficient to vary across cross-sections. All three individual unit root tests used 
combine the individual unit root test to derive a panel-specific result. 
The null hypothesis of the panel unit root test indicates unit root or non-stationary. 
As shown in Table 7-1, the P-values of all the unit root tests for all the proxies of  
EM and AC (including PA and PP) proxies are lower than 1%, which suggests 
rejection of the null, and thus that the EM and AC proxies are stationary. Therefore, 
the EM and AC variables are qualified to proceed with Granger causality tests.  
 Table 7-1 Unit root test 
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Variables Levin, Lin & 
Chu  
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
PAasset  -382.633 -54.0915  7915.31  9246.23 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
PAsga  -16646.2 -1430.96  7575.92  8901.27 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
PPincome  -19.4481 -19.1468 4913.38 5136.45 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
PPdivpayout -210.426 -80.6175  9193.86  10891.4 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
PPdivsale  -309.811 -106.658 11661.5 13368.2 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
PPdivmar  -1486.19 -120.781 11369.7 13206.9 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
PPdivcf  -181.204 -78.7189 9058.30 10381.8 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
PPdivearn  -511.994 -76.0718  9306.59  11028.6 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
EM1  -547.222 -115.468  4259.45  4931.37 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
EM2  -7975.17 -451.792  10226.7  11716.3 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
EM3  -887.405 -105.461 10880.5 12727.0 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Note: This table presents the results of unit root tests on the basis of levels. The Levin, Lin and Chu 
test is employed to test the common unit root, while the Im, Pesaran, and Shin, Fisher-ADF and 
Fisher-PP test the presence of individual root. P-values are reported in parentheses. Probabilities for 
Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. Rejection of the null indicates no presence of unit root or stationary. 
 
The Granger causality test is used in the current study to examine the causality 
relationship between AC and EM. It is a statistical test used to test the causality 
between two variables based on the variables’ ability of prediction. 
The Granger (2001) causality test is not testing an exact cause and effect 
relationship in the everyday sense. It tests the ability of one variable to predict (or 
Granger-cause) the other.  “A variable y is said to Granger-cause x if x can be 
predicted with greater accuracy by using past values of the y variable rather than 
not using such past values, all other terms remaining unchanged” (Asteriou & Hall, 
2015, p. 336). 
The results of the Granger causality tests are reported in Table 7-2 and Table 7-3. 
Table 7-2 presents the test results on EM1 (discretionary accruals estimated using 
a time-series approach) and dependent variables (i.e., PA and PP agency cost 
proxies). The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test indicates that there is no 
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Granger causality present between EM1 and AC. Rejection of the null would 
suggest the alternative hypothesis is more appropriate. In Table 7-2,with regard to 
EM1 and AC, most of the null hypotheses are rejected in two ways, suggesting that 
in the EM1 and AC relationship, EM1 and AC Granger-cause each other 
simultaneously.  
Table 7-2 Granger causality test of EM1 and agency costs 
PA  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
 
 EM1 does not Granger Cause PAasset 14229 5.51260*** 0.0040 
 PAasset does not Granger Cause EM1  15.7840*** 1.E-07 
 
 PAsga does not Granger Cause EM1 13924 19.9465*** 2.E-09 
 EM1 does not Granger Cause PAsga  101.010*** 3.E-44 
PP  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
 
 PPincome does not Granger Cause EM1 7689 3.20179** 0.0407 
 EM1 does not Granger Cause PPincome  0.68522 0.5040 
 
 PPdivpayout does not Granger Cause EM1 14125 6.88349*** 0.0010 
 EM1 does not Granger Cause PPdivpayout  59.4619*** 2.E-26 
 
 PPdivsale does not Granger Cause EM1 14083 14.1349*** 7.E-07 
 EM1 does not Granger Cause PPdivsale  51.4926*** 5.E-23 
 
 PPdivmar does not Granger Cause EM1 13458 149.654*** 5.E-65 
 EM1 does not Granger Cause PPdivmar  224.593*** 1.E-96 
 
 PPdivcf does not Granger Cause EM1 14125 1.54747 0.2128 
 EM1 does not Granger Cause PPdivcf  4.02075** 0.0180 
 
 PPdivearn does not Granger Cause EM1 14125 5.19342*** 0.0056 
 EM1 does not Granger Cause PPdivearn  55.4630*** 1.E-24 
Note: This table reports the results of the Granger causality test between EM1 and AC proxies. EM1 
is discretional accruals computed using time series analysis of the modified Jones model. Asterisks 
of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Similar to Table 7-2, Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 also present a two-way rejection for 
most relationships, suggesting the EM proxies (i.e., EM2, EM3) and AC tend to 
Granger-cause each other simultaneously, which may incur the issue of endogeneity. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, simultaneity is one of the main sources of endogeneity. 
This study applies the Dubin-Wu-Hausman test to test for the presence of 
endogeneity in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. 
Jiraporn et al. (2008) test how AC and EM relate to each other, and they use AC as 
one of the explanatory variables to explain EM. According to the Granger causality 
test, the causality relation occurs in two directions with regard to the AC/EM 
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relationship. This study aims to investigate the role of EM activities in alleviating 
AC, and therefore uses EM as an explanatory variable to explain AC.  
Table 7-3 Granger causality test of EM2 and agency costs 
PA  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
  PAasset does not Granger Cause EM2 21986 67.5630*** 6.E-30 
 EM2 does not Granger Cause PAasset  6.62916*** 0.0013 
  PAsga does not Granger Cause EM2 21491 178.280*** 2.E-77 
 EM2 does not Granger Cause PAsga  30.5562*** 6.E-14 
PP  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
  PPincome does not Granger Cause EM2 11356 9.45526*** 8.E-05 
 EM2 does not Granger Cause PPincome  11.3364*** 1.E-05 
  PPdivpayout does not Granger Cause EM2 16136 1.55944 0.2103 
 EM2 does not Granger Cause PPdivpayout  2.74887** 0.0640 
  PPdivsale does not Granger Cause EM2 21073 12.3548*** 4.E-06 
 EM2 does not Granger Cause PPdivsale  7.59486*** 0.0005 
  PPdivmar does not Granger Cause EM2 20887 6.30897*** 0.0018 
 EM2 does not Granger Cause PPdivmar  75.7026*** 2.E-33 
  PPdivcf does not Granger Cause EM2 11539 4.26556** 0.0141 
 EM2 does not Granger Cause PPdivcf  1.34110 0.2616 
  PPdivearn does not Granger Cause EM2 15941 4.39326** 0.0124 
 EM2 does not Granger Cause PPdivearn  2.93005* 0.0534 
Note: This table reports the results of Granger causality tests between EM2 and AC proxies. EM2 
is the non-operating income ratio. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.  
 
Table 7-4 Granger causality test of EM3 and agency costs 
PA  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
  PAasset does not Granger Cause EM3 14278 41.8349*** 8.E-19 
 EM3 does not Granger Cause PAasset  15.3591*** 2.E-07 
  PAsga does not Granger Cause EM3 14000 13.1521*** 2.E-06 
 EM3 does not Granger Cause PAsga  19.2192*** 5.E-09 
PP  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
  PPincome does not Granger Cause EM3 7747 2.12446 0.1196 
 EM3 does not Granger Cause PPincome  1.33017 0.2645 
  PPdivpayout does not Granger Cause EM3 14169 50.7527*** 1.E-22 
 EM3 does not Granger Cause PPdivpayout  40.0941*** 4.E-18 
  PPdivsale does not Granger Cause EM3 14134 0.03631 0.9643 
 EM3 does not Granger Cause PPdivsale  9.46869*** 8.E-05 
  PPdivmar does not Granger Cause EM3 13506 59.4269*** 2.E-26 
 EM3 does not Granger Cause PPdivmar  10.2556*** 4.E-05 
  PPdivcf does not Granger Cause EM3 14169 7.28246*** 0.0007 
 EM3 does not Granger Cause PPdivcf  15.6153*** 2.E-07 
  PPdivearn does not Granger Cause EM3 14169 38.8335*** 2.E-17 
 EM3 does not Granger Cause PPdivearn  33.9416*** 2.E-15 
Note: This table reports the result of Granger causality tests between EM3 and AC proxies. EM3 is 
discretional accruals computed using time series analysis of the modified Jones model. Asterisks of 
*, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and1% level, respectively.   
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7.4 Summary 
This chapter describes the research framework and model specification for the 
empirical analyses of the thesis. Given the dynamic nature inherent in corporate 
governance studies, the empirical models in this study are established in a dynamic 
modeling framework. The one-year lagged dependent variable is employed as 
explanatory variables in the empirical models. The System GMM method that takes 
into account of all forms of endogeneity is applied to estimate the empirical models. 
Chapter 8 provide the empirical results for the first research question on the 
relationship between EM and PA.  
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8 CHAPTER 8 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND 
PA COSTS 
8.1 Introduction 
Based on the first hypothesis of a relationship between PA and EM as developed in 
Chapter 4, this chapter empirically tests the relationship between PA agency costs 
and EM in China. This chapter uses two different modelling frameworks (static and 
dynamic modelling) to test the relationship.  
Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 provide the empirical analysis results and interpretation. 
Chapter 8 focuses on PA agency costs, which are the traditional emphasis of agency 
theory. In Chapter 9, PP agency costs that are prevalent in emerging economies are 
the focus. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 8.1 presents the 
preparation of the data and preliminary analysis, which includes summary statistics, 
correlation, and the multicollinearity test for the PA/EM model. In Section 8.2, the 
main analysis is conducted. A static model is estimated using fixed-effect OLS and 
GLS after testing for the presence of heteroscedasticity. The Dubin-Wu-Hausman 
(DWH) test is then used to test for the presence of endogeneity. The DWH test 
suggests the presence of endogeneity. Therefore, the two-step system GMM 
dynamic model is used in subsection 8.2. Section 8.3 provides the multivariate 
statistics, and Section 8.4 concludes the chapter. 
8.2 Preliminary data analysis 
8.2.1 Winsorization 
All the variables employed in this study were winsorized to remove the influence 
of the most extreme 5% of data from two tails. The computation of statistical 
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parameters can be heavily influenced by extreme values, and winsorized variables 
tend to provide a robust estimation of statistics. By winsorizing the data, the tail 
values of the dataset are set to be equal to a specified percentile. For example, this 
study applies a 95% winsorization, which means the bottom 2.5% of the values are 
set equal to the value corresponding to the 2.5th percentile, while the top 2.5% of 
the values are set equal to the value corresponding to the 97.5th percentile.  
8.2.2 Summary statistics 
This section reports the summary statistics of the PA/EM relation. Two proxies of 
PA and two proxies of EM are used. Hence there are four equations to test: equation 
(8-1a) to equation (8-2b). 
𝑃𝐴𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  0a + 𝑎1𝐸𝑀1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎4𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … … … …   𝑒quation(8 − 1a) 
 
𝑃𝐴𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  0b + 𝑏1𝐸𝑀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑏4𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏6𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … … … …  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(8 − 1𝑏) 
 
Equation (8-1a) and Equation (8-1b) use the asset utilization ratio as the proxy for 
PA agency costs. As discussed in Chapter 5, the asset utilization ratio is commonly 
used to measure PA agency costs, and an increase in the asset utilization ratio 
indicates a decrease in PA agency conflicts. Equation (8-1a) and Equation (8-1b) 
use EM1 and EM2 as the proxies for EM respectively. As introduced in Chapter 5, 
EM1 denotes the discretionary accruals estimated through the time series approach. 
EM2 denotes the non-operating income to sales ratio, which captures the EM 
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through non-operation related activities. EM3, the discretionary accruals estimated 
cross-sectionally, is used in the robustness check. 
𝑃𝐴𝑠𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  0c + 𝑐1𝐸𝑀1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐2𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐3𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑐4𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐6𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … … … … …  equation(8 − 2a) 
 
𝑃𝐴𝑠𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  0d + 𝑑1𝐸𝑀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑2𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑3𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑑4𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑6𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … … … … … equation(8 − 2b) 
 
Equation (8-2a) and Equation (8-2b) use SGA expenses standardized by total assets 
as the second proxy for PA agency conflict. SGA expenses refer to the selling, 
general, and administrative expenses reported on firms’ income statements.  As 
discussed in Chapter 5, an increase in SGA expenses standardized by total assets 
ratio indicates an increase in PA agency costs. Equation (8-2a) and Equation (8-2b) 
test the relationship between PAsga and two different EM proxies (EM1 and EM2) 
respectively. 
Table 8-1 Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PAasset 27,768 0.6156 0.3891 0.1295 1.5932 
PAsga 27,262 0.1643 0.1230 0.0328 0.5129 
      
EM1 (millions) 18772 -24.30 347.00 -921.00 712.00 
EM2 27608 0.0161 0.0236 0.0002 0.0915 
EM3 (millions) 18821 -24.50 352.00 -930.00 725.00 
board_size 
(person) 
23,816 9.232239 2.050819 3 19 
board_indepedence 23,797 0.3087 0.1234 0.0000 0.4444 
firm_size  27,911 21.4775 1.0901 19.7446 23.8042 
leverage 26,549 0.4665 0.2051 0.1138 0.8363 
CEOduality 17,483 0.2036 0.4027 0 1 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics based on all the variables used in this chapter. 
The number of observations varies because of missing values. For interpretation purposes, 
the logarithmic form of the variables is not used as the basis of descriptive statistics. 
Instead, the descriptive statistics of variables are calculated on the basis of levels after 5% 
winsorization.  
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Table 8-1 reports the summary statistics of the dependent variables and independent 
variables used in the above equations. The levels data set after winsorization with 
5% probability is used to compute the summary statistics.  
The mean of the PAasset ratio suggests, on average, the companies in the sample 
generate about 62% of total assets as annual sales. The mean of PAsga suggests that, 
on average, 16% of total assets are spent on selling, general, and administrative 
expenses in this sample. The average time-series discretionary accruals (EM1) 
indicates the extent of earnings management is -24.30, which is similar to the 
average of cross-sectional time-series discretionary accruals (EM3). The average of 
EM2 suggests that on average, 1.61% of total sales are income from non-operating 
activities. The maximum board size in the sample is 19, indicating the largest board 
contains 19 members, while the minimum of 3 indicates the smallest board in the 
sample contains 3 members. The summary statistics of board independence show 
that in the sample, a maximum 44% of directors are independent, while a minimum 
of zero suggests there are boards that are completely composed of insider directors. 
The mean of leverage suggests, on average, that the firms in the sample carry 
approximately 47% leverage. The mean of the dummy variable CEO duality is 
around 20%, suggesting that 20% of firms in the sample have a CEO who is also 
acting as the chair of the board.  
8.2.3 Correlation 
This study uses natural log values of board independence, leverage, and EM to 
address the skewed data and non-normal distribution of residuals. Table 8-2 
presents the pairwise correlation coefficients between sets of variables. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, the correlation coefficient measures the strength and 
direction of a linear relationship between two variables. 
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The correlation matrix in Table 8-2 shows that the independent variables are not 
highly correlated with each other (mostly lower than 0.5). The underlying problem 
for highly correlated variables in regression is multicollinearity. In subsection 8.1.4, 
the VIFs (variance of inflation factors) are computed to examine whether there is a 
multicollinearity issue in the current model.   
As Table 8-2 shows, with a correlation coefficient of -0.0786, EM1 and EM2 are 
negatively related to each other. This means that when there is a high level of 
discretionary accruals, the non-operating income ratio tends to be low. This 
indicates that the companies in the sample tend to rely more on one means of 
earnings management than the other.  
Board size is positively associated with the PAasset ratio but negatively associated 
with the PAsga ratio, suggesting that PA agency costs are negatively related to 
board size. This indicates that larger board sizes in the sample are associated with 
decreases in PA agency costs. This does not support the agency theory argument 
that a large board size is less efficient, but instead supports the resource dependence 
theory that the bigger the board size, the more resources or external information can 
be introduced and used by the company to make effective and efficient decisions.  
Board independence is negatively associated with the PAasset ratio and 
insignificantly associated with the PAsga ratio. Since an increase in the PAasset 
ratio indicates a decrease in PA agency costs, the negative correlation between 
board independence and PAasset ratio suggests that the more outside board 
members there are on a board, the more severe are the PA agency conflicts.   
Both firm size and leverage show significant correlation and are negatively related 
to PA agency costs. This supports the argument that large firms tend to pay more 
attention to agency conflicts, and have more capacity to deal with conflicts more 
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professionally (Ariff et al., 2007; Beiner et al., 2004; Black et al., 2006). The 
evidence of the impact of leverage on agency costs is mixed in the prior literature. 
On one hand, high levels of debt or leverage are often associated with weak 
corporate governance, and therefore more severe agency problems (Friedman et al., 
2003). On the other hand, when a company is highly distressed, managers are 
motivated to be self-enforcing to generate adequate cash in order to fulfill the 
company’s obligations related to interest payments and loan repayments (Gillan, 
2006). The coefficients on leverage show a significant positive relationship with 
PAasset, and a significant negative relationship with PAsga, thus suggesting more 
distressed companies have a lower level of PA agency conflict, which is in line with 
the second argument. CEO duality negatively associates with PAasset and 
positively associates with PAsga, suggesting the presence of CEO duality in a 
company increases the conflicts between principal and agent.  
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Table 8-2 Correlation Matrix 
 
PAasset PAsga EM1 EM2 board_size board_independence firm_size leverage CEOduality 
PAasset 1 
       
 
PAsga -0.349*** 1 
      
 
EM1 0.0560*** -0.235*** 1 
     
 
EM2 -0.326*** 0.325*** -0.0786*** 1 
    
 
board_size 0.0666*** -0.120*** 0.136*** -0.0886*** 1 
   
 
board_independence -0.0301*** 0.0162 0.0224* 0.0904*** -0.372*** 1 
  
 
firm_size 0.115*** -0.381*** 0.608*** -0.153*** 0.253*** 0.0213* 1 
 
 
leverage 0.163*** -0.268*** 0.298*** -0.122*** 0.143*** -0.0326*** 0.351*** 1  
CEOduality -0.0577*** 0.119*** -0.0817*** 0.0786*** -0.160*** 0.0784*** -0.146*** -0.170*** 1 
 
Note: This table presents pair-wise correlation coefficients for all the variables used in this chapter. The variables are defined in Table 5-3. Asterisks of *, **, ***, 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and1% level, respectively.  
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8.2.4 Multicollinearity test 
As discussed in Chapter 6, variance inflation factors (VIFs) measure how much the 
variance of estimated regression coefficients are inflated compared to the 
coefficient estimator in the absence of multicollinearity. In this section, VIFs are 
computed to detect whether there is a multicollinearity problem in the model.  
Table 8-3 shows the VIFs of all the four models investigating PA agency costs and 
EM relation, and illustrates that the mean VIFs for the variables applied in the 
PA/EM model are all lower than twice the minimum VIF of each column or the cut-
off point of 10 or 5, indicating the absence of multicollinearity. 
Table 8-3 Variance inflation factors for multicollinearity test 
Variable PAasset  PAsga  
VIF VIF VIF VIF 
EM1 1.61  1.61  
EM2  1.04  1.04 
board_size 1.28 1.26 1.28 1.26 
board_in~e 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 
firm_size 1.77 1.25 1.76 1.25 
leverage 1.18 1.16 1.18 1.16 
CEOduality 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.07 
     
Mean VIF 1.34 1.16 1.34 1.16 
Note: This table reports the variance inflation factors calculated for all the four equations 
that investigate PA/EM relationships in this chapter.  
 
8.3 Multiple regression 
This section presents the multiple regression results of Equations (8-1a), (8-1b), (8-
2a) and (8-2b). In subsection 8.2.1, a heteroscedasticity test is applied to check the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. The result indicates the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, thus in subsection 8.2.2, a fixed-effect OLS (Hausman) test is 
used to choose between a fixed-effect or random-effect approach. In addition, GLS 
approaches are used in the static model to control for heteroscedasticity. Subsection 
8.2.3 tests for the presence of endogeneity; the results of the DWH test suggest the 
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models are subject to endogeneity issues. Therefore in subsection 8.2.4, the 
dynamic two-step system GMM model is applied as an alternative method to take 
all forms of endogeneity into account. 
8.3.1 Heteroscedasticity test 
As discussed in Chapter 6, one important assumption of the OLS requires the 
variance of the error term to be constant. Violation of this assumption indicates a 
heteroscedasticity problem, and the pooled OLS estimation is thus no longer 
optimal. It is therefore important to test whether the models are subject to 
heteroscedasticity problems or not. This study conducts a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity to examine the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
The null hypothesis of the Breusch and Pagan (1979b) and Cook and Weisberg 
(1983) test assumes constant variance or no presence of heteroscedasticity. The chi-
squared statistics calculated and the p-values across the four equations all suggest 
rejection of the null, and indicate that there is a heteroscedasticity issue in the model, 
hence pooled OLS estimation is not recommended.  
This study controls for the heteroscedasticity problem in the static model using 
fixed-effect OLS with a robust standard error that produces heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. A Hausman test is conducted in subsection 8.2.2.1 to 
check whether the fixed-effect OLS suits the model. 
Table 8-4 Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
 EM1 EM2 
 PAasset PAsga PAasset PAsga 
chi2 419.16 1340.81 1778.31 1888.22 
Prob > chi2 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: This table reports the results of the heteroscedasticity test. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity suggests the 
presence of heteroscedasticity; thus the pooled OLS is not optimal. 
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8.3.2 Static model 
In this section, the traditional static model is estimated using the fixed-effect OLS 
and GLS. The remainder of the section proceeds as follows. Subsection 8.2.2.1 
commences with a Hausman test to decide whether a fixed-effect or random effect 
is more suitable for the model. Subsection 8.2.2.2 reports the results and 
interpretation of the fixed-effect OLS and GLS regression.  
8.3.2.1 Fixed-effect or Random-effect OLS 
The Hausman (1978) test is used to choose between fixed-effect and random-effect 
OLS. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test favours the random effect estimation. 
Thus, rejection of the null suggests that a fixed-effect OLS is superior to a random 
effect. Fixed-effect OLS with robust standard errors eliminates unobserved fixed 
effects and controls heteroscedasticity issues in pooled OLS. 
Table 8-5 Hausman specification test 
Test Ho : difference in coefficients not systematic 
 EM1 EM2 
 PAasset PAsga PAasset PAsga 
chi2 309.81 209.22 761.76 519.63 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: This table reports the results of the Hausman test applied to choose between fixed-
effect and random-effect OLS. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests a fixed-effect OLS 
estimation is preferred.  
 
Table 8-5 shows that the p-values of the Hausman test are all lower than the 
minimum 1% significance level, suggesting rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, in the next subsection, a fixed-effect OLS with robust standard error is 
applied to estimate the PA and EM model.  
8.3.2.2 Fixed-effect OLS and GLS 
Table 8-6 reports the results of the fixed-effect OLS estimation. In addition to the 
fixed-effect OLS, GLS is also employed to address the issue of heteroscedasticity. 
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Preliminary tests revealed a heteroscedasticity problem in subsection 8.2.1. White 
(1980) introduces a weighted least squares estimator to address the 
heteroscedasticity problem and finds significant improvement in heteroscedasticity 
using a weighted least squares estimator compared to an OLS estimator. With 
regard to heteroscedasticity, the terms of GLS (generalized least squares) and 
weighted least squares are interchangeable (Gujarati, 2009).  GLS regression is used 
in addition to the fixed-effect OLS to estimate the static model. The results of the 
fixed effect OLS and GLS are reported in Table 8-6 and Table 8-7, respectively. 
Columns (2)-(3) of Table 8-6 report the fixed-effect OLS regression results by 
regressing the PA agency costs proxy, PAasset, on the first proxy for EM (EM1, 
the discretionary accruals estimated using a time series approach) and other control 
variables. Columns (4)-(5) of Table 8-6 report the fixed-effect OLS regression 
results by regressing the second PA agency costs proxy, PAsga, on EM1 and other 
control variables. 
Columns (6)-(7) of Table 8-6 report the fixed-effect OLS regression results by 
regressing the PA agency costs proxy, PAasset, on the second proxy of EM (EM2, 
the non-operating income to sales ratio) and other control variables. Columns (8)-
(9) of Table 8-6 report the fixed-effect OLS regression results by regressing the 
second PA agency costs proxy, PAsga, on EM2 and other control variables. 
176 
 
Table 8-6 Fixed-effect OLS estimation, static model 
VARIABLES EM1 EM2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 PAasset  PAsga  PAasset  PAsga  
  t  t  t  t 
EM1 -0.00260* -1.74 0.00156*** 2.63     
 (0.00150)  (0.000591)      
EM2     -0.0276*** -12.90 0.00891*** 11.63 
     (0.00214)  (0.000767)  
board_size 0.00662 0.34 -0.000277 -0.02 0.0275 0.97 -0.0100 -1.03 
 (0.0194)  (0.0113)  (0.0285)  (0.00972)  
board_independence -0.0198 -0.99 -0.00384 -0.36 -0.0364 -1.54 -0.0124 -1.27 
 (0.0199)  (0.0106)  (0.0237)  (0.00976)  
firm_size -0.0650*** -13.79 -0.0421*** -10.10 -0.0927*** -8.83 -0.0352*** -10.55 
 (0.00471)  (0.00417)  (0.0105)  (0.00334)  
leverage 0.00772 1.09 0.0201*** 4.18 0.0427*** 3.62 0.0175*** 4.42 
 (0.00710)  (0.00480)  (0.0118)  (0.00397)  
CEOduality -0.0119* -1.66 -0.00147 -0.37 0.00182 0.18 -0.00396 -1.14 
 (0.00720)  (0.00400)  (0.0102)  (0.00348)  
Constant 1.975*** 9.33 1.041*** 11.29 2.188*** 8.95 0.935*** 7.35 
 (0.212)  (0.0922)  (0.245)  (0.127)  
Industry dummy no  no  no  no  
Stock exchange dummy no  no  no  no  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  yes  
Observations 12,442  12,321  16,953  16,789  
Number of stock 2,017  2,017  2,531  2,530  
R-squared 0.047  0.080  0.090  0.098  
F statistics 25.73  16.17  27.34  24.07  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Note: This table reports the results of the fixed-effect OLS static model of equations 8-1a, 8-2a, 8-1b, 8-2b in this chapter. Two PA costs proxies PAasset and PAsga) are used to run 
the regression against the EM proxies (i.e., EM1, EM2) and the other controlling CG variables. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 8-7 GLS estimation, static model 
VARIABLES EM1 EM2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 PAasset  PAsga  PAasset  PAsga  
  t  t  t  t 
EM1 -0.0111*** -2.66 0.00386*** 2.97     
 (0.00416)  (0.00130)      
EM2     -0.08640*** -40.24 0.02510*** 33.91 
     (0.00215)  (0.00074)  
board_size 0.119*** 3.50 -0.0419*** -3.91 0.00823 0.43 0.01028 1.55 
 (0.0341)  (0.0107)  (0.01926)  (0.00662)  
board_independence -0.107** -2.31 -0.0330** -2.40 0.00160 0.06 0.00883 0.99 
 (0.0463)  (0.0137)  (0.02593)  (0.00894)  
firm_size 0.0497*** 7.15 -0.0435*** -20.76 -0.00473 -1.23 -0.02655*** -21.67 
 (0.00695)  (0.00210)  (0.00355)  (0.00122)  
leverage 0.145*** 13.92 -0.00283 -0.96 0.11301*** 19.37 -0.03115*** -15.48 
 (0.0104)  (0.00295)  (0.00584)  (0.00201)  
CEOduality -0.0241* -1.91 -0.00214 -0.53 -0.01119 -1.59 0.00892*** 3.67 
 (0.0126)  (0.00401)  (0.00705)  (0.00243)  
Constant -2.726*** -5.88 1.235*** 21.06 -0.01334 -0.12 0.85324*** 22.61 
 (0.464)  (0.0586)  (0.10945)  (0.03774)  
Industry dummy yes  yes  yes  yes  
Stock exchange dummy yes  yes  yes  yes  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  yes  
Observations 12,442  12321  16,953  16,789  
Number of stock 2017  2017  2,531  2,530  
R-squared 0.181  0.053  0.2956  0.2631  
F statistics 105.19  27.64  179.65  153.04  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Note: This table reports the results of the GLS static model of equations 8-1a, 8-2a, 8-1b, 8-2b in this chapter. Two PA costs proxies (PAasset and PAsga) are used to run the regression 
against the EM proxies (EM1, EM2) and the other controlling CG variables. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 8-6 shows that EM has a significant impact on PA agency costs. As shown 
in column (2), EM1 is negatively associated with PAasset, which indicates that a 
higher level of EM1 increases PA agency costs, as a decrease in the PAasset proxy 
relates to an increase in the PA agency costs. More specifically, the coefficient of 
EM1 is significant and negative at the 10% level (β=-0.00260, t=-1.74), suggesting 
that one unit increase in EM1 will, on average, increase PA agency costs by 0.26%, 
holding all other factors fixed. Column (4) shows that EM1 is positively associated 
with PAsga, suggesting that a higher level of EM1 increases PA agency costs, as 
an increase in the PAsga proxy represents an increase in the PA agency costs. Thus, 
the fixed-effect estimators of the first EM proxy, EM1, suggest that engagement in 
EM activities increases agency costs between principal and agent.  
The fixed-effect OLS estimators of the second EM proxy (EM2) present results that 
are consistent with those for EM1. As reported in Column (6) of Table 8-6, EM2 is 
negatively associated with PAasset, which indicates that a higher level of EM2 
increases PA agency costs, as an increase in the PAasset proxy is linked to a 
decrease in PA agency costs. More specifically, the coefficient of EM2 is 
significant and negative at the 1% level (β=-0.0276, t=-12.90), suggesting that one 
unit increase in EM2 measurement will, on average, increase PA agency costs by 
2.76%, holding all other factors fixed. Therefore, using the fixed-effect OLS static 
model, the time-series discretionary accruals (EM1) and non-operating income ratio 
(EM2) are significantly positively related to the level of PA agency costs.  
In addition to fixed-effect OLS estimation, this study also uses GLS to estimate the 
static model. GLS relaxes the assumption of OLS and is often used to control for 
heteroscedasticity.  The results of the GLS estimation are reported in Table 8-7. The 
GLS estimation shows that EM has a significant influence on PA agency costs. 
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Consistent with the fixed-effect OLS estimation, EM1 and EM2 are negatively 
associated with PAasset, and positively associated with PAsga. 
Jiraporn et al. (2008) investigate the relationship between EM and PA agency costs 
in the US, and report a significant negative relationship between EM and agency 
costs, indicating that EM, on average, is not detrimental, and even beneficial. The 
static model results obtained in this study also suggest a significant relationship 
between PA and EM. However, contradicting the findings of Jiraporn et al. (2008) 
in the US, the static model of fixed-effect OLS and GLS estimation suggest that 
EM in China is not beneficial but is exacerbating PA agency conflicts, and 
engagement in EM in China, thus stimulating instead of alleviating PA agency 
conflicts. 
However, it is important to note that the fixed-effect OLS approach assumes strict 
exogenous explanatory variables. In other words, it assumes there is no correlation 
between the explanatory variables and the regression error term. Violating this 
assumption may lead to unreliable causal inferences. Endogeneity issues are highly 
likely to arise in CG issues, including the PA/EM model. As Wintoki et al. (2012) 
emphasize in their paper, endogeneity issues are especially important when 
investigating the effect of governance or board structure on performance, because 
of the dynamic nature inherent in these variables.  
Both the fixed-effect OLS approach and GLS estimation fail to take endogeneity 
sources (such as dynamic nature, omitted variables, measurement error) into 
account when estimating parameters. Therefore the fixed-effect OLS and GLS 
statistics do not appear to provide an optimal and reliable basis for causal inferences 
for the PA/EM relationship. The next section discusses the potential endogeneity 
issues and conducts tests for the presence of endogeneity. 
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8.3.3 Endogeneity and GMM  
Dynamic relationships are an important source of endogeneity in the CG research 
context. In order to capture the impact of past corporate governance characteristics, 
this study uses both a static model and a dynamic model to specify the AC/EM 
nexus, as discussed in Chapter 6 Section 6.9. It is acknowledged that endogeneity 
issues are pervasive in empirical CG studies. Endogeneity means that the 
explanatory variables are correlated with the model error term.  The sources of 
endogeneity are mainly omitted variables, simultaneity and measurement error 
(Roberts & Whited, 2013).  Harris and Raviv (2008) and Raheja (2005) argue that 
there is a dynamic nature inherent in corporate governance circumstances, because 
past CG characteristics tend to be carried forward and have an impact on current 
CG characteristics. More recently, Schultz et al. (2010) and Wintoki et al. (2012) 
reach the same conclusion and suggest that a dynamic model, where lagged 
performance is used as explanatory variable, is the most appropriate model for 
internal corporate governance research. This study therefore applies a dynamic 
model in addition to the static model, and uses a 1-year lagged dependent variable 
as an explanatory variable, as recommended by Wintoki et al. (2012), to control for 
the dynamic nature of the internal CG context.  
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator is used to estimate the 
dynamic model to correct for bias caused by potentially endogenous explanatory 
variables. GMM estimation relaxes the OLS assumptions, such as normally 
distributed error terms. GMM is often more efficient than the other types of 
estimations (e.g., OLS and 2SLS) (Wooldridge, 2001). Specifically, the GMM 
estimator with differenced dependent variable and lagged instruments is efficient in 
correcting unobserved effects and simultaneity bias (Blundell & Bond, 2000).  
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Dynamic GMM estimation is superior to least squares or fixed-effect estimation, 
because dynamic GMM estimation accounts for unobservable heterogeneity, 
influences from past value, and is not dependent on external instruments (Wintoki 
et al., 2012). Wintoki et al. (2012) argue that the assumption of governance 
variables’ current values as completely independent of past values is not realistic, 
and CG issues are most likely of a dynamic nature. Wintoki et al. (2012) also 
provide empirical support showing that corporate governance is dynamically 
related to a firm’s past performance. 
A dynamic GMM model with a first-differenced dependent variable has become 
the leading GMM application in the panel data context (Wooldridge, 2001). The 
GMM estimator uses instrumental variables to constrain endogeneity effects. 
Ineffective instrumental variables can lead to serious bias in the estimation.  In the 
dynamic GMM model, the first-differenced dependent variable is used to remove 
unobserved firm-specific effects, using the lag two and beyond functions as 
instrumental variables (Anderson & Hsiao, 1982; Blundell & Bond, 2000). To take 
endogeneity and the dynamic nature of internal CG into account, this study uses a 
dynamic GMM model to examine how EM affects agency costs. Before proceeding 
with GMM estimations, this study carefully tests for the presence of endogeneity in 
regressors. The Dubin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test is applied for each of the 
equations for the PA/EM relationship, under the null hypothesis that all the 
variables are exogenous. Rejection of the null indicates the presence of endogeneity. 
The results of the DWH test for endogeneity are shown in Table 8-8. 
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Table 8-8 Endogeneity test 
Model Robust score chi2 
   Ho : variables are exogenous 
PAasset-EM1 76.29  
 (p = 0.0000) 
PAasset-EM2 342.844   
 (p = 0.0000) 
PAsag-EM1 131.949 
 (p = 0.0000) 
PAsga-EM2 297.564 
 (p = 0.0000) 
Note: This table reports the results of the endogeneity test. The rejection of the null 
suggests the regressors used are subject to endogeneity issues.  
Table 8-8 presents the DWH test statistics that follow a Chi-squared distribution 
with the degree of freedom of 6. This study treats all the CG variables as 
endogenous, and the industry dummy, stock exchange dummy and year dummy as 
exogenous. One-year lagged differences of the CG variables are used as 
instrumental variables. As shown in Table 8-8, all the p-values suggest rejection of 
the null hypothesis of the DWH test. Therefore, the OLS and GLS estimations of 
the static model could be biased due to the presence of endogeneity, and a dynamic 
system GMM model is more appropriate. The next subsection uses a dynamic two-
step system GMM estimation to estimate the PA/EM relationship and interpret the 
result.  
8.3.4 GMM dynamic model 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
CG variables tend to be persistent and slow-changing over time (Brown, Beekes, & 
Verhoeven, 2011; Flannery & Hankins, 2013). As a result, the dynamic nature of 
CG is one source of endogeneity, which arises from the impact of past values of 
governance variables on current values, but is often ignored in empirical CG 
research (Wintoki et al., 2012). Taking into account the slow-changing features of 
CG variables, this study uses a dynamic two-step system GMM model as the main 
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approach. The two-step system GMM estimator is the preferred solution to deal 
with endogeneity issues arising from a dynamic panel setting (Antoniou et al., 
2008). 
This study treats all the CG variables (EM, board size, board independence, firm 
size, leverage, CEO duality) as endogenous, and the industry dummy, stock 
exchange dummy and year dummy as exogenous. The lagged level and first-
differenced values of the endogenous variables are used as instruments in the two-
step system GMM estimation.  
This study uses two sets of specification tests to check the validity of instruments: 
autocorrelation tests of residuals, and over-identification tests of instruments.  
Autocorrelation (AR) tests of residuals and over-identification tests of instruments 
are important diagnostics in terms of two-step system GMM estimation. Arellano 
and Bond (1991) develop a test for the presence of autocorrelation. If the AR test 
suggests the presence of autocorrelation, then the tested lags are invalid as 
instruments. As shown in Table 8-9, Arellano-Bond AR tests in first difference are 
applied to test the presence of serial correlation in differenced residuals. The 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test uses the first differences of the first lags of residuals, the 
AR(2) test uses the first differences of the second lags of residuals, and the AR(3) 
test uses the first differences of the third lags of residuals. As discussed in Chapter 
6 Section 6.8, system GMM contains both a levels equation and a differenced 
equation. The original residuals of the differenced equation tend to have serial 
correlation by construction. However, serial correlation is not expected in 
differenced residuals. “If a significant AR(2) statistic is encountered, the second 
lags of endogenous variables will not be appropriate instruments for their current 
values” (Baum, 2010, p. 65). The presence of autocorrelation can render some lags 
invalid as instruments. For example, when the p-values of Arellano-Bond AR tests 
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suggest that the AR(1) statistic is significant, while the AR(2) statistic is 
insignificant, the second lags of endogenous variables are considered as valid 
instruments but not the first lags. The optimal length of lags used in this study as 
instruments are chosen based on Arellano-Bond AR tests, which are reported with 
the GMM estimation results.  
The consistency of a system GMM estimator is highly dependent on the validity of 
the instruments set. Instrument variables should not correlate with the error terms, 
as discussed above. Arellano-Bond AR tests are employed to test the serial 
correlation in the first differences of residual error. The other validity issue with 
regard to the instruments used requires testing of whether the model is appropriately 
specified. This study uses an overidentification test, in which the null indicates a 
well-specified model and a valid instrument set. The Sargan test of over-
identification and Hansen test of over-identification are used to test for joint validity 
of the instrumental variables. The results of the GMM estimation, Arellano-Bond 
AR tests, Sargan test of over-identification, and Hansen test of over-identification 
for the PA/EM relationship are reported in Table 8-9 and Table 8-10. 
As shown in Table 8-9 and Table 8-10, the results of the two-step system GMM 
show the coefficients of 1-year lagged PA agency costs are all positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that past values of PA agency costs significantly 
contribute to controlling for unobserved historical factors in the relationship 
between EM and PA agency costs. This empirical evidence strongly supports the 
arguments of Wintoki et al. (2012) that there is a dynamic nature inherent in CG 
circumstances. 
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Table 8-9 PAasset-EM model, two-step system GMM, dynamic model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES PAasset      
  z     P>z  z     P>z 
Lagged PAasset 0.808*** 11.44 0.000 0.811*** 11.66 0.000 
 (0.0706)   (0.0695)   
EM1 0.0129 0.24 0.810    
 (0.0537)      
EM2    0.00776 0.30 0.766 
    (0.0261)   
board_size -0.0573 -0.39 0.693 -0.0859 -0.84 0.401 
 (0.145)   (0.102)   
board_independence 0.524* 1.82 0.068 0.354 1.09 0.278 
 (0.287)   (0.327)   
firm_size 
-0.0191 -0.28 0.777 -
0.000181 
-0.01 0.994 
 (0.0673)   (0.0222)   
leverage 0.0121 0.24 0.813 -0.0242 -0.58 0.560 
 (0.0512)   (0.0416)   
CEOduality 0.00121 0.03 0.979 -0.0112 -0.26 0.797 
 (0.0467)   (0.0436)   
Constant 1.084 1.62 0.106 0.800 1.36 0.175 
 (0.671)   (0.590)   
Industry dummy yes   yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
yes   
yes   
Year dummy yes   yes   
Observations 12,440   15,700   
Number of stock 2,017   2,481   
Number of 
instruments 
33   
31   
Wald chi2 2444.15   1529.44   
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   
       
AR(1)  -7.38   0.000  -8.55   0.000 
AR(2)  0.60   0.551  0.36   0.718 
AR(3)  0.89 0.374  1.53 0.126 
Sargan test (chi2)  8.80   0.117  4.23   0.238 
Hansen test (chi2)  7.65   0.177  3.25   0.355 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PA agency costs 
(PAasset) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxies, and other control variables. Asterisks of *, **, 
***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The Windmeijer-corrected standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are reported for a large sample size, on the basis of 
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The industry dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy 
are treated as exogenous. The other variables are treated as endogenous. Lag2 and beyond of the 
endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
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Table 8-10 PAsga/EM model, two-step system GMM, dynamic model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES PAsga      
  z     P>z  z     P>z 
Lagged PAsga 1.121*** 8.48 0.000 1.054*** 7.47 0.000 
 (0.132)   (0.141)   
EM1 
-
0.000202 
-0.01 0.991    
 (0.0185)      
EM2    -0.00596 -0.50 0.616 
    (0.0119)   
board_size 0.0346 0.66 0.512 -0.0188 -0.48 0.628 
 (0.0528)   (0.0387)   
board_independence -0.0653 -0.58 0.561 -0.110 -1.13 0.259 
 (0.113)   (0.0976)   
firm_size 0.0152 0.76 0.449 0.0120 1.32 0.187 
 (0.0201)   (0.00907)   
leverage -0.0117 -0.68 0.493 -0.0155 -1.54 0.124 
 (0.0171)   (0.0101)   
CEOduality -0.00182 -0.11 0.912 0.00731 0.42 0.673 
 (0.0165)   (0.0173)   
Constant -0.515* -1.95 0.051 -0.373 -1.55 0.121 
 (0.264)   (0.240)   
Industry dummy yes   yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
yes   yes   
Year dummy yes   yes   
       
Observations 12,260   15,450   
Number of stock 2,017   2,480   
Number of 
instruments 
34   35   
Wald chi2 2138.44   1724.53   
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   
       
AR(1)  -6.70   0.000  -6.86   0.000 
AR(2)  1.54   0.123  2.14   0.032 
AR(3)  0.93 0.352  0.30   0.768 
Sargan test (chi2)  7.36   0.195  11.48   0.119 
Hansen test (chi2)  4.62   0.464  6.12   0.526 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PA agency costs 
(PAsga) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxies, and other control variables. Asterisks of *, **, 
***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The Windmeijer-corrected standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are reported for a large sample size, on the basis of 
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The industry dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy 
are treated as exogenous. The other variables are treated as endogenous. Lag2 and beyond of the 
endogenous variables are employed as instruments. 
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A dynamic two-step system GMM estimation is used to take the dynamic nature of 
PA/EM relation into account. The results for the PAasset-EM model are reported 
in Table 8-9. It is noteworthy that when applying a dynamic model and GMM 
estimator to control endogeneity issues, the estimators are different from the static 
models using OLS or GLS estimation.  
Both the fixed-effect OLS and GLS estimations report a negative and significant 
impact of EM on PAasset, suggesting that an increase in EM level results in 
increases in PA agency costs. According to the two-step system GMM result in 
column (2) of Table 8-9, EM1 (time-series discretionary accruals estimated using 
the Jones model) is not significantly associated with PAasset (z=0.24, p=0.810). In 
column (5) of Table 8-9, EM2 also shows an insignificant relationship to PA agency 
costs (z=0.30, p=0.766).   
Table 8-10 shows that in the dynamic two-step system GMM estimation, similar to 
the result using PAasset, both EM proxies show insignificant association with the 
second PA agency costs measure, PAsga. The results of the static estimation and 
dynamic estimation may differ as a result of ignoring the endogeneity issue and the 
dynamic nature inherent in the PA/EM relationship. 
8.4 Multivariate analysis 
Multivariate statistics encompass the simultaneous observation and analysis of 
more than one outcome variable. Multivariate analysis is a generalization of 
analysis to a situation in which there are several dependent variables (Tabachnick, 
Fidell, & Osterlind, 2007). 
The null hypothesis of multivariate tests is that the slope of all coefficients is 
simultaneously zero. The hypothesis being tested is whether there is a joint linear 
effect of the set of predictors on the set of responses.  In other words, multivariate 
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tests tell us whether a set of predictors accounts for a statistically significant portion 
of the variance in the dependent variables. 
In the last section, multiple regressions are estimated for the four equations 
separately. This section conducts multivariate statistics to test the overall impact of 
EM combined with other independent variables in the set of combined dependent 
variables, PA agency costs.  The four tests used are Wilks’ Lambda, Pillai’s Trace, 
Hotelling-Lawley trace, and Roy’s greatest root. 
The F statistics of the multivariate tests are presented in Table 8-11.  Columns (2)-
(4) report the test results for EM1 combined with the other control variables on the 
set of combined dependent variables (PAasset and PAsga). Columns (5)-(7) report 
the test results of EM2 combined with the other control variables on the set of 
combined dependent variables (PAasset and PAsga). The results of all four tests of 
multivariate statistics show that the set of independent variables (EM and 
controlling variables) jointly has a significant influence on the set of dependent 
variables (PA agency costs).  
Table 8-11 Multivariate statistics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Source EM1   EM2    
   F Prob>F    F Prob>F  
W 0.7875*** 260.38 0.0000 0.6882*** 574.49 0.0000 e 
P 0.2144*** 246.48 0.0000 0.3240*** 540.69 0.0000 a 
L 0.2674*** 274.36 0.0000 0.4352*** 608.62 0.0000 a 
R 0.2579*** 529.31 0.0000 0.3897*** 1089.93 0.0000 u 
Residual 12314   16782    
Note: This table reports the results of multivariate statistics, where W = Wilks' lambda; L = Lawley-
Hotelling trace; P = Pillai's trace; R = Roy's largest root; e = exact, a = approximate, u = upper bound 
on F. Multivariate statistics test the joint impact of the set explanatory variables on the group of 
dependent variables. Rejection of the null indicates significance.  
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8.5 Robustness check 
This section conducts a robustness check on the estimations reported in Section 
8.2.4   regarding the PA/EM relationship. The robustness check uses an alternative 
measurement of discretionary accruals. As discussed in Chapter 5, the first EM 
proxy, EM1, is identified as discretionary accruals by a time-series model. This 
section identifies discretionary accruals, EM3, using a cross-sectional model, and 
re-estimates the two-step system GMM model9 to check whether the results remain 
consistent.  
As shown in Table 8-12, the coefficients for 1-year lagged PA agency costs remain 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the past extent of PA agency 
costs significantly contributes to controlling for unobserved historical factors in the 
relationship between EM and PA agency costs. This is consistent with the results 
reported using the other two EM proxies in Section 8.2.  Therefore, it provides 
strong evidence related to the dynamic nature inherent in CG circumstances.   
  
                                                          
9 The fixed-effect OLS and GLS result of PA/EM3 model is available in Appendix 5 and 
Appendix 7. The fixed-effect OLS is chosen based on the Hausman test, which is available in 
Appendix 4. 
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Table 8-12 Robustness check of the relation between PA agency costs and 
EM estimated using cross-sectional analysis: two-step system GMM 
estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABL
ES 
PAasset   PAsga   
  z P>z  z P>z 
Lagged 
PAasset 
0.899*** 17.31 0.000    
 (0.0519)      
Lagged 
PAsga 
   1.086*** 7.76 0.000 
    (0.140)   
EMcross -0.0233 -0.25 0.804 -0.00226 -0.12 0.906 
 (0.0938)   (0.0191)   
board_size 0.0662 0.33 0.741 0.0244 0.48 0.630 
 (0.200)   (0.0506)   
board_inde
pendence 
0.358 0.75 0.451 -0.0755 -0.67 0.502 
 (0.476)   (0.113)   
firm_size -0.0102 -0.15 0.880 0.0143 0.68 0.496 
 (0.0677)   (0.0209)   
leverage 0.0915 1.40 0.160 -0.00827 -0.47 0.640 
 (0.0652)   (0.0177)   
CEOduality -0.122 -0.94 0.345 -0.00299 -0.18 0.854 
 (0.129)   (0.0163)   
Constant 1.014 1.37 0.171 -0.429 -1.57 0.116 
 (0.741)   (0.273)   
Industry 
dummy 
yes   yes   
Stock 
exchange 
dummy 
yes   yes   
Year 
dummy 
yes   yes   
Observatio
ns 
12,459   12,300   
Number of 
stock 
2,018   2,017   
Number of 
instruments 
35   34   
Wald chi2 8856.32   2156.51   
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   
       
AR(1)  -10.15 0.000  -6.29 0.000 
AR(2)  1.15 0.251  1.64 0.101 
AR(3)  0.29 0.771  0.70 0.485 
Sargan test 
(chi2) 
 5.82 0.561  7.46 0.189 
Hansen test 
(chi2) 
 2.35 0.938  4.43 0.489 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PA agency costs 
(i.e., PAasset and PAsga) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxy, and other control variables. 
Discretionary accrual estimated through cross-sectional analysis is used as the EM proxy. Asterisks of *, 
**, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The Windmeijer-corrected 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are reported for a large sample size, on the 
basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The industry dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year 
dummy are treated as exogenous. The other variables are treated as endogenous. Lag2 and beyond of the 
endogenous variables are employed as instruments. 
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8.6 Summary 
To address the first hypothesis developed in Chapter 4, this chapter investigated the 
relationship between EM and PA agency costs in China.  
Firstly, in Section 8.2.2, the fixed-effect OLS and GLS were used to estimate the 
static model employed. The static regression showed that EM1 (discretionary 
accruals estimated using time series approach), and EM2 (the non-operating income 
ratio that measures the level of EM through tunneling), supported the hypothesis of 
a significant positive PA/EM relationship, which is contrary to Jiraporn et al. (2008) 
finding in the US market. In addition, the multivariate statistics showed each of the 
two EM proxies combined with other control variables accounted for a statistically 
significant portion of the variance in PAasset and PAsga. 
Given that CG variables tend to be persistent and slow-changing, a dynamic model 
was employed to capture the influence from the past. Two-step system GMM was 
used to control for potential sources of endogeneity. In the dynamic model approach, 
both EM proxies (i.e., EM1 and EM2) showed insignificant association with 
PAasset and PAsga. Since the static model fails to take endogeneity issue into 
account, and “endogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that 
make reliable inference virtually impossible” (Roberts & Whited, 2013, p. 6), the 
dynamic model was more appropriate. As a robustness test, this study used a third 
proxy for EM; the discretionary accruals estimated using a cross-section approach 
(EM3). EM3 gave the same results as the first two proxies of EM, indicating an 
insignificant relationship to PA agency costs through the dynamic two-step system 
GMM model. 
The insignificant relationship between PA and EM suggested by the dynamic model 
contradicts the static model result and Jiraporn et al. (2008) findings. This indicates 
192 
 
that studies relying on static models, which fail to take account of endogeneity 
issues, can be biased.   
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9 CHAPTER 9 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND 
PP COSTS 
9.1 Introduction 
Based on the second hypothesis of the PP and EM relationship developed in Chapter 
4, this chapter conducts empirical analysis to provide insight into the impact of EM 
on PP agency costs.  
This chapter considers the conflicts between principal and principal as an important 
component of agency costs in China. As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, PP 
agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are 
mainly attributed to concentrated ownership. PP agency costs are prevalent in China 
due to the weak legal protection of minority shareholders, and the concentrated 
ownership structure. Therefore, in addition to the traditional agency costs between 
principal and agent, this study examines PP agency conflict.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 9.1 presents the summary 
statistics, correlations, and the multicollinearity test, for the PP/EM model. In 
Section 9.2, the fixed-effect OLS and GLS are used in the static model. Then, the 
two-step system GMM dynamic model is used to control for endogeneity. Section 
9.3 provides the multivariate statistics, and Section 9.4 concludes the chapter. 
9.2 Preliminary data analysis 
This chapter reports and interprets the empirical results of the PP/EM relationship. 
Six different proxies for PP and two proxies for EM are used in the main test. Hence, 
there are 12 models to test. Equations (9-1a) to (9-6a) use the discretionary accruals 
estimated using a time series approach (EM1) as a proxy for EM, and examine the 
relationships between EM1 and six PP proxies separately.  
194 
 
Among the six PP agency costs proxies, PPincome is the income measurement, 
while the other five PP proxies are dividend measurements. As discussed in Chapter 
5, Section 5.3, for those companies that rarely pay any dividends, dividend 
measurements of PP costs become invalid, whereas income measurement of PP 
agency costs acts as an alternative profit distribution metric to capture the extent of 
PP conflicts. 
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+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … … …  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (9 − 6𝑎) 
 
The second EM proxy (EM2) is the non-operating income to sales ratio, following 
Bertrand et al. (2002). Discretionary accruals are applied in the standard accounting 
literature to capture EM levels, whereas EM2 captures the EM through tunneling 
that is done via non-operating components of profit. Equations (9-1b) to (9-6b) use 
the second EM proxy (EM2), and examine the relationship between EM2 and six 
PP agency costs proxies separately.  
incomePP
𝑖𝑡
=  
0a
+ 𝑎1𝐸𝑀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎4𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑦
+ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … … … … … 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (9 − 1𝑏) 
 
divpayoutPP
𝑖𝑡
=  
0a
+ 𝑎1𝐸𝑀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎4𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑦
+ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … … … … …  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(9 − 2𝑏) 
 
divsalePP
𝑖𝑡
=  
0a
+ 𝑎1𝐸𝑀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎4𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑦
+ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … … … … … 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (9 − 3𝑏) 
 
divmarPP
𝑖𝑡
=  
0a
+ 𝑎1𝐸𝑀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎4𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑦
+ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … … … … … . 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(9 − 4𝑏) 
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divcfPP
𝑖𝑡
=  
0a
+ 𝑎1𝐸𝑀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎4𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑦
+ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … … … … . 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (9 − 5𝑏) 
 
divearnPP
𝑖𝑡
=  
0a
+ 𝑎1𝐸𝑀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎4𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑦
+ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 … … … … … … … … … … . 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (9 − 6𝑏) 
 
9.2.1 Summary statistics 
Table 9-1 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in equations (9-1a) 
to (9-6b). The summary statistics of earnings management proxies (EM1 and EM2) 
and the control variables leverage, board size, board independence, firm size, and 
CEO duality) are same as for the PA/EM model in Chapter 8. Therefore, this chapter 
only interprets the PP proxies that are new to the analysis in this chapter.  
As for the descriptive statistics of the PA/EM model in Chapter 8, the summary 
statistics here present the level data after winsorization with 5% probability. Table 
9-1 shows that the value of the first PP proxy (PPincome) is quite small, which 
makes sense as the net operation income is scaled twice using share numbers and 
total sales to compute the PPincome ratio.  
The other five PP agency costs proxies are all dividend-related. The five dividend 
measures of PP costs have similar means. PPdivpayout has the highest average of 
approximately 1.026, while PPdivmar has the lowest average of approximately 
0.023. Therefore, the means of all the dividend-related PP proxies range between 
1.026 and 0.023, with no significant outliers, and meet expectations. The summary 
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statistics of variables of interest (EM1, EM2, EM3) and controlling variables are 
interpreted in Chapter 8. For conciseness, the interpretation is not repeated here.  
Table 9-1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PPincome 16,540 2.46e-06 6.38e-06 -4.93e-06 .0000246 
PPdivpayout 27,620 1.025994 1.415014 -.2378977 5.591084 
PPdivsale 27,561 .0560431 .0507856 .0031288 .1959753 
PPdivmar 26,733 .0225581 .0219752 .0006924 .0819821 
PPdivcf 27,619 .3193158 .7755575 -1.31536 2.318789 
PPdivearn 27,620 .8628858 1.146423 -.2875807 4.470708 
      
EM1 18,772 -2.43e+07 3.47e+08 -9.21e+08 7.12e+08 
EM2 27,608 0.0161 0.0236 0.0002 0.0915 
EM3 18,821 -2.45e+07 3.52e+08 -9.30e+08 7.25e+08 
board_size (person) 23,816 9.232239 2.050819 3 19 
board_indepedence 23,797 0.3087 0.1234 0.0000 0.4444 
firm_size[ln(total 
assets)] 
27,911 21.4775 1.0901 19.7446 23.8042 
Leverage (%) 26,549 0.4665 0.2051 0.1138 0.8363 
CEOduality 17,483 0.2036 0.4027 0 1 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics based on all the variables used in this chapter. 
The number of observations varies because of missing values. For interpretation purposes, 
the logarithmic form of the variables is not used as the basis of descriptive statistics. 
Instead, the descriptive statistics of variables are calculated on the basis of levels after 5% 
winsorization.  
 
9.2.2 Correlation 
Table 9-2 presents the pair-wise correlation matrix for the key variables used in the 
PP/EM model. In Table 9-2, EM1 (discretionary accruals) shows a significant 
positive association with most of the PP costs proxies (correlation coefficients of 
0.0271, 0.0742, 0.0714, 0.311, 0.0620 for PPincome, PPdivsale, PPdivpayout, 
PPdivmar, and PPdivearn, significant at the 10%, 1%, 1%, 1% and 1% level, 
respectively). This suggests that engagement in EM tends to reduce PP agency costs.  
EM1 and EM2 are negatively associated with each other with a coefficient of -
0.0914, which is significant at the 1% level. Unlike EM1, EM2 shows insignificant 
correlations with most of the PP agency costs proxies. With regard to the control 
variables, board size positively associates with all the PP costs proxies, indicating 
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that large board size tends to reduce PP agency costs. Board independence has a 
negative relationship with PPdivpayout and PPdivearn (correlation coefficients of 
-0.0307, -0.0242 significant at the 5% and 10% level respectively), which suggests 
that more independent boards tend to increase PP costs. Correlation coefficients for 
firm size also show positive relationships with all the PP proxies (correlation 
coefficients of 0.0444, 0.139, 0.112, 0.486, 0.0401, 0.124, all significant at the 1% 
level), indicating that larger firm size tends to mitigate PP agency problems. 
The control variable of leverage shows a significant positive relationship with most 
of the PP cost proxies (coefficients of 0.269, 0.419, and 0.245 on PPdivpayout, 
PPdivmar, and PPdicearn respectively, all significant at the 1% level). This 
indicates that distressed companies pay out more dividends and may have a lower 
level of PP conflicts. Highly distressed companies have a high level of debt and 
require the manager to be more self-enforcing to generate adequate cash in order to 
fulfill the company’s obligations related to interest payments and loan repayments. 
This supports the argument presented by Gillan (2006). 
The correlation coefficients for CEO duality mostly show significant and negative 
signs in relation to PP cost proxies (coefficients of -0.0670, -0.0643, -0.138, -0.0260 
and -0.0570 on PPincome, PPdivpayout, PPdivmar, PPdivcf, and PPdivearn, 
significant at the 1%, 1%, 1%, 10% and 1% levels respectively). This indicates that 
the presence of CEO duality reduces dividend payouts and exacerbates PP agency 
conflicts. 
The potential problem with highly correlated explanatory variables is 
multicollinearity. Correlation coefficients higher than 0.5 indicate that the 
independent variables are highly correlated to each other, thus multicollinearity can 
be problematic in these cases. Table 9-2 shows that the correlation coefficients of 
independent variables in the estimated models in this chapter are mostly lower than 
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0.5, thus it is unlikely that multicollinearity is present. However, this study carefully 
tests for the presence of multicollinearity through VIFs in  subsection 9.1.3.  
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Table 9-2 Correlation Matrix 
 PPincome PPdivpayout PPdivsale PPdivmar PPdivcf PPdivearn EM1 EM2 board_size board_independence firm_size leverage CEOduality 
PPincome 1             
PPdivpayout -0.0466*** 1            
PPdivsale 0.0746*** 0.206*** 1           
PPdivmar -0.0503*** 0.410*** 0.382*** 1          
PPdivcf -0.0111 0.0940*** 0.124*** 0.130*** 1         
PPdivearn -0.0350** 0.912*** 0.208*** 0.382*** 0.0854*** 1        
EM1 0.0271* 0.0742*** 0.0714*** 0.311*** -0.0176 0.0620*** 1       
EM2 -0.0108 0.00898 0.153*** -0.154*** 0.0162 0.00290 -0.0914*** 1      
board_size 0.00834 0.0912*** 0.0423*** 0.176*** 0.0269* 0.0782*** 0.144*** -0.0862*** 1     
board_independence -0.0201 -0.0307** 0.00150 -0.00606 -0.00961 -0.0242* 0.0396*** 0.0859*** -0.351*** 1    
firm_size 0.0444*** 0.139*** 0.112*** 0.486*** 0.0401*** 0.124*** 0.618*** -0.152*** 0.240*** 0.0548*** 1   
leverage -0.00130 0.269*** -0.0499*** 0.419*** -0.0140 0.245*** 0.331*** -0.167*** 0.182*** -0.0496*** 0.416*** 1  
CEOduality -0.0670*** -0.0643*** -0.00778 -0.138*** -0.0260* -0.0570*** -0.0940*** 0.0925*** -0.150*** 0.0893*** -0.153*** -0.196*** 1 
Note: This table presents pair-wise correlation coefficients for all the variables used in this chapter. The variables are defined in Table 5-3. Asterisks of *, **, ***, 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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9.2.3 Multicollinearity test 
Table 9-3 presents the computed VIFs to test for multicollinearity. The means of 
VIFs for the variables applied in the PP/EM model are all lower than twice the 
minimum VIF of each column or the cut-off point of 10 or 5, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a concern in the estimated models.  
Table 9-3 Variance inflation factors for multicollinearity test 
Variable VIF      
Equation(1a-
6a) 
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) 
 PPincome PPdivpayout PPdivsale PPdivmar PPdivcf PPdivearn 
firm_size 1.84 1.78 1.78 1.80 1.78 1.78 
board_size 1.25 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 
board_in~e 1.17 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 
EM1 1.64 1.62 1.62 1.63 1.62 1.62 
leverage 1.26 1.18 1.19 1.20 1.18 1.18 
CEOduality 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 
       
Mean VIF 1.37 1.35 1.35 1.36 1.35 1.35 
       
Variable VIF      
Equation(1b-
6b) 
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) 
 PPincome PPdivpayout PPdivsale PPdivmar PPdivcf PPdivearn 
firm_size 1.31  1.25 1.25 1.26 1.25 1.25 
board_size 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 
board_in~e 1.28 1.18 1.18 1.17 1.18 1.18 
EM2 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 
leverage 1.24 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.16 1.16 
CEOduality 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.07 
       
Mean VIF 1.19 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 
Note: This table reports the variance inflation factors calculated for all 12 equations that 
investigate the PP/EM relationship in this chapter.  
 
 
9.3 Multiple regression analysis 
9.3.1 Heteroscedasticity test 
Before proceeding with regression, checks on heteroscedasticity, which violates the 
OLS assumption, are important. In the presence of heteroscedasticity, OLS 
estimation is no longer efficient.  
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As in Chapter 8, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test is applied to test for the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of the Breusch and Pagan 
(1979b) and Cook and Weisberg (1983) test for heteroscedasticity assumes constant 
variance and no presence of heteroscedasticity. As shown in Table 9-4, the chi-
squared statistics calculated and the p-values across the equations suggest rejection 
of the null, indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity in the model, hence the 
pooled OLS estimation is no longer optimal. The fixed-effect OLS with 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors is thus employed. A fixed-effect OLS 
with robust standard errors eliminates unobserved fixed-effects and controls for 
heteroscedasticity issues in a pooled OLS.  
Table 9-4 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
EM1 
Equation (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) 
 PPincome  PPdivpayout PPdivsale PPdivmar PPdivcf PPdivearn 
chi2    787.20 1597.13 1089.70 2304.55 10.93 1329.13 
Prob > 
chi2   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 
EM2 
Equation (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) 
 PPincome  PPdivpayout PPdivsale PPdivmar PPdivcf PPdivearn 
chi2        974.55 2576.34 1417.21 3330.06 3.55 2243.02 
Prob > 
chi2   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0594 0.0000 
Note: This table reports the results of the heteroscedasticity test. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity suggests the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, and pooled OLS is not optimal. 
 
9.3.2 Static model 
This study conducts a Hausman (1978) specification test to choose between the use 
of a fixed-effect OLS or random-effect OLS. As shown in Table 9-5, p-values 
across all the models reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman test, thus suggesting 
the fixed effect OLS is preferred over the random effect OLS. Therefore, a fixed-
effect OLS estimation is employed and the results are reported in subsection 9.2.2.1. 
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Table 9-5 Hausman specification test 
Test Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
EM1 
Equation (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) 
 PPincome PPdivpayout PPdivsale PPdivmar PPdivcf PPdivearn 
chi2 150.77 36.72 196.30 81.99 38.25 14.66 
Prob > 
chi2 
0.0000 0.0127 0.0000 0.0000 0.0083 0.0119 
EM2 
Equation (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) 
 PPincome PPdivpayout PPdivsale PPdivmar PPdivcf PPdivearn 
chi2  259.21 140.95 320.81 75.92 37.02 132.43 
Prob > 
chi2 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0116 0.0000 
Note: This table reports the results of the Hausman test applied to choose between fixed-
effect and random-effect OLS. Rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test 
suggests a fixed-effect OLS estimation is preferred.  
 
9.3.2.1 Fixed-effect OLS and GLS 
Tables 9-6, 9-7, 9-8, 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12, and 9-13 report the static model results 
for the PP/EM relationship. This study applies two different approaches (Fixed-
effect OLS and GLS) to estimate the static model. Tables 9-6 and 9-7 present the 
OLS estimators of EM1 against six different PP proxies. As Table 9-6 and Table 9-
7 indicate, apart from the income measurement of PP conflict (PPincome), the 
dividend measurements of PP conflict all show significant negative associations 
between EM level and PP proxies. An increase in the dividend measurement is 
considered a sign of decreasing PP agency conflicts, as the increase in dividend 
measurement in PP conflict indicates that the company is paying more dividends to 
shareholders, and less money remains inside, under the majority shareholder’s 
control. Therefore, a negative association between EM and the dividend measure 
of PP conflicts suggest that the EM activities exacerbate PP conflict. 
Tables 9-6 and 9-7 show that EM1 is significantly and negatively related to four 
dividend measurements of PP cost proxy (PPdivpayout, PPdivmar, PPdivcf, and 
PPdivearn). Since the reduction in dividend measurement indicates more severe PP 
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agency conflicts, the fixed-effect OLS estimation suggests that an increase in EM1 
tends to increase PP conflicts. 
Tables 9-8 and 9-9 use the second measurement of EM (EM2) and report the 
regression estimators of EM2 against PP proxies using the fixed-effect OLS. Of the 
six PP conflict proxies, PPdivmar and PPdivcf show insignificant PP/EM 
relationships. The other four PP proxies (i.e., PPincome, PPdivpayout, PPdivsale, 
PPdivearn) all show significant and positive relationships between EM2 and PP 
conflict proxies. Therefore, in general, the fixed-effect OLS estimation suggests 
that an increase in EM2 reduces PP conflicts, which contradicts the estimation using 
EM1.  
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Table 9-6 Fixed-effect OLS estimation, static model, EM1 
VARIABLES (1a)  (2a)  (3a)  
 PPincome  PPdivpayout  PPdivsale  
  t  t  t 
EM1 4.68e-08 0.94 -0.0432*** -4.14 0.00673 1.20 
 (4.98e-08)  (0.0104)  (0.00559)  
board_size -1.45e-06* -1.80 0.0167 0.10 0.132* 1.81 
 (8.02e-07)  (0.164)  (0.0725)  
board_independence 1.65e-06 0.72 0.104 0.68 0.251*** 3.38 
 (2.29e-06)  (0.153)  (0.0743)  
firm_size -4.65e-07 -1.57 0.243*** 5.71 0.342*** 19.39 
 (2.96e-07)  (0.0426)  (0.0176)  
leverage -6.89e-06*** -7.32 0.413*** 7.45 0.176*** 6.61 
 (9.41e-07)  (0.0554)  (0.0267)  
CEOduality 3.24e-07 0.98 0.0179 0.30 -0.0293 -1.09 
 (3.32e-07)  (0.0599)  (0.0269)  
Constant 1.63e-05** 2.49 -2.449*** -2.63 -9.804*** -12.45 
 (6.52e-06)  (0.931)  (0.788)  
       
Industry dummy no  no  no  
Stock exchange dummy no  no  no  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  
       
Observations 8,670  12,412  12,389  
Number of stock 1,697  2,017  2,017  
R-squared 0.038  0.031  0.078  
F statistics 4728.13  16.45  43.80  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.000  
Note: This table reports the results of a fixed-effect OLS static model of equations 9-1a, 9-2a, 9-3a. Three PP costs proxies (PPinocme, PPdivpayout, PPdivsale), are used to run the 
regression against EM1 and the other CG variables. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9-7 Fixed-effect OLS estimation, static model, EM1 (continue) 
VARIABLES (4a)  (5a)  (6a)  
 PPdivmar  PPdivcf  PPdivearn  
  t  t  t 
EM1 -0.0107* -1.85 -0.0159** -2.51 -0.0324*** -3.59 
 (0.00578)  (0.00633)  (0.00902)  
board_size 0.103 1.37 -0.100 -1.22 0.0514 0.44 
 (0.0752)  (0.0822)  (0.117)  
board_independence 0.277*** 3.56 0.0475 0.56 0.0593 0.49 
 (0.0778)  (0.0843)  (0.120)  
firm_size 0.548*** 29.41 0.0660*** 3.31 0.174*** 6.13 
 (0.0186)  (0.0199)  (0.0284)  
leverage 0.522*** 18.84 0.0734** 2.44 0.331*** 7.71 
 (0.0277)  (0.0301)  (0.0429)  
CEOduality -0.0369 -1.31 0.0306 1.00 0.00661 0.15 
 (0.0281)  (0.0305)  (0.0434)  
Constant -13.96*** -17.22 -0.427 -0.48 -1.631 -1.28 
 (0.811)  (0.893)  (1.272)  
       
Industry dummy no  no  no  
Stock exchange dummy no  no  no  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  
       
Observations 12,153  12,412  12,412  
Number of stock 2,012  2,017  2,017  
R-squared 0.343  0.008  0.028  
F statistics 264.43  3.96  14.80  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Note: This table reports the results of a fixed-effect OLS static model of equations 9-4a, 9-5a, 9-6a. Three PP costs proxies (PPdivmar, PPdivcf, PPdivearn), are used to run the 
regression against EM1 and the other CG variables. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9-8 Fixed-effect OLS estimation, static model, EM2 
VARIABLES (1b)  (2b)  (3b)  
 PPincome  PPdivpayout  PPdivsale  
  t  t  t 
EM2 2.28e-07*** 3.59 0.101*** 9.41 0.00234*** 6.93 
 (6.33e-08)  (0.0107)  (0.000337)  
board_size -1.48e-06** -2.01 0.00963 0.07 0.00310 0.68 
 (7.37e-07)  (0.142)  (0.00453)  
board_independence -2.55e-07 -0.35 0.135 1.03 0.00578 1.39 
 (7.19e-07)  (0.132)  (0.00417)  
firm_size -3.55e-07 -1.35 0.265*** 7.53 0.0138*** 9.36 
 (2.63e-07)  (0.0352)  (0.00147)  
leverage -2.15e-06*** -7.57 0.356*** 8.54 0.00654*** 3.85 
 (2.84e-07)  (0.0417)  (0.00170)  
CEOduality 3.62e-07 1.35 0.0123 0.26 -0.00223 -1.40 
 (2.68e-07)  (0.0467)  (0.00160)  
Constant 1.33e-05* 1.75 -2.738** -2.05 -0.195*** -5.56 
 (7.61e-06)  (1.334)  (0.0351)  
       
Industry dummy no  no  no  
Stock exchange dummy no  no  no  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  
       
Observations 11,555  16,890  16,890  
Number of stock 2,109  2,532  2,532  
R-squared 0.032  0.042  0.063  
F statistics 6.78  24.90  24.09  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Note: This table reports the results of a fixed-effect OLS static model of equations 9-1b, 9-2b, 9-3b. Three PP costs proxies (PPincome, PPdivpayout, PPdivsale), are used to run the 
regression against EM2 and the other CG variables. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9-9 Fixed-effect OLS estimation, static model, EM2 (continue) 
VARIABLES (4b)  (5b)  (6b)  
 PPdivmar  PPdivcf  PPdivearn  
  t  t  t 
EM2 0.000153 1.25 0.00498 0.95 0.0772*** 8.99 
 (0.000122)  (0.00524)  (0.00859)  
board_size -8.14e-06 -0.00 -0.0642 -0.89 0.0205 0.18 
 (0.00165)  (0.0725)  (0.117)  
board_independence 0.00354** 2.31 -0.0230 -0.34 0.102 0.95 
 (0.00153)  (0.0672)  (0.108)  
firm_size 0.00833*** 15.18 0.0512*** 2.96 0.193*** 6.54 
 (0.000549)  (0.0173)  (0.0294)  
leverage 0.00926*** 13.60 0.0448* 1.93 0.276*** 7.83 
 (0.000681)  (0.0232)  (0.0353)  
CEOduality -0.000569 -1.04 0.000579 0.02 -0.00726 -0.19 
 (0.000547)  (0.0255)  (0.0388)  
Constant -0.138*** -10.14 -0.935** -2.18 -2.437*** -2.94 
 (0.0137)  (0.428)  (0.828)  
       
Industry dummy no  no  no  
Stock exchange dummy no  no  no  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  
       
Observations 16,306  16,890  16,890  
Number of stock 2,482  2,532  2,532  
R-squared 0.339  0.006  0.038  
F statistics 182.19  4.18  21.81  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Note: This table reports the results of a fixed-effect OLS static model of equations 9-4b, 9-5b, 9-6b. Three PP costs proxies (PPdivmar, PPdivcf, PPdivearn), are used to run the 
regression against EM2 and the other CG variables. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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In addition to the fixed effect OLS, this study also uses GLS estimation in the static 
model and the results of GLS estimation are reported in Tables 9-10, 9-11, 9-12, 
and 9-13.  
Tables 9-10 9-11 report the estimators of EM1 against the six different PP proxies 
using GLS estimation. Consistent with the fixed-effect estimation, EM1 has a 
significant negative relationship with most PP proxies, except the income 
measurement of PP proxy (PPincome). Tables 9-12 and 9-13 report the estimators 
of EM2 on six different PP proxies using GLS estimation. Consistent with the fixed-
effect OLS estimation, EM2 shows significant and positive association with all six 
proxies for PP agency costs. 
The potential explanation for the differences in EM1 and EM2 model are two-fold. 
First, the employment of EM2 (he non-operating income to sales ratio) captures 
earnings tunneling through non-market based, non-operating related party 
transactions (e.g., disposal of fixed assets), while EM1 represents the discretionary 
portion of accruals that identifies management choices. Prior study presents 
evidence of tunnelling behaviour among Chinese listed companies (e.g., Gao & 
Kling, 2008; Jiang, Lee, & Yue, 2010), and the positive association between EM2 
and PP agency costs suggests the beneficial use of non-operating income.  Second, 
it is important to note that the fixed-effect approach assumes strictly exogenous 
explanatory variables. In other words, it assumes there is no correlation between 
explanatory variables and the regression error term. Violating this assumption may 
lead to unreliable causal inference. For the PP/EM model, the endogeneity issue is 
highly likely to arise. As Wintoki et al. (2012) emphasize in their paper, 
endogeneity is especially important when investigating the effect of governance or 
board structure on performance, due to the dynamic nature inherent in CG variables. 
Both fixed-effect OLS and GLS estimation fail to take endogeneity sources 
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(dynamic nature, omitted variables, measurement error) into account, therefore the 
fixed-effect OLS and GLS statistics do not appear to be the best and most reliable 
base from which to make causal inferences for this study. 
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Table 9-10 GLS estimation, static model, EM1 
VARIABLES (1a)  (2a)  (3a)  
 PPincome  PPdivpayout  PPdivsale  
       
EM1 7.504851E-8 1.44 -0.02472** -2.19 -0.00184*** -4.42 
 5.215999E-8  0.0113  0.000417  
board_size 2.548178E-7 0.60 0.36596*** 3.96 0.0148*** 4.37 
 4.275701E-7  0.0926  0.00339  
board_independence 0.00000203*** 3.72 0.52922*** 4.49 0.01882*** 4.15 
 5.447836E-7  0.11799  0.00453  
firm_size 1.046066E-7 1.13 0.0775*** 3.88 0.01087*** 14.75 
 9.226355E-8  0.01998  0.000737  
leverage -0.00000107*** -8.11 0.48376*** 16.88 -0.0126*** -11.61 
 1.323487E-7  0.02866  0.00109  
CEOduality -8.00007E-7*** -5.35 -0.03637 -1.12 0.00158 1.29 
 1.49396E-7  0.03236  0.00122  
Constant -0.00000123 -0.53 -0.67063 -1.34 -0.15787*** -8.18 
 0.00000231  0.50008  0.0193  
Industry dummy yes  yes  yes  
Stock exchange dummy yes  yes  yes  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  
Observations 8,670  12,412  12,389  
Number of stock 1,697  2,017  2,017  
R-squared 0.1365  0.1721  0.1106  
F statistics 54.06  70.76  42.69  
Prob > F <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
Note: This table reports the results of the fixed-effect GLS static model of equations 9-1a, 9-2a, 9-3a. Three PP costs proxies (PPinocme, PPdivpayout, PPdivsale), are used to run the 
regression against EM1 and the other CG variables. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9-11 GLS estimation, static model, EM1 (continued) 
VARIABLES (4a)  (5a)  (6a)  
 PPdivmar  PPdivcf  PPdivearn  
       
EM1 -0.00056*** -4.01 -0.04137*** -5.95 -0.04258*** -4.55 
 0.00014  0.00695  0.00935  
board_size 0.00576*** 5.05 0.04704 0.83 0.2991*** 3.94 
 0.00114  0.0565  0.07596  
board_independence 0.00454*** 2.98 0.02747 0.36 0.30309*** 2.98 
 0.00153  0.07561  0.10166  
firm_size 0.00903*** 36.4 0.09434*** 7.68 0.07152*** 4.33 
 0.000248  0.01229  0.01653  
leverage 0.00805*** 22.02 -0.0605*** -3.34 0.42244*** 17.35 
 0.000365  0.01811  0.02435  
CEOduality -0.00089** -2.15 -0.02485 -1.22 -0.00471 -0.17 
 0.000412  0.02041  0.02744  
Constant -0.16961*** -26.1 -0.93292*** -2.9 -0.41701 -0.96 
 0.0065  0.32205  0.43302  
Industry dummy yes  yes  yes  
Stock exchange dummy yes  yes  yes  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  
Observations 12,153  12,412  12,412  
Number of stock 2,012  2,017  2,017  
R-squared 0.4345  0.0182  0.0917  
F statistics 258.73  7.22  34.88  
Prob > F <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
Note: This table reports the results of a fixed-effect GLS static model of equations 9-4a, 9-5a, 9-6a. Three PP costs proxies (PPdivmar, PPdivcf, PPdivearn), are used to run the 
regression against EM1 and the other CG variables. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9-12 GLS estimation, static model, EM2 
VARIABLES (1b)  (2b)  (3b)  
 PPincome  PPdivpayout  PPdivsale  
       
EM2 1.92E-07*** 4.43 0.07686*** 8.49 0.00769*** 21.14 
 4.33E-08  0.00905  0.000364  
board_size -6.47E-07* -1.74 0.37188*** 4.77 0.00833*** 2.66 
 3.72E-07  0.0779  0.00313  
board_independence 2.97E-07 0.6 0.26625*** 2.59 0.01163*** 2.81 
 4.92E-07  0.10299  0.00414  
firm_size 3.04E-07*** 4.33 0.09458*** 6.44 0.01117*** 18.91 
 7.02E-08  0.01469  0.00059  
leverage -5.72E-07*** -5.27 0.55824*** 24.56 -0.00839*** -9.19 
 1.09E-07  0.02273  0.000913  
CEOduality -9.41E-07*** -7.35 -0.06302 -2.35 -0.00054 -0.51 
 1.28E-07  0.02679  0.00108  
Constant 1.51E-06 0.9 -1.39229*** -3.95 -0.14256*** -10.07 
 1.68E-06  0.35237  0.01416  
Industry dummy yes  yes  yes  
Stock exchange dummy yes  yes  yes  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  
Observations 11,555  16,890  16,890  
Number of stock 2,109  2,532  2,532  
R-squared 0.0650  0.1396  0.1200  
F statistics 30.57  70.07  59.06  
Prob > F <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
Note: This table reports the results of a fixed-effect OLS static model of equations 9-1b, 9-2b, 9-3b. Three PP costs proxies (PPincome, PPdivpayout, PPdivsale), are used to run the 
regression against EM2 and the other CG variables. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9-13 GLS estimation, static model, EM2 (continued) 
VARIABLES (4b)  (5b)  (6b)  
 PPdivmar  PPdivcf  PPdivearn  
       
EM2 0.00701** 2.12 0.01807*** 7.75 0.04155*** 5.58 
 0.0033  0.00233  0.00745  
board_size 0.00126** 1.99 0.05008** 2.3 0.31145*** 4.86 
 0.00064  0.02175  0.06411  
board_independence -0.0019 -0.86 -0.0521 -1.62 0.18781** 2.22 
 0.00225  0.03224  0.08476  
firm_size 0.00762*** 61.78 0.03741*** 5.28 0.05802*** 4.8 
 0.00012  0.00708  0.01209  
leverage 0.02308*** 41.28 0.10629*** 13.04 0.41588*** 22.23 
 0.00056  0.00815  0.01871  
CEOduality -0.002*** -9.24 0.11174*** 12.14 -0.04961** -2.25 
 0.00021  0.00921  0.02205  
Constant -0.1531*** -56.21 -0.7882 -0.66 -0.90252*** -3.11 
 0.00272  1.19746  0.29  
Industry dummy yes  yes  yes  
Stock exchange dummy yes  yes  yes  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  
Observations 16,306  16,890  16,890  
Number of stock 2,482  2,532  2,532  
R-squared 0.4890  0.8458  0.1187  
F statistics 574.26  3439.72  58.37  
Prob > F <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
Note: This table reports the results of a fixed-effect OLS static model of equations 9-4b, 9-5b, 9-6b. Three PP costs proxies (PPdivmar, PPdivcf, PPdivearn), are used to run the 
regression against EM2 and the other CG variables. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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9.3.3 Endogeneity test 
Considering endogeneity and the dynamic nature of CG, in addition to the OLS and 
GLS static model, this study applies the dynamic two-step system GMM model to 
investigate the PP/EM relationship.  
Before proceeding with GMM estimations, this study carefully tests for the 
presence of endogeneity in regressors. The Dubin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for all 
regressors is executed for each model in the PP/EM relationship, under the null 
hypothesis that all the variables are exogenous. Rejection of the null indicates the 
presence of endogeneity. The results of the DWH test of endogeneity are shown in 
Table 9-14. 
Table 9-14 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected at all the conventional levels 
of significance (all p-values are lower than 1%), which suggests that the regressors 
are not exogenous. Therefore the two-step system GMM model is superior to the 
static OLS and GLS models.  
Table 9-14 Endogeneity test 
Model Robust score (chi2) p-value 
EM1 PPincome 71.5138 (p = 0.0000) 
 PPdivpayout 121.197 (p = 0.0000) 
 PPdivsale 62.2997 (p = 0.0000) 
 PPdivmar 243.465 (p = 0.0000) 
 PPdivcf 17.9866 (p = 0.0000) 
 PPdivearn 115.677 (p = 0.0000) 
EM2 PPincome 100.918 (p = 0.0000) 
 PPdivpayout 143.982 (p = 0.0000) 
 PPdivsale 105.456 (p = 0.0000) 
 PPdivmar 275.818 (p = 0.0000) 
 PPdivcf 11.0186 (p = 0.0000) 
 PPdivearn 138.552 (p = 0.0000) 
Note: This table reports the results of the endogeneity test. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis suggests the employed regressors are subject to endogeneity issues.  
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9.3.4 GMM dynamic model 
A dynamic GMM model with the first differenced dependent variable is used to 
take into consideration the unobserved firm-specific effects and endogeneity issues. 
Since CG variables tend to be persistent and slow-changing, there is a dynamic 
nature inherent in CG. Past CG characteristics tend to be carried forward, leading 
to an impact on the current CG characteristics (Harris & Raviv, 2008). Thus, a 
dynamic model, where lagged performance is used as one of the explanatory 
variables, should be appropriate in the context of internal CG research (Schultz et 
al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012).  
The GMM estimator uses instrumental variables to constrain endogeneity effects. 
Lags of the endogenous variables function as instrumental variables. In two-step 
system GMM estimation, the lags of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
However, ineffective instrumental variables can lead to serious bias in the 
estimation, thus it is important to choose the optimal lag length. Serial correlation 
(or autocorrelation) refers to the case where the residuals for one time period are 
correlated with the residuals for a subsequent time period. A valid instrument is 
required to be uncorrelated with the error terms but correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable. If the lags show significant correlation with the error terms or 
residuals, it is a sign of poor instruments; in this case, further lags should be applied.  
Arellano-Bond AR tests in first difference are applied to test the presence of serial 
correlation in differenced residuals. As discussed in Chapter 8, Arellano-Bond 
AR(1), AR(2), and AR(3) tests use the first differences of the first lags of residuals, 
the second lags of residuals, and the third lags of residuals, respectively. The System 
GMM contains both a levels equation and a differenced equation. The null 
hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond AR test assumes no serial correlation. The results 
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of Arellano-Bond tests are reported with the system GMM estimation. As Tables 
9-15 to 9-20 show, the second and third lags of residuals tend to have insignificant 
p-values (i.e., no serial correlation), indicating the second/third lag and beyond are 
valid instruments for the endogenous variables.  
The consistency of the system GMM estimator is very much dependent upon the 
validity of the instruments variables employed. Sargan and Hansen tests are used to 
diagnose whether the instrument sets of the model are exogenous and properly 
specified. The null hypotheses of the Sargan and Hansen tests assume the over-
identification restriction of instruments is valid. Rejection of the null of the Sargan 
and Hansen tests suggests that the instrument set used in the system GMM model 
is valid or exogenous.  
In the GMM dynamic models, most of the coefficients of 1-year lagged PP agency 
costs are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that past PP agency costs 
significantly contribute to controlling for unobserved historical factors in the 
relationship between PP agency costs and EM. This empirical evidence strongly 
supports the arguments of Wintoki et al. (2012) that there is a dynamic nature 
inherent in CG circumstances. For two-step GMM, standard errors are typically 
downward biased (Blundell & Bond, 1998), thus this study employs the Windmeijer 
(2005) finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix.  
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Table 9-15 PPincome-EM model, two-step system GMM, dynamic model 
VARIABLES (1a)   (1b)   
 PPincome   PPincome   
  z P>z  z P>z 
Lagged PPincome 0.873*** 4.95 0.000 0.604** 2.47 0.013 
 (0.176)   (0.245)   
EM1 8.65e-07 0.80 0.426    
 (1.09e-06)      
EM2    -1.48e-06 -1.49 0.137 
    (9.95e-07)   
board_size 5.11e-06 1.35 0.178 -9.73e-06 -0.92 0.360 
 (3.80e-06)   (1.06e-05)   
board_independence -4.09e-07 -0.05 0.960 -5.63e-06 -0.31 0.755 
 (8.18e-06)   (1.80e-05)   
firm_size 
-1.50e-
06* 
-1.81 0.070 8.08e-07 0.23 0.819 
 (8.28e-07)   (3.53e-06)   
leverage -3.61e-07 -0.23 0.815 -2.96e-06 -1.20 0.230 
 (1.55e-06)   (2.47e-06)   
CEOduality -8.83e-07 -0.76 0.450 -6.12e-07 -0.33 0.742 
 (1.17e-06)   (1.86e-06)   
Constant 5.91e-06 0.36 0.717 5.56e-07 0.01 0.994 
 (1.63e-05)   (7.64e-05)   
Industry dummy Yes   Yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
Yes   Yes   
Year dummy Yes   Yes   
Observations 8,261   10,140   
Number of stock 1,641   1,991   
Number of 
instruments 
34   31   
Wald chi2 913.97   52.87   
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   
       
AR(1)  -4.80 0.000  -3.31 0.001 
AR(2)  1.00 0.319  0.77 0.441 
Sargan test (chi)  7.64 0.177  3.83 0.281 
Hansen test(chi)  7.38 0.194  0.28 0.963 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP costs 
(PPincome) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxies, and other control variables. 
Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The 
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are reported 
for a large sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The industry 
dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as exogenous. The other variables 
are treated as endogenous. Lag2 and beyond of the endogenous variables are employed as 
instruments. 
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Table 9-16 PPdivpayout-EM model, two-step system GMM, dynamic model 
VARIABLES (2a)   (2b)   
 PPdivpayout   PPdivpayout   
  z P>z  z P>z 
Lagged PPdivpayout 0.714*** 3.28 0.001 0.885*** 3.79 0.000 
 (0.218)   (0.234)   
EM1 -0.401 -0.96 0.335    
 (0.416)      
EM2    0.216 1.28 0.202 
    (0.169)   
board_size 0.0550 0.05 0.961 0.495 0.52 0.601 
 (1.123)   (0.945)   
board_independence -0.838 -0.46 0.647 -1.530 -0.79 0.432 
 (1.828)   (1.947)   
firm_size 0.359 1.14 0.256 0.219* 1.92 0.055 
 (0.316)   (0.114)   
leverage 0.491 1.22 0.221 0.00654 0.02 0.982 
 (0.401)   (0.285)   
CEOduality 0.202 0.58 0.561 0.197 0.54 0.589 
 (0.347)   (0.366)   
Constant -0.0488 -0.01 0.989 -6.076** -2.17 0.030 
 (3.656)   (2.803)   
Industry dummy yes   yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
yes   yes   
Year dummy yes   yes   
Observations 12,384   15,591   
Number of stock 2,017   2,484   
Number of 
instruments 
35   35   
Wald chi2 734.83   392.29   
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   
       
AR(1)  -4.81 0.000  -5.22 0.000 
AR(2)  3.55 0.000  3.60 0.000 
AR(3)  0.34 0.732  0.86 0.388 
Sargan test (chi2)  6.81 0.449  4.95 0.666 
Hansen test (chi2)  5.71 0.574  4.03 0.777 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP costs 
(PPdivpayout) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxies, and other control variables. 
Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The 
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are reported 
for a large sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The industry 
dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as exogenous. The other variables 
are treated as endogenous. Lag3 and beyond of the endogenous variables are employed as 
instruments. 
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Table 9-17 PPdivsale-EM model, two-step system GMM, dynamic model 
VARIABLES (3a)   (3b)   
 PPdivsale   PPdivsale   
  z P>z  z P>z 
Lagged PPdivsale 0.695*** 4.64 0.000 0.577*** 4.90 0.000 
 (0.150)   (0.118)   
EM1 -0 -0.05 0.962    
 (8.22e-11)      
EM2    -0.00432 -0.77 0.441 
    (0.00561)   
board_size 0.00504 0.23 0.822 -0.00257 -0.09 0.928 
 (0.0224)   (0.0284)   
board_independence -0.0822 -0.52 0.601 -0.139 -1.56 0.118 
 (0.157)   (0.0886)   
firm_size -0.000469 -0.04 0.966 0.00180 0.24 0.808 
 (0.0111)   (0.00742)   
leverage -0.00858 -0.36 0.718 0.00313 0.33 0.741 
 (0.0238)   (0.00945)   
CEOduality -0.00904 -0.67 0.500 -0.0185* -1.70 0.089 
 (0.0134)   (0.0109)   
Constant 0   -0.160 -0.68 0.496 
 (0)   (0.236)   
Industry dummy Yes   yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
Yes   yes   
Year dummy Yes   yes   
Observations 12,434   15,569   
Number of stock 2,020   2,484   
Number of 
instruments 
33   31   
Wald chi2 2245.88   356.23   
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   
       
AR(1)  -5.41 0.000  -5.38 0.000 
AR(2)  0.75 0.454  0.44 0.658 
Sargan test (chi2)  4.81 0.186  2.37 0.499 
Hansen test (chi2)  5.15 0.161  1.35 0.716 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP costs 
(PPdivsale) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxies, and other control variables. 
Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The 
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are reported 
for a large sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The industry 
dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as exogenous. The other variables 
are treated as endogenous. Lag2 and beyond of the endogenous variables are employed as 
instruments. 
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Table 9-18 PPdivmar-EM model, two-step system GMM, dynamic model 
VARIABLES (4a)   (4b)   
 PPdivmar   PPdivmar   
  z P>z  z P>z 
Lagged PPdivmar 0.952*** 8.25 0.000 0.764* 1.85 0.064 
 (0.115)   (0.413)   
EM1 -0.529* -1.74 0.081    
 (0.303)      
EM2    -0.664 -1.26 0.209 
    (0.529)   
board_size -1.162 -1.25 0.211 -0.00807 -0.18 0.857 
 (0.930)   (0.0448)   
board_independence -1.720 -1.10 0.270 0.0982 0.75 0.453 
 (1.559)   (0.131)   
firm_size 0.452* 1.77 0.076 -0.00214 -0.51 0.608 
 (0.255)   (0.00417)   
leverage 0.175 0.59 0.554 0.00955 0.95 0.344 
 (0.296)   (0.0101)   
CEOduality -0.184 -0.66 0.511 0.0184 0.84 0.399 
 (0.279)   (0.0219)   
Constant -1.402 -0.45 0.653 0.213* 1.83 0.067 
 (3.122)   (0.116)   
Industry dummy yes   yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
yes   yes   
Year dummy yes   yes   
Observations 11,820   14,854   
Number of stock 2,006   2,473   
Number of 
instruments 
33   31   
Wald chi2 2225.31   1741.49   
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   
       
AR(1)  -5.16 0.000  -2.41 0.016 
AR(2)  1.11 0.266  0.86 0.390 
Sargan test (chi2)  3.39 0.640  1.46 0.692 
Hansen test (chi2)  1.46 0.918  1.27 0.736 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP costs 
(PPdivmar) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxies, and other control variables. 
Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The 
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are reported 
for a large sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The industry 
dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as exogenous. The other variables 
are treated as endogenous. Lag2 and beyond of the endogenous variables are employed as 
instruments. 
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Table 9-19 PPdivcf-EM model, two-step system GMM, dynamic model 
VARIABLES (5a)   (5b)   
 PPdivcf   PPdivcf   
  z P>z  z P>z 
Lagged PPdivcf 0.198 0.68 0.494 0.536* 1.78 0.076 
 (0.290)   (0.302)   
EM1 -0.194 -1.37 0.170    
 (0.141)      
EM2    0.995 0.20 0.841 
    (4.953)   
board_size 0.251 0.67 0.506 0.633 1.39 0.165 
 (0.377)   (0.456)   
board_independence 0.139 0.24 0.812 2.391 1.03 0.302 
 (0.584)   (2.316)   
firm_size 0.241** 2.08 0.038 0.0331 0.52 0.600 
 (0.116)   (0.0632)   
leverage 0.104 1.12 0.263 -0.0372 -0.17 0.861 
 (0.0924)   (0.213)   
CEOduality 0.0138 0.13 0.893 -0.0193 -0.12 0.901 
 (0.102)   (0.156)   
Constant -1.663 -1.61 0.108 -2.836 -1.57 0.116 
 (1.036)   (1.802)   
Industry dummy yes   yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
yes   yes   
Year dummy yes   yes   
Observations 12,383   15,732   
Number of stock 2,017   2,484   
Number of 
instruments 
35   35   
Wald chi2 173.04   274.35   
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   
       
AR(1)  -2.33 0.020  2.91 0.004 
AR(2)  0.58 0.559  1.49 0.137 
Sargan test (chi2)  6.77 0.453  2.83 0.900 
Hansen test (chi2)  4.30 0.744  3.65 0.819 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP costs 
(PPdivcf) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxies, and other control variables. Asterisks 
of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The Windmeijer-
corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are reported for a large 
sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The industry dummy, stock 
exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as exogenous. The other variables are treated as 
endogenous. Lag2 and beyond of the endogenous variables are employed as instruments. 
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Table 9-20 PPdivearn-EM model, two-step system GMM, dynamic model 
VARIABLES (6a)   (6b)   
 PPdivearn   PPdivearn   
  z P>z  z P>z 
Lagged PPdivearn 0.624** 2.48 0.013 0.754*** 3.14 0.002 
 (0.252)   (0.240)   
EM1 -0.407 -1.28 0.201    
 (0.319)      
EM2    0.0714 0.56 0.576 
    (0.128)   
board_size -0.286 -0.33 0.740 0.494 0.68 0.498 
 (0.861)   (0.728)   
board_independence -0.0753 -0.06 0.956 -0.161 -0.11 0.909 
 (1.356)   (1.407)   
firm_size 0.382 1.54 0.123 0.136 1.58 0.115 
 (0.248)   (0.0863)   
leverage 0.414 1.31 0.189 0.0251 0.11 0.913 
 (0.315)   (0.228)   
CEOduality 0.0290 0.11 0.916 0.0315 0.11 0.913 
 (0.276)   (0.289)   
Constant 0.987 0.35 0.726 -3.898 -1.41 0.158 
 (2.810)   (2.763)   
Industry dummy yes   yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
yes   yes   
Year dummy yes   yes   
Observations 12,384   15,591   
Number of stock 2,017   2,484   
Number of 
instruments 
35   35   
Wald chi2 537.16   484.57   
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   
       
AR(1)  -3.94 0.000  -4.60 0.000 
AR(2)  2.46 0.014  2.76 0.006 
AR(3)  0.69 0.491  1.18 0.237 
Sargan test (chi2)  9.97 0.191  8.38 0.137 
Hansen test (chi2)  7.66 0.364  5.36 0.374 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP costs 
(PPdivearn) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxies, and other control variables. 
Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The 
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are reported 
for a large sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The industry 
dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as exogenous. The other variables 
are treated as endogenous.Lag3 and beyond of the endogenous variables are employed as 
instruments. 
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The dynamic GMM model presents different estimators compared to the static 
fixed-effect OLS and GLS models. Tables 9-15, 9-16, 9-17, 9-18, 9-19, and 9-20 
report the results of two-step system GMM conducted on six different 
measurements of PP agency costs. Table 9-15 reports the model that uses the 
income measurement of PP agency costs (PPincome) as the dependent variable, and 
uses EM metrics combined with other control variables as explanatory variables. In 
each PP agency costs proxy, two different EM measurements (EM1 and EM2) are 
applied. It is noticeable that both of the EM estimators no longer suggest a 
significant impact on PPincome in the GMM dynamic model. The other five PP 
agency costs models using dividend measurements also present consistent results.  
Tables 9-15 to 9-20 show that all of the significant coefficients on EM estimator 
estimated in the static model have become insignificant in the two-step system 
GMM model. The OLS and GLS static models can lead to biased and inconsistent 
results with the presence of endogenous explanatory variables, but the dynamic 
GMM model is not susceptible to the endogeneity issue. According to the Hausman 
test, the explanatory variables in this study are endogenous; therefore, the GMM 
estimation is more reliable for interpretation purposes and more appropriate to draw 
conclusions from.  
In Table 9-18 where the PPdivmar ratio is used as the dependent variable, EM1 
shows a negative association with the PP cost proxy, and is significant at the 10% 
level  (coefficient of -.529, p-value = 0.081). This suggests the increase in EM1 is 
positively and significantly associated with the severity of PP agency conflicts. 
However, this result is not supported by the other dividend measurement of PP costs, 
and lacks robustness to draw any conclusion.  
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In light of the recent techniques developed to address the endogeneity issues that 
are prevalent in CG studies, the potential biases in the static model cast doubt on 
conclusions drawn without addressing the endogeneity issue. Overall, in 
comparison to the static model, the results of the two-step system GMM model 
suggest that engagement in EM activities in China does not play an important role 
in explaining the agency costs of companies.  
9.4 Multivariate analysis 
This section uses multivariate statistics to test the overall impact of EM combined 
with other independent variables on the dependent variables set of PP agency costs.  
The four tests used are Wilks’ Lambda, Pillai’s Trace, Hotelling-Lawley trace, and 
Roy’s greatest root. 
Table 9-21 Multivariate test 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Source EM1   EM2    
  F Prob>F  F Prob>F  
W 0.6249*** 116.24 0.0000 0.5839*** 177.06 0.0000 a 
P 0.3969*** 99.60 0.0000 0.4511*** 150.94 0.0000 a 
L 0.5657*** 132.47 0.0000 0.6541*** 202.31 0.0000 a 
R 0.4981*** 700.45 0.0000 0.5557*** 1031.90 0.0000 u 
Residual 8437   11141    
 
Note: This table reports the results of multivariate statistics, where W = Wilks' lambda; L 
= Lawley-Hotelling trace; P = Pillai's trace; R = Roy's largest root; e = exact, a = 
approximate, u = upper bound on F. Multivariate statistics test the joint impact of the set of 
explanatory variables on the group of dependent variables. Rejection of the null indicates 
significance.  
The F statistics of the multivariate tests are presented in Table 9-21.  Columns (2)-
(4) report the test results of EM1 combined with the other control variables on the 
set of combined dependent variables. Columns (5)-(7) report the test results of EM2 
combined with the other control variables on the set of combined dependent 
variables. The results of all four multivariate analyses show that the set of 
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independent variables (EM and controlling variables) jointly has a significant 
influence on the set of dependent variables (PP agency costs).  
9.5 Robustness check 
This section conducts a robustness check on the estimations reported in Section 
9.2.4. A robustness check uses an alternative measurement of discretionary accruals. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the first EM proxy, EM1, is discretionary accruals 
estimated using a time-series approach. In this section, discretionary accruals, 
labelled EM3, are identified using a cross-sectional model, and re-estimated using 
the two-step system GMM model10 to check whether the results remain consistent. 
As with EM1, the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated cross-
sectionally (EM3) is computed to measure the degree of EM.  
As reported in Tables 9-22, 9-23, 9-24, 9-25, 9-26, and 9-27, the coefficients of 1-
year lagged PP agency costs are positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that past PP agency costs significantly contribute to controlling for unobserved 
historical factors in the relationship between PP agency costs and EM. This is 
consistent with the results reported in Section 9.2 using the other two EM proxies, 
and provides strong evidence of the dynamic nature inherent in CG circumstances.   
 
 
 
  
                                                          
10 The fixed-effect OLS and GLS result of PP/EM3 model is available in Appendix 6 and 
Appendix 8. The fixed-effect OLS is chosen based on the Hausman test, which is available in 
Appendix 4. 
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Table 9-22 Robustness check of the relationship between PPincome and EM 
estimated using cross-sectional analysis: two-step system GMM estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PPincome   
  z     P>z 
Lagged PPincome 0.790*** 3.96 0.000 
 (0.280)   
EM3 1.61e-06 0.97 0.330 
 (1.65e-06)   
board_size -1.82e-06 -0.32 0.748 
 (9.27e-06)   
board_independence -1.02e-05 -0.61 0.541 
 (2.07e-05)   
firm_size -5.50e-07 0.13 0.895 
 (2.80e-06)   
leverage -1.61e-06 -0.75 0.453 
 (2.39e-06)   
CEOduality 6.10e-07 0.54 0.586 
 (1.41e-06)   
Constant 0   
 (0)   
Industry dummy yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
yes   
Year dummy yes   
Observations 8,315   
Number of stock 1,649   
Number of 
instruments 
30   
Wald chi2(27) 68.62   
Prob > chi2 0.000   
    
AR(1)  -3.01   0.003 
AR(2)  1.33   0.183 
Sargan test (chi2)  0.87   0.352 
Habseb test (chi2)  0.30   0.583 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP 
costs (PPincome) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxy, and other control variables. 
Discretionary accrual estimated through cross-sectional analysis is used as an EM proxy. 
Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are 
reported for a large sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The 
industry dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as exogenous. The 
other variables are treated as endogenous. Lag2 and beyond of the endogenous variables 
are employed as instruments. 
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Table 9-23 Robustness check of the relationship between PPdivpayout and 
EM estimated using cross-sectional analysis: two-step system GMM 
estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PPdivpayout   
  z     P>z 
Lagged 
PPdivpayout 
0.706*** 3.21 0.001 
 (0.220)   
EM3 -0.484 -1.08 0.280 
 (0.448)   
board_size 0.122 0.11 0.913 
 (1.118)   
board_independence -0.728 -0.38 0.703 
 (1.912)   
firm_size 0.423 1.26 0.208 
 (0.336)   
leverage 0.524 1.17 0.242 
 (0.448)   
CEOduality 0.171 0.48 0.631 
 (0.355)   
Constant 0.180 0.04 0.964 
 (4.023)   
Industry dummy Yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
Yes   
Year dummy Yes   
Observations 12,398   
Number of stock 2,018   
Number of 
instruments 
35   
Wald chi2(27) 716.15   
Prob > chi2 0.00   
    
AR(1)  -4.79   0.000 
AR(2)  3.27   0.001 
AR(3)  0.66   0.511 
Sargan test (chi2)  8.79   0.268 
Hansen test (chi2)  7.04   0.425 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP 
costs (PPdivpayout) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxy, and other control 
variables. Discretionary accrual estimated through cross-sectional analysis is used as an 
EM proxy. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. The Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-
statistics are reported for a large sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard 
errors. The industry dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as 
exogenous. The other variables are treated as endogenous. Lag3 and beyond of the 
endogenous variables are employed as instruments.  
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Table 9-24 Robustness check of the relationship between PPdivsale and EM 
estimated using cross-sectional analysis: two-step system GMM estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PPdivsale   
  z     P>z 
Lagged PPdivsale 0.637*** 6.33 0.000 
 (0.101)   
EM3 6.59e-11 0.99 0.323 
 (6.67e-11)   
board_size 0.00320 0.12 0.901 
 (0.0257)   
board_independence -0.397** -2.41 0.016 
 (0.165)   
firm_size -0.00885 -0.75 0.455 
 (0.0119)   
leverage 0.00191 0.06 0.949 
 (0.0298)   
CEOduality -0.0205** -2.11 0.035 
 (0.00971)   
Constant 0.307 1.29 0.197 
 (0.238)   
Industry dummy Yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
Yes   
Year dummy Yes   
Observations 12,455   
Number of stock 2,021   
Number of 
instruments 
33 
  
Wald chi2(27) 395.94   
Prob > chi2 0.000   
    
AR(1)  -6.36   0.000 
AR(2)  0.56   0.576 
Sargan test (chi2)  5.40   0.145 
Hansen test (chi2)  3.85   0.278 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP 
costs (PPdivsale) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxy, and other control variables. 
Discretionary accrual estimated through cross-sectional analysis is used as an EM proxy. 
Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are 
reported for a large sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The 
industry dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as exogenous. The 
other variables are treated as endogenous. Lag2 and beyond of the endogenous variables 
are employed as instruments. 
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Table 9-25 Robustness check of the relationship between PPdivmar and EM 
estimated using cross-sectional analysis: two-step system GMM estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PPdivmar   
  z     P>z 
Lagged PPdivmar 1.424*** 3.16 0.002 
 (0.451)   
EM3 -0.592 -1.35 0.177 
 (0.438)   
board_size -0.980 -0.47 0.636 
 (2.070)   
board_independence -5.171 -1.05 0.292 
 (4.911)   
firm_size 1.077** 2.29 0.022 
 (0.469)   
leverage -0.196 -0.26 0.794 
 (0.750)   
CEOduality -0.292 -0.60 0.546 
 (0.483)   
Constant -16.66* -1.72 0.086 
 (9.700)   
Industry dummy yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
yes 
  
Year dummy yes   
Observations 11,839   
Number of stock 2,010   
Number of 
instruments 
31   
Wald chi2(27) 736.24   
Prob > chi2 0.000   
    
AR(1)  -3.53   0.000 
AR(2)  1.37   0.172 
Sargan test (chi2)  0.73   0.866 
Hansen test (chi2)  0.29   0.962 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP 
costs (PPdivmar) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxy, and other control variables. 
Discretionary accrual estimated through cross-sectional analysis is used as an EM proxy. 
Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are 
reported for a large sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The 
industry dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as exogenous. The 
other variables are treated as endogenous. Lag2 and beyond of the endogenous variables 
are employed as instruments. 
  
231 
 
Table 9-26 Robustness check of the relationship between PPdivcf and EM 
estimated using cross-sectional analysis: two-step system GMM estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PPdivcf   
  z     P>z 
Lagged PPdivcf 0.264 0.68 0.497 
 (0.388)   
EM3 -0.0234 -0.10 0.917 
 (0.225)   
board_size 0.255 0.52 0.602 
 (0.489)   
board_independence -0.685 -0.84 0.399 
 (0.812)   
firm_size 0.0868 0.49 0.625 
 (0.177)   
leverage -0.0888 -0.40 0.692 
 (0.224)   
CEOduality 0.0648 0.42 0.678 
 (0.156)   
Constant -2.621 -1.27 0.204 
 (2.063)   
Industry dummy yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
yes 
  
Year dummy yes   
Observations 12,397   
Number of stock 2,018   
Number of 
instruments 
35   
Wald chi2(27) 166.40   
Prob > chi2 0.000   
    
AR(1)  -1.81   0.070 
AR(2)  0.66   0.507 
Sargan test (chi2)  4.87   0.676 
Hansen test (chi2)  4.75   0.690 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP 
costs (PPdivcf) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxy, and other control variables. 
Discretionary accrual estimated through cross-sectional analysis is used as an EM proxy. 
Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are 
reported for a large sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The 
industry dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as exogenous. The 
other variables are treated as endogenous. Lag2 and beyond of the endogenous variables 
are employed as instruments. 
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Table 9-27 Robustness check of the relationship between PPdivearn and EM 
estimated using cross-sectional analysis: two-step system GMM estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PPdivearn   
  z     P>z 
Lagged PPdivearn 0.491** 2.23 0.026 
 (0.220)   
EM3 -0.107 -0.37 0.709 
 (0.287)   
board_size 0.141 0.17 0.866 
 (0.831)   
board_independence -0.855 -0.59 0.552 
 (1.439)   
firm_size 0.154 0.70 0.484 
 (0.221)   
leverage 0.234 0.69 0.491 
 (0.340)   
CEOduality 0.00519 0.02 0.985 
 (0.279)   
Constant -1.920 -0.72 0.472 
 (2.672)   
Industry dummy yes   
Stock exchange 
dummy 
yes 
  
Year dummy yes   
Observations 12,398   
Number of stock 2,018   
Number of 
instruments 
35   
Wald chi2(27) 501.45   
Prob > chi2 0.000   
    
AR(1)  -4.12   0.000 
AR(2)  2.19   0.028 
AR(3)  0.40   0.688 
Sargan test (chi2)  10.73   0.151 
Hansen test (chi2)  7.98   0.334 
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic two-step system GMM regression of PP 
costs (PPdivearn) on lag 1 of the dependent variable, EM proxy, and other control variables. 
Discretionary accrual estimated through cross-sectional analysis is used as an EM proxy. 
Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The z-statistics are 
reported for a large sample size, on the basis of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The 
industry dummy, stock exchange dummy, and year dummy are treated as exogenous. The 
other variables are treated as endogenous. Lag3 and beyond of the endogenous variables 
are employed as instruments. 
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9.6 Summary 
To address the second research question developed in Chapter 4, this chapter 
examined the relationship between PP agency costs and EM in listed companies of 
mainland China.   
In this chapter, firstly, static models were used to test the PP/EM relation. The fixed-
effect OLS selected by applying the Hausman test, and GLS were used to run 
regressions on a static model. The results of the static model show significant 
coefficients on EM, suggesting that engagement in EM has a significant impact on 
PP agency costs. 
However, the fixed effect OLS and GLS models fail to accommodate potential 
endogeneity issues, and endogeneity does present in this study, according to the 
DWH test conducted in subsection 9.2.3. Therefore, in addition to the static model, 
the dynamic two-step system GMM estimation was used to take the endogeneity 
issue into account, and to avoid spurious regression. Based on agency theory, 
Jiraporn et al. (2008) relate EM with PA agency costs, and find a significant 
negative relationship between EM and PA agency costs using a static model. The 
empirical evidence reported in Chapter 8 demonstrates that failing to take account 
of the endogeneity issue may lead to biased estimations.  
This chapter extended Jiraporn et al. (2008) work by taking PP agency costs into 
consideration. This is because China, as one of the emerging economies, is 
characterized by a weak CG system and weak legal protection of minority 
shareholders. In addition, the ownership of Chinese listed companies is highly 
concentrated, meaning that minority shareholders’ interests can be easily 
expropriated by controlling shareholders. Therefore, in addition to PA agency costs, 
PP agency costs are major concerns in CG in China.  
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The findings of this chapter are consistent with the conclusion of chapter 8 on the 
PA/EM relationship This chapter showed that in the static model, significant results 
are obtained, but after moving to the dynamic model, the significant signs reduce 
to insignificant levels. A robustness test was conducted using an alternative EM 
proxy. In the robustness test, discretionary accruals estimated using cross-sectional 
approachl were used in the dynamic model to run a regression against six different 
PP agency costs proxies. The robustness test results showed consistent results to the 
models using the other two EM proxies. Therefore, this chapter established there 
was an insignificant PP/EM relationship and provided evidence that CG studies that 
fail to take the dynamic nature of CG variables into account can be biased.  
  
  
235 
 
10 CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION 
10.1 Analysis 
In this thesis, the relationship between earnings management and agency costs was 
investigated in both static and dynamic modelling frameworks. This thesis focused 
on two different types of agency costs: principal-agent and principal-principal 
agency costs.  
Using a static model, the fixed-effect OLS and GLS estimators produced mostly 
significant relationships between AC and EM. However, in the dynamic model 
using the two-step system GMM estimator, almost all the significant results 
weakened into insignificance. A summary of the empirical findings using different 
models is presented in Table 10-1. The changes in the results suggest that using a 
static model without addressing endogeneity issues can lead to spurious regressions 
and biased interpretation.  
Table 10-1 A summary of the empirical findings of the thesis 
  Static model Dynamic model 
  Fix-effect 
OLS 
GLS Two-step system GMM 
  EM1 EM2 EM1 EM2 EM1 EM2 EM3 
PA PAasset -* -*** -*** -*** Ø Ø Ø 
 PAsga +*** +*** +*** +*** Ø Ø Ø 
PP PPincome Ø +*** Ø +*** Ø Ø Ø 
 PPdivpayout -*** +*** -** +*** Ø Ø Ø 
 PPdivsale Ø +*** -*** +*** Ø Ø Ø 
 PPdivmar -* Ø -*** +** -* Ø Ø 
 PPdivcf -** Ø -*** +*** Ø Ø Ø 
 PPdivearn -*** +*** -*** +*** Ø Ø Ø 
This table reports the comparisons between static model results and dynamic model results. Symbols 
(+), (-), and (Ø) represent positive, negative, and no significant relationships respectively. Asterisks 
of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
In the dynamic model, the lagged value of the dependent variable was included as 
an explanatory variable, and the results showed that the lagged value was positively 
236 
 
and significantly related to the current value of the dependent variable. This led to 
an important finding that there is a dynamic nature inherent in the CG context, CG 
variables tend to be persistent and slow-changing, and past CG variables have 
significant influence on the current one. 
10.2 Contribution and implication 
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to investigate the 
relationship between EM and two different types of agency costs in China. 
Specifically, this study investigated the relationship between EM, principal-agent 
and principal-principal agency costs. Principal-agent agency costs are the 
traditional focus of agency theory, which originated in the developed market with 
a mostly dispersed ownership structure, a well-regulated financial market, a 
developed legal system and strong shareholder protection. Unlike the developed 
markets, in emerging markets, principal-principal agency costs are prevalent due to 
highly concentrated ownership structures and weak protection of shareholders. In 
China, the conflict between majority shareholders and minority shareholders is an 
important subject to study in terms of CG.  
This study examined whether EM reduces or exacerbates agency costs (AC) in 
China, where companies suffer from agency problems. It used both static and 
dynamic models to test the AC/EM nexus. The results indicated a significant and 
positive relationship between AC and EM, based on the static model, which 
suggested opportunistic EM in China. These results are consistent with the 
suggestions in the literature that EM can be used opportunistically by managers 
(e.g., Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Guidry et al., 1999; Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 
1995). However, there was an insignificant relationship between AC and EM when 
the dynamic model that takes into account endogeneity issues was used. Therefore, 
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the results suggested that engagement in EM has no significant influence on AC in 
China. Furthermore, board size, board independence, firm size, leverage, and CEO 
duality, which are conventionally thought to be important in explaining AC, do not 
appear to have a significant impact. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it extends the 
literature beyond developed markets by providing the first empirical evidence of 
the role of EM in agency conflicts in China, and shows that there is no significant 
relationship between AC and EM. As AC is a fundamental problem in CG 
worldwide, this study is expected to be of interest to regulatory and supervisory 
authorities, investors, and financial analysts. The findings are inconsistent with 
what is implied by Agency theory, suggesting that CG in China is different, and 
conventional western market theory may not fully incorporate the CG dilemma in 
emerging economies. Therefore, in agreement with researchers such as Young et al. 
(2004), this study suggests that creative solutions need to be explored by countries 
with emerging economies, to resolve their particular agency conflicts under their 
own specific institutional contexts. This finding indicates fruitful avenues for future 
research. Second, this study adds new empirical evidence to support the growing 
literature on concerns about endogeneity issues in corporate governance studies. 
Consistent with the prior studies of Wintoki et al. (2012) and Schultz et al. (2010), 
this study has demonstrated that failing to take endogeneity issues into account can 
lead to spurious results. Therefore, caution should be exercised when making policy 
implications based on empirical results that fail to address endogeneity issues. The 
results of this study should be of great interest to academics involved in researching 
CG topics that have inherited dynamic natures and endogeneity issues.  
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10.3 Future research 
Despite the contributions mentioned above, this study is subject to certain 
limitations, many of which may indicate fruitful avenues for future research. First, 
this study investigated the linkage between EM and agency costs, and the results of 
the two-step system GMM dynamic model suggest that EM does not have a 
significant role in mitigating or exacerbating agency conflicts. If EM is not used to 
influence agency conflicts, it would be interesting for future research to undertake 
surveys or interviews to explore the management incentives behind EM and what 
role EM may play in firm performance.  
Second, comparisons between more countries or regions could be interesting. 
Although this study found insignificant linkage between EM and agency costs in 
mainland China, this may not be the case elsewhere. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 
(2003) studied EM across 31 countries and found systematic differences in EM 
across clusters of countries. It would be interesting to expand the current study to 
more countries and see how the linkage differs in response to different CG 
circumstances and institutional contexts. Also, the research area of this study 
focused on mainland China. It is very likely that the Chinese Special Administrative 
Regions, such as Hong Kong and Macao, would give different results, as Special 
Administrative Regions have separate political systems from mainland China and 
operate under a capitalist economy. Investigating the situation in more countries or 
regions in the future will deepen our understanding about EM, agency conflict and 
CG. 
10.4 Summary 
This chapter has concluded the thesis with a summary of the findings, contributions, 
and limitations. The interests of this thesis were three-fold: (a) whether there is a 
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significant relationship between EM and agency costs in companies listed in 
mainland China; (b) whether this relationship persists when the dynamic nature 
inherent in this relationship is taken into consideration; and (c) whether the PA/EM 
and PP/EM relationships differ. 
The main findings of this thesis suggest that when static modeling approaches are 
applied to investigate the relationship between EM, PA, and PP agency costs, the 
results indicated that EM is significantly related to both PA and PP agency costs. 
However, in the dynamic modeling framework, the relationship was insignificant. 
Therefore, according to the dynamic model, the relationship between EM and PA 
and PP agency costs is subject to endogeneity issues. 
This thesis contributes to the CG literature in at least two ways. First, to the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the relationship between EM and 
agency costs in China. Considering the highly concentrated ownership structure and 
the fact that China is the largest emerging economy, this study decomposed agency 
costs into PA and PP costs and examined their relationship to the extent of EM 
separately. Second, this study used advanced model specification and estimation to 
take control of the endogeneity issue that is prevalent in corporate governance study.   
As discussed earlier in this chapter, this study is subject to several limitations. For 
example, one could expand the investigation in this study to different and diverse 
markets and seek to understand the differences. The limitations from which the 
current study suffers provide immense opportunities for future research endeavours. 
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12 APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 Summary of prior studies on earnings management 
Study 
Topic Sample Main findings Major limitations 
Aharony, 
Wang, and 
Yuan (2010) 
Earnings management and 
tunneling during the IPO 
process in China. 
198 newly listed Chinese IPO 
firms on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange during the period 1999 
to 2001. 
In the IPO process, Chinese parent 
companies manage earnings by 
related party transactions (RPTs). 
The validity of findings depends on the proper 
measurement of earnings performance and tunneling. 
The sample period is from 1999 to 2001; the 
extrapolation of the results should be more recent. 
Haw, Qi, 
Wu, and Wu 
(2005) 
Whether listed Chinese 
firms manage earnings to 
meet regulatory 
benchmarks. 
Whether regulators and 
investors consider the 
quality of earnings in their 
respective regulatory and 
investment decisions. 
A-share Chinese firms from 1996-
1998 
In order to meet regulatory 
benchmarks, managers engage in 
earnings management by 
executing transactions involving 
below-the-line items and using 
income-increasing accounting 
accruals. 
Investors are able to differentiate 
the quality of earnings and put less 
value on earnings with a higher 
possibility of management. 
The validity of the findings is limited to the proper 
estimation of pair-matched control samples. 
Lacking investigation on other share types in China. 
The sample period is from 1996 to 1998; the 
extrapolation of the results should be more recent. 
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Chen and 
Yuan (2004) 
Whether earnings 
management decreases the 
effectiveness of regulations 
on capital resource 
allocation. 
Companies with rights issue 
applications made from 1996-
1998. 
In China, companies manage 
earnings to meet the accounting 
threshold (10% return on equity) 
to get permission to issue 
additional shares. 
Firms get rights issue permission 
through extra non-operating 
income. 
The study is limited to within-group comparisons of 
companies that have applied for a rights issue. 
The study only includes non-operating income as an 
indicator of earnings management. 
The study assumes that the important objective of capital 
market regulation is better performance. 
Wang, 
Chen, Lin, 
and Wu 
(2008) 
The frequencies and 
magnitudes of earnings 
management under two 
different thresholds, zero 
earnings, and prior 
earnings. 
In the Chinese market from 1997-
2004. 
The practice of earnings 
management increases both in 
frequency and magnitude before 
2000. 
The frequency and magnitude of 
earnings management are higher 
when avoiding negative earnings 
than when reporting increasing 
earnings. 
The frequency and magnitude of 
earnings management in the 
Chinese market are higher than the 
US market. 
The validity of findings depends on the accuracy of the 
mixed-normal distribution model used in the study. 
The sample period is from 1997 to 2004; the 
extrapolation of the results should be more recent. 
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Chen, 
Wang, and 
Zhao (2007) 
To examine both the 
determinants and 
consequences of 
impairment reversals due to 
its recent developments in 
standard-setting. 
A-share listed companies in non-
financial industries from 2003 to 
2005. 
Managerial opportunism may have 
reduced the reliability of otherwise 
value-relevant reversal 
information. 
The validity of findings depends on the accuracy of the 
return model used in the study. 
Lacking investigation on the other share types in China. 
Ding et al. 
(2007) 
The link between 
ownership concentration 
and earnings management 
practice in 2002. 
273 privately-owned and state-
owned Chinese companies listed 
in 2002. 
Privately-owned listed companies 
tend to maximise accounting 
earnings more. 
State-owned listed companies 
have more entrenchment effects 
than privately-owned listed 
companies. 
Both operating-related accrual 
mechanisms and non-operating 
transactions are being used by 
firms to manage earnings. 
The “non-operating income over sales” measure makes 
no distinction between normal gains and losses and 
abnormal transactions with related parties. 
Jaggi and 
Tsui (2007) 
The relationship between 
insider trading, earnings 
management, and corporate 
governance. 
Hong Kong firms from 1995 to 
1999. 
Hong Kong executives manage 
reported earnings to maximize 
their private benefits from insider 
selling. 
A higher proportion of 
independent directors (INED) on 
The validity of findings depends on the reliability of 
measurement of earnings management and abnormal 
trading used in the study. 
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corporate boards moderates the 
positive association between 
insider selling and earnings 
management. 
Noronha, 
Zeng, and 
Vinten 
(2008) 
Identify the most 
frequently used earnings 
management techniques in 
China and underlying the 
incentives for firms to 
engage in earnings 
management. 
Legal corporate entities in 
Guangdong Province. 
The size and form of ownership of 
companies materially influence 
earnings management incentives 
and techniques in China. 
Public ownership companies have 
stronger incentives to manage 
earnings for management 
compensation. 
Private ownership companies pay 
more attention to tax expense 
savings. 
Reveals several popular 
techniques employed in China. 
The analysis of earnings management is based on the 
institutional characteristics of the market. 
The low response rate to their questionnaires creates a 
non-response bias. 
The sample is limited to Guangdong Province. 
Jaggi, 
Leung, and 
Gul (2009) 
The relationship between 
family control, board 
independence, and earnings 
management in Hong Kong 
firms. 
From 1998-2000, Hong Kong 
firms in Global Vantage database. 
A higher proportion of 
independent non-executive 
directors (INED) contributes to 
constraining earnings 
management. 
The validity of findings depends on the use of proper 
proxies for DAs and accrual quality for earnings quality. 
The validity of findings depends on the proper estimation 
of family control of the firm. 
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The monitoring effectiveness of 
INED is reduced in family-
controlled firms. 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2000; the 
extrapolation of the results should be more recent. 
Kao, Wu, 
and Yang 
(2009) 
Whether government 
regulations (two sets of 
IPO regulations issued 
between January 1, 1996, 
and February 11, 1999) 
contribute to opportunistic 
behaviour (earnings 
management, post-IPO 
performance) by the issuer. 
366 firms that issued A-shares for 
the first time between January 
1996 and February 11, 1999. 
On average, after the issue of IPO, 
Chinese firms report a decreasing 
profit and poor long-run stock 
performance. 
IPO pricing regulation based on 
accounting profit motivates IPO 
firms to overstate their earnings 
during the IPO pricing period. 
The validity of findings depends on proper estimation of 
earnings management. 
The sample period is from 1996 to 1999; the 
extrapolation of the results should be more recent. 
Lin, 
Hutchinson, 
and Percy 
(2009) 
Whether monitoring of 
earnings by audit 
committee benefits Chinese 
firms listing in Hong Kong. 
A non-random sample of the top 
208 firms listed on the HKEX in 
2004 to 2008 
An audit committee is an 
important monitoring mechanism 
as audit committee independence, 
expertise and size are associated 
with reduced levels of abnormal 
accruals. 
The ownership concentration and 
the presence of government 
officials on the audit committee 
are important determinants of the 
negative association between audit 
The sample size restricts the generalizability of the 
results. 
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committee characteristics and 
earnings management. 
No significant associations 
between the audit committee and 
abnormal accruals for Chinese 
firms listed only on the Chinese 
domestic Stock Exchange. 
Li, Niu, 
Zhang, and 
Largay 
(2011) 
Earnings management and 
accrual anomaly. 
A-share firms whose annual data 
is available on CSMAR from 
1998-2002. 
The artificial distribution of firm 
earnings, which has been created 
by delisting regulation, affects the 
market pricing of accruals and 
masks the accrual anomaly. 
The validity of findings depends on the accuracy of the 
“big-bath” proxy. 
Lacking investigation of the other share types in China. 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2002; the 
extrapolation of the results should be more recent. 
Tang and 
Firth (2011) 
The relationship between 
book-tax differences and 
earnings management, tax 
management, and their 
interaction with Chinese-
listed companies. 
All Chinese B-share firms listed 
on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 
1999-2004 (664 firm-year 
observations). 
Firms with strong incentives for 
earnings and tax management 
exhibit high levels of abnormal 
book-tax differences. 
Earnings management explains 
7.4% of abnormal book-tax 
differences, tax management 
explains 27.8% of abnormal book-
tax differences, and their 
interaction explains 3.2% of 
abnormal book-tax differences. 
The validity of findings depends on the accuracy of the 
measurement of book-tax differences in China. 
Lacking investigation of the other share types in China. 
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Appendix 2 Illustration of financial accounting information users 
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government
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customers
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audit institutions
general public
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Appendix 3 Potential earnings management techniques or activities 
1. Changing depreciation methods, (e.g., accelerated to straight-line) 
2. Changing the useful lives used for depreciation  
3. Changing estimates of salvage value used for depreciation purposes 
4. Determining the allowance required for uncollectible accounts or loans receivable. 
5. Determining the allowance required for warranty obligations. 
6. Deciding on the valuation allowance required for deferred tax assets. 
7. Determining the presence of impaired assets and any necessary loss accrual. 
8. Estimating the stage of completion of percentage-of-completion contracts. 
9. Estimating the likelihood of realization of contract claims. 
10. Estimating write-downs required for certain investment. 
11. Estimating the amount of a restructuring accrual. 
12. Judging the need for and the amount of inventory write-downs. 
13. Estimating environmental obligation accruals. 
14. Making or changing pension actuarial assumptions. 
15. Determining the portion of the price of a purchase transaction to be assigned to acquired 
in-process research and development. 
16. Determining or changing the amortization periods for intangibles. 
17. Deciding the extent to which various costs such as landfill development, direct-response 
advertising, and software development should be capitalized. 
18. Deciding on the paper hedge-classification of a financial derivative. 
19. Determining whether an investment permits the exercises of significant influence over 
the investee company. 
20. Deciding whether a decline in the market value of an investment is other than 
temporary. 
21. Deciding the valuation on history cost. 
(Source: Mulford & Comiskey, 2002, p. 65) 
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Appendix 4 Hausman specification test using EM3 
Test Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
EM3 
Equati
on 
        
 PAass
et 
PAsg
a 
PPinco
me  
PPdivpay
out 
PPdivs
ale 
PPdiv
mar 
PPdiv
cf 
PPdivea
rn 
chi2   304.7
6 
185.
75 
155.29 45.71 172.54 56.83 35.84 32.55 
Prob > 
chi2   
0.000
0 
0.00
00 
0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.022
8 
0.0378 
Note: This table reports the Hausman test, which is applied to choose between fixed-effect 
and random-effect OLS estimation. Rejection of the null of the Hausman test suggests 
fixed-effect OLS estimation is preferred.  
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Appendix 5 The relationship between PA agency costs and EM3, fixed-effect 
OLS estimation, static model 
     
VARIABLES PAasset  PAsga  
  t  t 
EM3 -0.00286* -1.91 0.00156*** 3.14 
 (0.00150)  (0.000496)  
wboard_size 0.0110 0.57 0.00291 0.45 
 (0.0193)  (0.00641)  
wlboard_independence -0.0241 -1.22 -0.00513 -0.78 
 (0.0198)  (0.00657)  
wfirm_size -0.0601*** -12.75 -0.0416*** -26.57 
 (0.00471)  (0.00157)  
wlleverage 0.00916 1.28 0.0194*** 8.06 
 (0.00716)  (0.00241)  
ceoduality -0.00965 -1.34 -0.00141 -0.59 
 (0.00719)  (0.00238)  
Constant 1.874*** 8.87 1.011*** 27.12 
 (0.211)  (0.0373)  
     
Industry dummy no  no  
Stock exchange dummy no  no  
Year dummy yes  yes  
Observations 12,461  12,357  
Number of stock 2,018  2,018  
R-squared 0.045  0.079  
F statistics 24.69  46.32  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  
Note: This table reports the results of the fixed-effect OLS static model. Two PA costs 
proxies (i.e., PAasset, PAsga) are used to run the regression against EM3 and the other 
controlling CG variables. EM3 is discretionary accruals estimated using a cross-sectional 
approach. Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix 6 The relationship between PP agency costs and EM3, Fixed-effect OLS estimation, static model 
             
VARIABLES PPincome  PPdivpayout  PPdivsale  PPdivmar  PPdivcf  PPdivearn  
  t  t  t  t  t  t 
EM3 5.63e-08 1.29 -0.0449*** -4.09 0.000424 1.60 -0.0102* -1.75 -0.0141** -2.21 -0.0340*** -3.75 
 (4.37e-08)  (0.0110)  (0.000264)  (0.00581)  (0.00636)  (0.00906)  
board_size -1.41e-06** -2.45 0.0343 0.24 0.00537 1.61 0.126* 1.68 -0.0994 -1.21 0.0884 0.76 
 (5.74e-07)  (0.142)  (0.00333)  (0.0751)  (0.0821)  (0.117)  
board_independence -4.14e-07 -0.72 0.145 0.99 0.0300*** 2.94 0.286*** 3.67 0.0212 0.25 0.0880 0.73 
 (5.78e-07)  (0.146)  (0.0102)  (0.0779)  (0.0844)  (0.120)  
firm_size -4.59e-07*** -2.96 0.255*** 7.38 0.0117*** 14.20 0.559*** 29.80 0.0726*** 3.63 0.178*** 6.23 
 (1.55e-07)  (0.0346)  (0.000826)  (0.0188)  (0.0200)  (0.0285)  
leverage -2.08e-06*** -9.65 0.419*** 7.95 0.0201*** 6.29 0.511*** 18.22 0.0602** 1.97 0.332*** 7.64 
 (2.15e-07)  (0.0527)  (0.00319)  (0.0280)  (0.0305)  (0.0435)  
CEOduality 4.37e-07** 2.13 0.0316 0.60 -0.00238* -1.88 -0.0426 -1.51 0.0283 0.93 0.0148 0.34 
 (2.05e-07)  (0.0527)  (0.00126)  (0.0281)  (0.0305)  (0.0435)  
Constant 2.72e-05*** 4.95 -2.625* -1.70 -0.198*** -5.19 -14.25*** -
17.51 
-0.650 -0.73 -1.716 -1.35 
 (5.50e-06)  (1.548)  (0.0382)  (0.814)  (0.896)  (1.276)  
             
Industry dummy no  no  no  no  no  no  
Stock exchange dummy no  no  no  no  no  no  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Observations 8,644  12,427  12,502  12,173  12,427  12,427  
Number of stock 1,696  2,018  2,021  2,015  2,018  2,018  
R-squared 0.030  0.032  0.053  0.345  0.007  0.029  
F statistics 10.71  17.33  27.86  267.19  3.87  15.58  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note: This table reports the results of the fixed-effect OLS static model. Six PP costs proxies (i.e., PPincome, PPdicpayout, PPdivsale, PPdivmar, PPdivcf, PPdivearn) 
areused to run the regression against EM3 and the other controlling CG variables. EM3 is discretionary accruals estimated using a cross-sectional approach. Asterisks 
of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix 7 The relationship between PA agency costs and EM3, GLS 
estimation using EM3, static model 
     
VARIABLES PAasset  PAsga  
  t  t 
EM3 -0.00989** -2.40 0.00459*** 3.55 
 (0.00413)  (0.00129)  
board_size 0.129*** 3.83 -0.0306*** -2.82 
 (0.0338)  (0.0108)  
board_independence -0.103** -2.26 -0.0324** -2.36 
 (0.0456)  (0.0137)  
firm_size 0.0536*** 7.76 -0.0436*** -20.74 
 (0.00690)  (0.00210)  
leverage 0.139*** 13.46 -0.00159 -0.53 
 (0.0103)  (0.00298)  
CEOduality -0.0254** -2.04 -0.00211 -0.53 
 (0.0125)  (0.00400)  
Constant -2.847*** -6.24 1.185*** 20.34 
 (0.456)  (0.0583)  
     
Industry dummy yes  yes  
Stock exchange dummy yes  yes  
Year dummy yes  yes  
Observations 12,461  12,357  
Number of stock 2,018  2,018  
R-squared 0.182  0.053  
F statistics 106.22  27.59  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  
Note: This table reports the results of the GLS static model. Two PA costs proxies (i.e., 
PAasset, PAsga) are used to run the regression against EM3 and the other controlling CG 
variables. EM3 is discretionary accruals estimated using a cross-sectional approach. 
Asterisks of *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Appendix 8 The relationship between PP agency costs and EM3, GLS estimation using EM3, static model 
             
VARIABLES PPincome  PPdivpayout  PPdivsale  PPdivmar  PPdivcf  PPdivearn  
  t  t  t  t  t  t 
EM3 9.54E-08** 1.84 -0.04754*** -4.17 -0.00143*** -3.46 -0.00047*** -3.35 -0.04171*** -5.92 -0.04591*** -4.84 
 (5.18E-08)  (0.01139)  (0.000414)  (0.000142)  (0.00705)  (0.00948)  
board_size 3.97E-07 0.94 0.29606*** 3.20 0.01224*** 3.64 0.00545*** 4.74 0.07603 1.33 0.31633*** 4.11 
 (4.24E-07)  (0.09243)  (0.00336)  (0.00115)  (0.0572)  (0.0769)  
board_independence 2.11E-06*** 3.19 0.21425* 1.76 0.01999*** 4.50 0.00483*** 3.18 -0.01036 -0.14 0.29215*** 2.88 
 (5.39E-07)  (0.12203)  (0.00444)  (0.00152)  (0.07552)  (0.10153)  
firm_size 9.50E-08 1.04 0.09908*** 4.95 0.00942*** 12.94 0.00895*** 35.93 0.09754*** 7.88 0.08045*** 4.83 
 (9.15E-08)  (0.02001)  (0.000728)  (0.000249)  (0.01238)  (0.01665)  
leverage -1.2E-06*** -9.16 0.54694*** 18.44 -0.01205*** -11.17 0.00817*** 22.14 -0.07188*** -3.92 0.41058*** 16.64 
 (1.32E-07)  (0.02965)  (0.00108)  (0.000369)  (0.01835)  (0.02467)  
CEOduality -7.55E-07*** -5.13 -0.00836 -0.25 0.00107 0.89 -0.00112*** -2.73 -0.02174 -1.06 -0.00109 -0.04 
 (1.47E-07)  (0.03301)  (0.0012)  (0.000411)  (0.02043)  (0.02746)  
Constant -2.3E-06 -1.00 -0.85458* -1.65 -0.13136*** -6.99 -0.16886*** -26.24 -1.1243*** -3.51 -0.64199 -1.49 
 (2.26E-06)  (0.5169)  (0.0188)  (0.00643)  (0.31989)  (0.43005)  
             
Industry dummy yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Stock exchange dummy yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Year dummy yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Observations 8,644  12,427  12,502  12,173  12,427  12,427  
Number of stock 1,696  2,018  2,021  2,015  2,018  2,018  
R-squared 0.1737  0.1057  0.1239  0.4393  0.0378  0.1021  
F statistics 70.76  39.77  47.59  263.68  13.24  38.28  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note: This table reports the results of the GLS static model. Six PP costs proxies (i.e., PPincome, PPdicpayout, PPdivsale, PPdivmar, PPdivcf, PPdivearn) are used to 
run the regression against EM3 and the other controlling CG variables. EM3 is discretionary accruals estimated using a cross-sectional approach. Asterisks of *, **, 
***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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